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THE LEGACY OF DIMITRIE GUSTI FOR THE POST-WAR SOCIOLOGY

Cătălin Zamfir – University of Bucharest

The author evaluates the influence of the scientific personality of Dimitrie Gusti on the Romanian sociology and society, in four main aspects. One direction refers to the constitution of sociology as a science in Romania, with international prestige and a broad national involvement. The second direction refers to the creation of sociology as a science of the nation, with the mission of creating self-knowledge in the Romanian society and to further social modernization. This led to a dominantly descriptive and empirical orientation of sociology, based though on a high level theoretical conception. This orientation contributed to the development of the Romanian sociology in the heavily ideological communist period. The third direction of influence refers to the involvement of sociology in social reform, which persisted after 1945. The forth direction refers to the creation of a strong sociological school, which managed to survive the instauration of the communist regime and to create a school modeled on the antebellum achievements.

The outstanding men of science influence the subsequent scientific and social-cultural evolution in various ways. Some influence through the papers they wrote, their life being quickly forgotten after their death, except for the texts remaining after them. Other influence more through their activity of establishing institutions of culture. The influence of other men of science is a combination of the previous two. I think the latter is the case with Dimitrie Gusti. He contributed to the revival of sociology after the war both by his papers and by the late effects of the institutions, culture and sociologic movement that he established.

I would synthesise the legacy of Dimitrie Gusti in four directions.

The first legacy: the revival of sociology in Romania and its endowment with an outstanding scientific, cultural and social prestige, possibly unique worldwide. It is no matter of coincidence that Dimitrie Gusti was elected President of the Romanian Academy. The Bucharest school of sociology established by Dimitrie Gusti was one of the most articulate national sociologies worldwide, among the top 5 countries in Europe, acknowledged as such as shown by the fact that he was commissioned the responsibility of organising the 1939 World Congress of Sociology. The Bucharest school of sociology became a ***national movement*** in Romania. Sociology came forward from, simply, the academic perimeter and encompassed wide segments of population not just among the Romanian intellectuality. The peasants, particularly, were receptive to the sociological action of promoting the village.

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The second legacy. Dimitrie Gusti started a direction of development for sociology that proved to be widely accepted even today; beyond the general-universal theoretical and methodological frame, sociology is a national science. Dimitrie Gusti defined sociology as "science of the nation". Besides the objective of developing the understanding society in general, the vocation of sociology is mainly to be a science of the collective within which it develops. The mission of sociology is to describe systematically the society and its state, thus supporting the plans for national social development. The descriptive function of sociology is much more difficult than that of other curricula whose object are the individual systems, and not the universal classes, such as geography, for instance. Society is a much more complex reality that changes rapidly. Living in concrete social contexts, the collectives are vitally interested in a detailed description of their states and in identifying the directions of change. The sociology promoted by the Gustian school of sociology, although having a top theoretical component, focused on the empiric survey of the Romanian reality. Such an empirical orientation is not a methodological error, labelled with the infamous title of "empirism", it is rather the answer to a vital requirement of the Romanian society: to know itself. This orientation materialised in the objective of the monographic survey: the object of sociology is the analysis of the "social units", that have to become the actors of the social change. Dimitrie Gusti dreamed of developing a social map of Romania by producing monographs for all the Romanian villages. It is incorrect to discuss, form the positions of the post-war history, the feasibility and justification of such a large project. In general terms, the option was fully justified by the context of the Romanian society of the first half of the 20th century, a predominant agricultural society struggling to achieve a rapid modernization. Dimitrie Gusti suggested that modernization must not be done by the tough way of the rural capitalism and impoverishment of the peasants that could not be absorbed by industrialization and urbanization, but rather by "promoting the village", by its gradual modernization both by assimilating the modern agricultural techniques and by the modernization of the social and cultural life, in parallel with the development of industry and towns. The communist party swept brutally this program of development of the Romanian village by its own resources, replacing it with a forced program of cooperativization complemented by the industrialization and urbanization that were to absorb rapidly the surplus of peasants. It was only natural, within this context, that the program of monographic surveys had no more reason. A very important thing remained, however, from this program: beyond the fact that the idea of monograph entered a cone of shadow, the fundamental idea that the central mission of sociology is the empirical survey of society remained. The mission of the Romanian sociology is to become a national movement towards the understanding of the realities of our society.

The orientation of sociology towards the empirical investigation of reality had a massive, two-fold influence on the reconstruction of the Romanian sociology during the hard communist period. First, this empiric orientation provided the re-emerging sociology the opportunity of largely avoiding to be stifled by the officials of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. From the beginning of its revival, the Romanian sociology of the 60s-70s focused on the survey of the actual processes of industrialization and urbanization, on the process of integration of the peasants – forcefully released from a collectivised agriculture – in industry and in the urban environment, on the different disruptive social processes such delinquency. The Romanian school of that period had different topics of study than most of the communist countries. They were enslaved by topics derived from the communist program: homogenisation of the society, promotion of the socialist conscience, cooperativization of the agriculture, development of the socialist way of life promotion of the atheist conscience. This topics, promoted in the beginning by some ideologists, was rapidly replaced by the topics taken from the inter-war tradition. Second, the theoretical obsession that has dominated sociology in the communist countries – clearing the role of sociology within the Marxist-Leninist ideological frame, its relation with the Marxist philosophy, with the scientific socialism, with its basic concepts – was replaced by the empirical orientation of the research. The focus on the exploration of the Romanian reality enabled the new sociology the avoid the obsession of being engaged in dissecting the theoretical-ideological topics of an abstract communist program.

Taking advantage of the ideological option of the Romanian communism – distancing from the internationalism dominated by the Soviets and the national orientation – the Romanian sociology was granted a privileged status. It was allowed to develop a positive attitude towards the tradition of the pre-war Romanian sociology. The papers of Dimitrie Gusti were published. The "valorisation" (the main formulation during that period) of the contribution of the Bucharest school was accepted and even stimulated. But the "valorisation" of the Romanian sociology became a means towards the universal sociology and an additional distancing from Marxism-Leninism. A new question became valid: if the pre-war Romanian sociology is valuable, why shouldn't the pre-war western sociology, an essential source for the Romanian sociology, and the post-war one, be also valuable? In terms of opening towards the universal sociology, Romania was among the top communist countries: at the beginning at the same level with the Polish one, than maintaining, but loosing field in favour of the Magyar sociology after the Romanian sociology was marginalized in 1977. Although under very difficult conditions, the Romanian sociology remained on the third position within the communist system, particularly as topics and opening towards the western sociology.

The school of Dimitrie Gusti was not merely an academic circle, but an inter-academic movement. Due to its prestige, the sociological manner of thought and research diffused towards other social disciplines too. The effort of developing a multi-disciplinary synthesis in the social research generated an enthusiasm hardly to be conceived nowadays. This program remained, however, just a striving, it never turned out into an applied, durable plan. Not just in Romania, but worldwide too, sociology developed separately from other social disciplines, with mutual influences and borrows. It probably was a global logic of science evolution.

Third, Dimitrie Gusti formulated a vocation of our sociology: its commitment to the ***reform of the Romanian society***. The key element of his program was the commitment to the social change rather than the descriptive and explanative function. We may ask ourselves whether the commitment of the Bucharest School to the Reform runs against the communist program of change, thus blocking its influence. I think the correct answer is: partially. The communist program focused on a global approach of introducing a pattern of organization "from top to bottom", promoted with political means. The program of the Romanian sociology, taken from the School of Bucharest, was characterised by a "bottom to top" approach, with cultural means of persuasion and spreading of the patterns of modernity developed in the West, of promoting rationality and of focusing on the needs of the people. The reform program, which crystallized quickly, took advantage of the crisis of the communist program and of the period of openness and liberalization of the 60s. Sociology was tolerated and, for a period, even promoted. The evolution towards a personal bureaucratic dictatorship, which started during the early 70s, needed no more modernization, rationalization, therefore sociology. The exclusion of sociology in 1977 was the final act of the process of liberalization.

Finally, Dimitrie Gusti contributed to the revival of sociology by establishing a strong school of sociology. He died in 1955, feeling disappointed, it seems, with the way history took and pessimistic towards the faith of the Romanian sociology. Most of the members of his school survived, however. Some of them spent long years of imprisonment but resumed their activity after being released. Others survived in other institutions going on with their professional activity without stating they are sociologists, but continuing to practice sociology under other denominations accepted ideologically. I might say that the School of Bucharest survived underground continuing its activity in a quite illegal way. They formed survey teams and conducted programs of empirical research according to the pre-war traditional patterns, establishing a new school. They aroused the interest of the young for the Romanian and Western sociology although they were not sociologists.

I think that the current Romanian sociology owes Dimitrie Gusti much more than we might be tempted to think at a superficial reflection.

RELATIONSHIPS SCHOOL – FAMILY: THE ADOLESCENTS' PERSPECTIVE

Mircea Agabrian – University „1 Decembrie 1918", Alba Iulia

The case study of Alba County describes, conceptualizes and tries to explain the actual status of the school-family relationships from the adolescents' perspective. Our purpose was to find out what perceptions, representations and behavior patterns the adolescents have towards their parents' involvement in education and towards the relationships between school and family in the political and socio-economical context of Romania during the transition period to a democratic society.

The research theoretical support includes the social network paradigm (Blau, 1964; Barnes, 1972; Leinhart, 1977), J. Coleman's concept of social capital (1987) and J. Epstein's theory of overlapping spheres of influence (1990). The specificity of the proposed theme employs mainly interpretative research principles, the research design clearly showing details from the participants' perspective. We used the focus group technique, recommended for obtaining substantial data from teenagers. Participants were selected so that we obtain as many different opinions as possible. The collected data were analyzed using the techniques and procedures of Grounded Theory and the software ATLAS.ti 5.0.

The research confirms that teenagers have a different perspective on the family's style of education, on the attitudes and behaviors in school-family-community relations as compared to that of their parents'; all these influence his/her reactions and ultimately, his/her psycho-social development. In the light of the overlapping spheres of influence theory, the representations that the student has acquired in high school overlap with the representations of his/her family experience, thus providing him/her with a new and broader horizon of understanding the family micro-cosmos in relation to the school and community environment.

The theoretical and empirical support of the research

Theoretical development and recent research demonstrate that the organizations based on communities, such as schools, serve the social strategy of the organization and mobilization of the groups of people to achieve actions with specific objectives. They embody their members' ideals and they give value to the public debate and to the decisions of social politics. These kinds of organizations represent *democracy in action to solve the local problems*.

Schools are the key of the communities' welfare and the future prosperity of nations. Their health is a barometer of the democratic way of life and, that is why, one of the important problems during the transition period is represented by the *school transformation into centers of the community life*. This social change is being built on the people's desire to make the schools become better and better for all the children. We state that for the Romanian society, trapped into a too long and difficult transition, *the partnerships centered on schools represent an important dimension of the civil society's construction*.

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Schools of all degrees are organizations which are responsible for the formal education of children and adolescents. The schools which carry out successfully and more efficiently this responsibility consider themselves and their students as part of the social system which includes families and communities. The research developed in the USA and in some European countries shows that when schools, families and communities work together as partners, the beneficiaries are the students. The partnerships between schools, families and communities can: (a) help teachers with their work; (b) improve students' scholarly abilities; (c) improve the curriculum and the school environment; (d) improve parents' educational abilities; (e) develop parents' leadership abilities; (d) connect families to school and community members; (f) stimulate community's service to the use of schools; (g) offer services and support to families; (h) create a safer environment in schools.

The main reason for the creation of such partnerships is the desire to help students be successful at school and, later, in life. When parents, students and other members of a community consider each other partners in education, around the students is being created a community of support which starts to work.

Recent syntheses of several studies indicate the fact that since the first years of childhood, *the family, the school and the community influence simultaneously the children's growth and development*. The continuous importance of these contexts in each stage of the child's development is minutely described by a number of theoretical connected perspectives. These include *the paradigm of the social network* (Blau, 1964; Barnes, 1972; Leinhart, 1977), *the concept of social capital* of J. Coleman (1987) and *the theory of the intersection of influence spheres* of J. Epstein (1990).

The paradigm of the social network refers to the connections between individuals, the groups and the institutions with which a person has contact and of whose support is dependent (Bott, 1971). In the research in the educational domain it was discovered an essential aspect: the children who are included into well-developed social networks have much better educational results than the children who don't benefit of them (Coates, 1987). M. L. Clark (1991, 45) writes that the social networks provide social support (defined as "the availability of people we can rely on, people that we know they take care of us and love us"). She sustains that the bigger the social support of adolescence is, the bigger is the probability for a student to be successful at school. Clark suggests that schools can strengthen the support systems for young people, especially for the poor or the minorities, through guiding, tutorial and instruction programs leaded by responsible adults, ready for action in school, family and community.

J. Coleman refers to the social networks as to an integral component of the social capital, which designates the abilities of knowledge, the attitudinal and behavioral patterns which the individuals can spend or invest in order to

raise their success chances in social institutions, such as school. The social capital represents individual resources, values and advantages which the individuals earn as participants in a communitarian background. From here starts the idea that a community, rather than an individual, has a certain amount of social capital. The communities "build" the social capital by developing active relationships, by democratic participation, by strengthening the communitarian property and by social trust.

The theory of the intersection of the influence spheres of Epstein emphasizes the importance of mutual action of schools, families and communities in order to assure children's needs. The recognition as main principle of this theory of "the history of tight connections between major institutions which socialize and educate children" (Epstein, 1992, 1140-41), determines certain objectives, such as scholar success, to be a mutual interest for each institution's people, objectives which are reached through action and their cooperative support. This perspective is graphically represented under the shape of three spheres which intersect and symbolize the school, the family and the community. In his theory, based on the data of several researches, Epstein sustains that:

> The status variables are not the most important measures to understanding the parents' involvement. At all level classes, the evidence suggests that the school politics, the teacher and family's activities are more important than race, parents' education, family size, marital status and even the degree of determination if the parents continue to be part of their children education (109).

From here appears the option for a *qualitative approach* of the research theme and the use of *the study case* which ensures the work background for the profound understanding of social processes.

The design of the research

The research strategy. The specific of the theme engages with priority the principles of the interpretative perspective of research, the design of the research being conceived to show clearly *the details from the participants' point of view.* For this we have used the abductive research strategy (Blaikie, 2000) which explores in the informal language the knowledge which the social actors use to produce, reproduce and interpret the phenomenon which is being investigated.

The questions and objectives of the research. According to the abductive strategy there are not used hypotheses but a work background in shape of questions, submissive to a process of development and refining during the investigation. Through the selection of questions and the attention given to their order, we can determinate *what is studied, in what measure and how it will be studied.* Therefore, there were formulated the next *questions*:

- Which are the concepts, attitudes and behaviors of teenagers towards the parents' involvement in home studying activities?

- Which are the knowledge, attitudes and behaviors of students towards the relationships school-family?
- What kind of social processes produce these behaviors?
- Which are the patterns of the relationships between characteristically behaviors?
- Why do the identified patterns act this way?

The objectives aimed in the research are:

- *the description*, in order to provide rich details about the studied phenomenon;
- *the understanding*, to identify the rational of the actions of the people involved;
- *the explanation*, to determine the elements, the factors and the mechanisms responsible for the production of the relationships school-family.

The method, the selection of the participants and the collection of the data. The focus group technique has imposed as one of the most attractive and efficient investigation method, becoming the most utilized qualitative method of approach of some varied social domains, such as education. Also, the focus group is one of the few available techniques used to obtain consistent data from children and adolescents. The participants were selected in order to obtain a number as big as possible of different opinions. We took in consideration that they were sociable, that they could talk openly and honestly to each other, so that each group was homogenous concerning the experience but also the scholar environment which they come from. As a result, the opinion diversity was reached by choosing homogenous groups in which they interact and not by obtaining this characteristic from a heterogeneous human composition, anyway less recommended. We developed with the high-school students eight focus group sessions in order to gather their thoughts and opinions about the parents' involvement in their education and in the activity of the high-school where they study.

Data analysis. We specify that the investigation is part of a more elaborate research, which enters both in the domain of fundamental research and the applicative one. It aims the development of a theory of the partnerships school–family–community, as well as the implementation of certain partnership programmes in some pre–university education units from the Alba County. The collected data were analyzed with the *Grounded Theory* techniques and procedures using the software program ATLAS.ti 5.0. This way we achieved the description and the interpretation of the studied phenomenon and, as much as possible, its causal explanation.

The value of truth and confidence of the research. Because "there are no operationally defined tests that can be applied to the qualitative research" (Eisner, 1991, 53), the pragmatic validation of the research results was achieved through the judging of its relevance and utility by a numerous group of M.A.

students consisting of teachers and general or high-school principals, as well as several groups of students. They confirmed that the study helped them understand a situation that sometimes seemed "enigmatic or confusing".

The results of the study

The parents' involvement in the home studying activities

In the primary group of family the inter-individual relationships are direct, as well as the communication relationships, fact that facilitates the mutual knowledge, the appearance of affective relation and specific norms, attitudes and behaviors. Through its actions, the family works as a mediator between the individual and other parts of society, such as the school. That is why it needs to accomplish its educational obligations of transmitting the cultural patterns and social status. From this perspective of the research we proposed ourselves to find out how and in which conditions and contexts parents and other members of the family involve themselves in the studying activities of the teenagers, which are the routine strategies and tactics through which the involved ones solve the problems and give a shape to the studied phenomenon. At the same time, the questions wanted to challenge answers that could emphasize the effects of the actions/ interactions of the involved actors, the diversity of the generated consequences.

The shapes and the styles of the involvement. First the analyses surprised a series of shapes of the parents' involvement in the home studying activities, which formed the code family 1. They resulted from the analyses of the transcript of the discussions which took place in the focus group



Family Code 1. Forms of parents' involvement in the learning activity

sessions, the participants' descriptions being conceptualized under labels almost identical with their own words.

The grouping of the involvement shapes after the criteria of their presence and intensity, generates four educational styles of the parents: (1) active and constant, (2) limited, (3) excessive (authoritative) and (4) reduced or "parental rejection".

The style of active and constant parental involvement. This style is characterized by an equilibrated and flexible combination between the offering of material and financial support, affection and support (guiding, encouraging, advice and reward) of the adolescent's scholar activity, on the one hand checking and drawing attention and on the other hand exactingness in its evaluation. *The affective, material and financial support, the functional communication and the actions* – the four properties of this style, they manifest permanently and in harmony. The stress can be laid on more than one of those attributes, but none can completely miss. All these are sustained by the participants' voices who tell about the parents' active and permanent involvement in their education, for example:

> They ask me every day what grades I took, how it was at school, how I get along with my teachers. My parents discuss with me about school, they get involved, they come to the school, they help me with the homework if necessary.

The style of limited parental involvement. From the analyses of the collected data we concluded that this style of "limited", "sporadically", "partial" ("in vivo" categories), seems to be the most common. Here are the adolescents' voices: "From my point of view it is a partial involvement", "My parents get involved only sporadically" or "In my case they get involved to a certain limit". A participant's words accurately describe the limited involvement style:

> From my point of view it is a partial involvement... I experienced a serious participation from their part only when the problems imperatively demanded solutions, otherwise they seem reserved, almost absent, their daily involvement meaning a few questions which I would name of complaisance.

Concentrating the interest on the results is one of the generating causes of the style of parents' limited involvement. It is invoked by the participants in wordings like:

> S1: They are interested in me having big grades, and less in the essence.
>
> S2: They don't want me to run from the classes, nor to fail an examination.
>
> S3: They ask me if I passed the class. Rarely do they come at the school, only when the main teacher or the principal call.

The pattern of this style of parental involvement sometimes has its roots in the extreme situations in which teenagers may find themselves. A participant talks about it like this:

> My parents get involved and I involve them only when I find myself in extreme situations and they can stop them getting worse.

We believe that *the lack of time*, considered "limited resource" by students, and the positive evaluation of the situation are causal conditions which interact in many contexts and generate the pattern of the style of limited involvement which, sometimes, has positive consequences, such as gaining the freedom to decide by the teenagers and, implicitly, taking responsibility. Nevertheless, the parental supervision remains, as we can notice from what a student told:

> My parents have a healthy vision on education: "Until now we took care of you, now that you stepped into another world (high-school), you will form yourself there on the structure that we offered to you." There is a shade, too: if my behavioral tendencies deviate a lot from what they think is good, they will draw my attention. Quite firmly.

The avarice with which the parents spend time with their children, the interest limited to only some aspects, produce effects that teenagers perceive and of which they become aware as frustrations.

> We don't get time for what we think is important, namely they don't support us where we are the best or when we have a problem. I noticed that they like so much the comfort of a "Did you take good grades? Do you need anything else? When is there another meeting? etc" and they avoid as much as they can the delicate events that occur to us by invoking, I may say, infantile reasons.

The style of excessive (authoritative) parental involvement. This style of parental involvement in education is more complex than the others because its perception is the least wanted and, at the same time, harder to deal with by the teenagers.



Semantic Network 1. The style of excessive (authoritative) parental involvement

The conceptualizing of the style of involvement as excessive was a consequence of lines like this:

S1: They get involved more than I have ever wanted.

S2: They tell me over and over again: "Keep studying, keep studying because you do it for you."

S3: They tell me all day long: "study, study".

Analyzed and visualized, the style finds its major cause in the mistrust of the parents towards the teenagers, plus the authoritarian parents' manifestations like permanent and constant critics. The style, described by the words of a teenager, sounds like this:

They get involved, even too much. They want to know everything that happens at school, what activities take place, they don't miss any participation. The spare time that I should have, they think it would be indicated to exploit, so there goes the private reading and supplementary classes, therefore I can say that I don't know anymore which one is the family and which the school, they are both suffocating.

The intermediate variables are the mentalities and the behaviors that characterize the life of communities in small towns and/or "the obsession" of college that some parents manifest, especially those who, from one reason or another, didn't get a superior education. The sayings of a teenage-girl illustrate the analytic approach:

In my case they get too involved and that's why sometimes we have fights, my folks are so traditional and if I might break the habit, it's wrong...I must be like everybody else. Maybe they are afraid of what people may say and I think that if we stayed in a big city, this wouldn't happen.

Concerning the mistrust manifested by parents, the teenagers consider it as a cause:

S1: Nevertheless, they should have more trust in me, I know how to take care of me, and I can make right choices.

S2: They get involved in any possible way...my mother just can't wait a meeting to take place so that she can find out everything that happens in our school; she wants to convince herself that I' m not part of some weird gang with which I may do bad things.

The consequences of the authoritative involvement are various, they begin with dissatisfaction, stress or frustration caused to teenagers, they may go through frequent "quarrels" between parents and teenagers or they can generate negative attitudes. It is not unusual to this style to impose some authoritative decisions that sometimes are taken against the teenagers' desires and aspirations. This is an example:

...unfortunately, the parents know how to give you advice for what profile you should

choose. They forced me to go to informatics and yet I haven't found my place in the info class.

"The obsession" of college is invoked by many subjects in different ways:

S1: My parents didn't have the possibility to go to college and they want me to go there and they are pretty obsessed with this. They make efforts so that I become as best as I can at school, so I can go to a good college and to be successful.

S2: ... they keep telling me to study in order to go to college, to make a future, to have a career.

S3: They wish I studied more, so I can have a better future through school, they wish a higher education for me, so I can make a career and not to end up as a simple worker.

The analyses revealed that the generation gap is an attribute to the style of authoritative involvement and the subjects declared that "there definitely is a conflict between generations". A voice talks about this unequivocally:

I may say that there is a conflict between generations because the parents are losing their authority and they notice at their children something that they can't control, even if it is nothing bad, something that no longer belongs to them, new ideas come up and they are maybe better than theirs. They don't agree with this because of their pride and maybe because of some possession instinct.

The semantic network 2 presents the conditional structure and the process that explains the generation gap. Its interpretation tells that the parents' "traditional" behavior represents the generating cause of the specific manifestations of dictatorship in familial education. It is the parents who are animated by "modern ideas" that maintain this conflict.



Semantic Network 2. The generation gap

A significant role has the interposed variable of the *resistance to change* that characterizes some parents' behavior. It is known that unlikely from other domains of the social system, culture is much slower to change because people oppose to it, considering that they lose important values and beliefs. This creates a situation that sociologists call tension or cultural lag. In this situation, a value, a norm or a belief persists even if it became dysfunctional. It continues to exist only because it was sometime functional and many people are still attached to it.

The resistance to change is a significant characteristic of a society in transition, like Romania. Many parents are still attached by the "traditional" values of the authoritarian behavior towards children. That is why, maybe, many teenagers use quite frequently the word "old folks" when talking about their parents, considering that age is responsible for a behavior that no longer resonates with the social changes that were made. This label is used in different ways: "they are too old", "the old folks get involved" or "they are older, they have another mentality, they are surpassed". Talking about the project of the partnership school-family, a participant reasons the parents' resistance to change like this:

> I think that this project won't work; I mean you can't do anything with this generation of parents because they are not able to accept this kind of projects… maybe when we'll become parents, but now, no way.

The style of reduced involvement, of "parental rejection". The collected data and their analyses with the scheme of *Grounded Theory* method paradigm put into light the style of reduced parental involvement in education. The analyses of textual data led to the identification of the causal conditions and then allowed us to deepen the analyses by building the matrix 1 that presents the scheme in which we sorted and organized the connections between categories.

Matrix 1. The paradigm of the reduced involvement style

Causal conditions	Phenomenon	Context	Action/interaction strategies	Consequences
– Anachronistic conceptions – Lack of necessary abilities – Lack of interest – Family issues	**The style of reduced involvement, of 'parental rejection'**	– The socio-economical situation – Communitarian life characteristics – The structure and the organizing relationships at school – Socio-economical and educational variables of the family	– Limited communication – Non-participation to high-school organized activities	– Affective, attitudinal and behavioral, which have a negative impact on teenager's scholar success – Teenagers' perception of the need of parental involvement in their education

The participants' affirmations revealed that one of the causes of the manifestation of this style is the anachronistic conceptions. There is a clear voice:

> For my parents school was a necessary evil, so they don't get too involved and they let me in peace. They couldn't help me with anything if they got more involved.

The qualification of school as a "necessary evil" is an unusual thing and it is associated with the *lack of necessary abilities* for the involvement that you can see in the latent message: "They couldn't help me with anything." The teenager adds in the most sincere way what he thinks: "Anyway, a reproach coming from your parents is always welcomed because it makes you think about some things more seriously." Other two opinions are:

> S1: Every time when they are needed at the school they invoke the reason that they can't miss their work for my school, that they send me to school in order to study and to get a diploma and that it's enough that they are paying my school.

> S2: Many parents see the involvement as a punishment, others barely think about it and, like my case, others see the involvement as a way of satisfying their pride.

The lack of interest is an often mentioned factor by the participants when they talk about the parents' reduced involvement in their education:

> S1: They don't get involved too much, almost not at all. My mother gets involved a little, and my father is interested neither in my school issues, nor in my personal problems.

> S2: All I can tell you is that my parents have nothing to do with my education.

> S3: I was alone all the time. My father didn't even know at what profile I went. They gave me a free hand. So far I handled alone and I'll manage from now on too.

In some cases there are invoked as causes the *family issues* and some conflicts that represent obstacles to a bigger attention that parents should give to their children. There are two opinions:

> S1: It is a situation in which lack of interest rules. This situation is due not to their trust in me, but to a family system that is subdued to internal conflicts.

> S2: My folks don't do anything else than having contradictory talks with me and I always discover myself labeled as a "problem child".

Limited communication is a strategy action/interaction characteristic to this style, which frequently associates to parents' lack of interest. A teenager of says:

> We don't talk about school almost at all. They are not interested in what I do there, they just want to see good grades and they just can't wait to see that I've finished high-school and to get rid of me.

The effects of the involvement styles. The conditions-actions/ interactions-consequences paradigm, used in the analyses, prioritized the first two notions: the conditional structure and the process, and the consequences were named only generically. Now we develop the effects of the involvement styles for which we have built the matrix 2.

Matrix 2. The effects of the parents' involvement in the adolescent's education

Consequences	Direct effects	
	Positive effects	Negative effects
Affective	**Emotional support.** "At home I was always surrounded by warmth; they support me very much in every event which is connected to school."	**Frustration.** "I resent their involvement in a negative way. The effect of their reproaches is that I start thinking if I am like they say I am."
	The perception of the need of involvement. "Their involvement means allowing the necessary time for discussions and activities with me."	
Attitudinal	**The manifestation of trust.** "They don't tell me to go study because they trust me."	**Revolt.** "Have you ever thought that a parent can change, if he wants – and in lack of any discussion-, the course of his child's becoming, on reason that that way is better? Better for who?"
Behavioral	**The imposition of dialogue.** 'My parents would have preferred me to follow a profile with a future… but I talked to them and I explained them that it is better to do something you like."	
	The freedom of decision. "I take the decisions concerning school; eventually, they come with suggestions."	
	The assuming of responsibility. "They no longer send me to study; I am responsible."	

The evaluation of social actors' involvement. In their affirmations, the teenagers evaluated the behavior and the actions of those involved in their education. The results revealed that there are differences between the modalities and the grade of involvement of the two parents –mother and father- in their children's education. To one point, bigger brothers and sisters and other relatives get involved, too. Matrix 3 emphasizes all these aspects.

Matrix 3. The evaluation of social actors' involvement

Mother	+ I can't talk about the family's involvement, but about mother's involvement. My mother just can't wait for another meeting to take place in order to find out everything that happens in school. + My mother helps me with the subject matters at which I have difficulties. …
Father	+ – My father has a long program at work and I don't see him very often, so he asks me on Sundays how was at school. + My father follows everything from the background. – My father doesn't even know at what high-school I go and he rarely asks me if I didn't fail some examination. …

Brothers and sisters	+ My sister always tells me: 'Go study!' + My brother helps me with my homework if I don't understand. He asks me how was at school. ...
Other relatives	+ My grandmother always took care of me, she told me 'let's study, let's do the homework', she asked me 'how was at school today?' and, in case of a bad grade, she sent me study. + My uncle gives me more money when I get good grades. ...

Legend: +, + –, – indicate the attitude towards the involvement (positive, neutral, negative)

One may observe the mother's ascendancy over the involvement of other members of the family in children's education, the father's modest participation, the intervention, in some cases, of bigger brothers and sisters and, more rarely, the other relatives' involvement. The analysis does not consider the father's invoking of lack of time as a causal condition for his reduced involvement. We rather believe that the cause is a certain "traditional" mentality like "the father leaves this in the mother's job." We can affirm that the educational agents' role emphasizes subscribes in the desirability of the study about the child's educational relations with his father and the other members of the family, necessary for the over fulfillment of the stereotype that the mother assumes the natural responsibility of raising and educating the children.

The parental support at studying. A question demanded the teenagers to talk about what parents do to help them study. Through it we wanted to obtain details about parents' contribution to the students' scholar success. The analysis makes a difference between the routine strategies (advice, impulses, the insurance of study conditions etc) and forms of parental support that helps to the encouragement of children to study. The first ones are the same in the majority of cases, and the forms of support are reported to the family's particularities. For example, the rewards and the meditations are forms of support which are accessible only to families with financial resources. The strategy of insuring optimal conditions to study clearly predominates. This is an example:

> They give me all the time I need to make my homework and to get thoroughly to the knowledge I accumulated in class. They don't give me extra work at home only if I have nothing to study. Recently, they bought me a computer to help me with my homework and they connected it to the internet so I can find the necessary bibliography.

We also emphasize the behavior invoked by many participants that affirm that their parents stay away from this subject. This is in contradiction with the fact that, one way or another, parents should encourage, support and supervise the children in the process of learning developed at home, this thing being one of the minimal conditions of the family's involvement in the child's education.

The extra-lessons problem. The extra-lessons, as a form of parental support, constituted a theme for long discussions, the main approach being critical

to the address of some teachers and the system that allows and encourages them. The analyze identified some dimensions of the extra-lessons: (1) the develop of a true system; (2) their perception as a way of increasing the teachers' incomes; (3) the existence of the norms that regulate them, but eluded by a part of those who practice them; (4) the overwhelming financial efforts that some parents make.

In one of the focus groups where this problem was consistently discussed, a Romanian origin student from Canada also took part. The matrix 4 shows his conception and attitude, generated by a social context that doesn't know this extra-lessons phenomenon, which, moreover, is illegal.

Matrix 4. The Extra-lessons problem

	The need of extra-lessons	The status of extra-lessons	Consequences
S1	"...teachers don't give their best to their classes; moreover, they say that students can come for private lessons to learn more."	"...teachers should have authorization and most of them don't have it."	"...it appears the competition to give your child to the best teacher who, logically, has a proportional price to his value or prestige. This is how parents come to some overwhelming financial efforts."
S2	"It seems that it has developed an industry of education; except for a few teachers, they all wait for the students to come to extra-lessons."		"One way of helping me was that he gave me extra-lessons that cost me a fortune."
S3	"...it is almost impossible not to give your child to extra-lessons when he is in the 8th or the 12th grade."		"The fact that teachers have learned that there is a new and more advantageous way of teaching, namely private classes, makes them give at school a minimum of information."
S4	"The extra-lessons thing is stupid; if the child wants to study, he does it at home, alone."	"I don't need extra-lessons; there aren't such things in Canada. In their opinion something like this is illegal because if you go to a teacher and you pay him well he may tell you the subjects from the test."	"The thing is that here in Romania life is very hard even if many children learn very well. In foreign countries those who broom the streets are paid double to and engineer from here."

The family participation to scholar activities

The students' attitude towards participation

The active report of the family with the school is a recognized, accepted and encouraged phenomenon all over the world. E. Stanciulescu emphasizes that most of the parents, including those from the disadvantaged classes, prove to be real strategists of the educational action, they are concerned by the scholar success of their children, considering that this ensures their economic future and a good social position. From the scholar institution and teachers' perspective, the relationship with the students' families imposed with necessity.

The relationships between parents and teachers produce in multiple interaction shapes. There is an aspect of school-family relationship that is less known: the parents and the teachers are "doomed" to communicate through the student that plays the role of a messenger. No matter the shape and the content of the message, it moulds the relationships between adults and the student affirms his status of important actor. From this perspective it becomes interesting the investigation of the students' attitude towards their parents participation to the activities of the high-school where they learn, the knowledge of what parents wish to accomplish by their participation, as well as the identification of the problems that students consider to be important, concerning the school's improvement.

Data analysis has revealed four classes of students' attitudes towards their parents' participation to the activities in their schools: (1) participation to extracurricular activities only; (2) indifference towards their parents' participation or non-participation; (3) participation to all activities, including classes; (4) the parents should not participate at all.

The parents' participation only to extra scholar activities is approved, especially by the students from the high schools of art and sports, but also by a part of the students from other high schools. The explanation is to these activities students can show what abilities they have developed and what works they have done, waiting for social recognition from their parents first. A teenager says:

> Except for the daily classes, I think that all students are excited to see their parents participate to the scholar activities. Moreover, if they, the children, initiated these activities, you can imagine how good they would feel in the presence of their parents.

The analyses discovered that, in general, the teenagers' indifference towards the participation or non-participation of the parents at the high-school activities finds its explanation in the dissatisfying relationship between them and their parents. For example, the subjects invoked their sentiment of being guilty induced by their parents or the lack of interest towards them. Two voices say:

> S1: To participate means for them only to be present; you cannot make them be interested in my school activities and me.

S2: According to my situation, for me it is the same. I am not afraid that after their dialogue with the teachers they may find out something else that I have done. They have already accused me of everything.

The students' favorable attitude towards the parents' participation to different activities from the high school, including their presence in the classroom during the classes, represent a causal condition that may produce positive effects for the students. As teenagers say, the parents' participation may ensure: (1) a better training of the students, who fear not to disappoint their parents when they are present; (2) a better school environment and (3) the promotion of parents-teachers dialogue. It has been discussed especially the implications of the promotion of the parents-teachers dialogue. The subjects emphasized a few positive consequences of this dialogue.

1. The advantages earned by the communication between the social actors in the educational space.

S1: You can definitely realize how many communication and understanding barriers can be surpassed.

S2: ...this way it can find a common denominator between my parents and me.

2. The possibility of correcting some teachers' behavior towards students.

S1: The parents should cooperate with the teachers because sometimes they treat us like objects.

3. The clearing up of some possible negative consequences owed to the parents' participation to the activities.

S1: It may happen that sometimes the parents to say that the teacher is right, to our detriment, because they see in the teacher intelligence and justice, therefore the child is the problem; but things are not always like that.

S2: It could be vice versa, namely the parents could realize what kind of person the teacher really is, although, at the meetings, parents cannot get to know the teacher, so they leave with the impression that it is only the student's fault.

The manifestation of the teenagers' negative attitude towards their parents' participation to different activities that take place in the high school is expressed like this: "I wouldn't like it.", "I don't want them to come.", "Definitely, no!', "I'd like them to stay at home.", "Of course I don't want to. I don't want my folks involved in any scholar activity.", "Simply I don't like my parents to come to my school." We have grouped the participants' arguments in table 1.

Table 1. Arguments against parents' participation to the activities in school

	Themes and arguments	The researcher's explanation
1	**Negative conceptions** S1: I don't go to their work place, so they shouldn't come to school. S2: I've had enough of my parents at home, why do they have to bother me at school, too. S3: They are older. They should mind their own business and I'll do the same.	The dissatisfying parents–teenagers relationships, the children's need of independence, the lack of knowledge, they all contribute to this kind of conceptions.
2	**Discomfort shame and compulsion feelings** S1: I am inhibited by their presence and I do not feel at ease. S2: I do not allow them to come so they do not embarrass me. S3: I would not like them to come and give me a kiss and to tell me that my bench is a mess. S4: They scold me in front of my classmates. They embarrass me.	These attitudes are generated by the lack of knowledge and the lack of parents' appropriate intervention abilities.
3	**Parents that do not understand the problems** S1: My parents were raised in a village and they have a traditional way of thinking. S2: Teachers are teachers and parents are workers.	The cultural discrepancy between teachers and some parents represents a variable of intervention.
4	**Dissatisfying relationships and adverse communication** S1: The impediment could be this lack of communication between my family and me. By coming to my school they would get information that they will interpret in their own way, without being interested in my perspective on certain situations; in other words, we would be two mirrors that reflect quite different realities so that we won't be able to find similar solutions.	Various social, cultural and economical factors are involved in this situation.
5	**Scholar activities are not interesting** S1: To our school, except for the festive activities and the meetings, nothing happens, but if it were, I would like my parents to take part. S2: What happens to our school is not interesting for my folks.	The festivities predominate and there are few interesting activities at school.
6	**The students do not realize the importance of their parents' participation** S1: There are certain people that take care of this kind of activities, why should my parents get involved, too.	The students do not understand what the parents' participation to the scholar activities means.

The students' participation to meetings together with the parents. The concepts, the conceptual relationships and the texts from the semantic network 3 present the students' opinions on their participation at the meetings with the parents, namely their presence where there are talked things that directly concern them. The teenagers talk about the probable reactions of some teachers and parents towards this problem.



Semantic Network 3. Students' participation to meeting together with their parents

What students want their parents to do at the school?

The list of students' desires concerning what their parents can do at the school is long. Of the problems seen as possible to realize we stop over the promoting of students' interests, a problem that launched animated debates and whose conclusion was that any try of that would end with a failure. The paradigm from the matrix 5 presents the conditional structure and the process of promoting students' interests by their parents, which, through consequences, shows the reduced probability of having success in practice. We observe that there are produced some favorable effects, especially the improvement of some situation in the school and the possibility of the parents' authority increase, aspects that may facilitate a better collaboration between students and teachers. They send us to the idea of spreading the power in the democratic society, fact that is perfectly valid for the educational institutions, too.

Matrix 5. The Paradigm of promoting students' interests

Causal conditions	Phenomenon	Context	Intrinsic Conditions	Action/Interaction Strategies	Consequences
The parents are not organized "They will never have any power in taking any decisions in school provided that they organize themselves in a homogenous group which, in my opinion is complicated." **Lack of any initiative** "The main problem is represented by parents' lack of unity and their lack of initiative."	Failure in promoting students' interests by their parents	– The general socio-economic situation and its local particularities – Specific features of community life – Structure and organizational relationships in school – Socio-economic and educational variables of the family	**Traditional mentality and behavior** **The "paternalist" conception of the teachers** "The teachers can't do anything, they merely teach and that's all, they can't change anything, everything depends on the government" **Formal participation of the parents** **Resistance to changes** "No matter what the parents might say, the school and the teachers will remain the same...Nobody will change anything."	– Due to the parents' initiative, the problems were discussed in meetings – The parents applied to the secretariats – The Head of the class went to the Local Education Authority	**Improvement of some momentary situations.** **The parents are treated with indifference.** **Reduced probability of success.** "It seems to me almost impossible that they could do anything in school. You know very well that they are given little importance or they are taken into account momentarily. In the next moment everything is forgotten."

The conclusion drawn by the adolescents regarding their parents' probability of solving their interests is that the latter have little possibilities for achieving this. Two situations they have experimented are illustrative: the optional subjects and the changing of some teachers. Here they are in vivo:

> Why are subject matters which should be optional imposed as being compulsory? What is optional should be subject to our choice, not imposed by our teachers. The teachers we do not like should be changed.

The solution to this issue should be given by the high school, and as far as changing teachers, the final decision belongs to the Local Education Authority. The two problems aroused by the students have been remained unsolved.

Issues to be discussed between parents and teachers. Identifying themes for parents-teachers a discussion highlights how the focus-technique materializes group-interactions and uses the information on this level and not on an individual level. The analysis has spotted from the research data the main issues the students consider to be the most suited themes to be discussed between their teachers and their parents so that their situation in school should improve. An interviewed person has given the following signification to such discussions:

> I think they should discuss those problems that require urgent solutions. During these discussions we, the students should be necessarily invited to as we are the main target.

His sayings denote the fact that the students are aware of the fact that they represent the object of any action that takes place in the school, that they anything that takes place in the family has as a goal their better condition and, as they are the main actors it is natural that they should actively take part to debates and decision-making. From the great range of the problems the students consider to be very important both for the parents and the teachers, in thematic matrix 1 we hereby show a whole set of generic problems which produce two major discussion issues: curriculum for the modern educational process and involved social actors' communication and behavior.

Thematic Matrix 1. Conceptual Themes

Problems	THEMES: Curriculum and the modern educational process	THEMES: Communication and behavior
High school generic problems 1. What does being a student nowadays mean? 2. Instructional programs for parents 3. Specialized education 4. Scholarships	**Parents instruction and counseling** S1: "I think that teachers should teach our parents according to the way they teach us. Thus they could demonstrate that school is not what it used to be in the past. They say that school nowadays is very easy and you should have attended school in the past, that was the real school." S2: "They should organize monthly sessions, discussions during which the teachers, the headmasters and students' counselors should inform both the students and the parents what the educational system in the western countries consists of and how this can be applied in Romania so that the Romanian school system might become a specialized one, producing specialists and not only educated people." **The Scholarship problem** "I think that scholarships abroad	

	THEMES	
Problems	Curriculum and the modern educational process	Communication and behavior
	should be discussed. There are plenty of students who might become interested, thus I think this subject should be given more attention."	
Problems generated by the high school educational process 1. Subject matters which are treated the same way 2. Too much information 3. Optional subject matters are compulsory 4. Too many tasks 5. Patience, teachers' understanding and tact 6. Getting rid of any discrimination when treating students.	**Overloaded Curriculum** S1: "They should focus more on subject matters that are useful for our graduation exam. Why should we study subjects we won't find necessary in the future?" S2: "We get too much information. They ask too much from us. Every teacher wants us to be well prepared for his/her subject. It is too difficult to make everybody happy. If I want to focus on a certain subject, the other teachers should leave me alone." **Imposed optional courses** "Why are the subject matters which should be optional compulsory? What is optional should be subject to our choice, not imposed by our teachers." **Very busy program** S1: "We should have a much easier program, not like the one we have nowadays. We should have the possibility of choosing the subject matters we want to study and we should also have the possibility of changing the teachers we don't like." S2: "I have a lot of chores at home. The teachers don't understand the fact that we need time for other things, too."	**Understanding students** S1:"If the student has a problem or he/she is a little shy, the teachers should treat him/her more tenderly and they should make him/her feel at ease." S2:"There are some teachers who use a very aggressive language, especially those between 40-50 years." S3:"The teachers should be more indulgent, they shouldn't come to courses when they are angry and they should use good language when addressing us." S3:"The teachers should understand us as we understand them. They should understand us when we don't study because we have been gone or we have been ill." **Eliminating any discrimination when treating students** "They should not make differences between the students who have money and those who don't. If you "help" the teacher with something, he/she will also "help" you."
Generic problems for the family 1. The parents do not know the dysfunctional aspects of the educational process 2. The parents are not counseled by the teachers 3. The necessity of a teachers–parents collaboration for moral education	**The theoretical-practical rapport; overloaded textbooks** "The parents must understand that we get too less practice for the theory we have acquired. The parents should talk to the teachers so that they might understand that the textbooks are too sophisticated, they are overloaded with too much information that has to be assimilated for exams." **Too much information and a lot of requirements for all the subject matters** "The parents should talk about the fact that we get too much information	**The parents arbitrarily impose professional options to the students** "The teachers should make the parents under–stand that the students should choose the university they want to go to. My mother should meet the teacher who teaches the subject I am the best. The teacher should present the advantages of this subject and the future perspectives. This could be a sort of counseling regarding my future career." **The parents should get involved in all the aspects regarding the educational process** "I would like my parents to take care of

Problems	THEMES	
	Curriculum and the modern educational process	Communication and behavior
and students' psychological assistance	and there are a lot of requirements for all the subject matters."	the psychical and moral sides of the education."
Context problems Taking responsibility for the student's behavior	**School–family discrepancy** "Both the school and the family always blame the other one for the students' deviances. The parents let the teachers do everything, while the latter focus only on the contents they should teach the students. Every teacher focuses on his subject only, avoiding, purposely or not, training the students for real life situations. I think there is a huge discrepancy between the school and the family."	

Conclusions

During the analytical process we have meant the categories to be abstractions that do not represent an individual or the story of a group. They are the accounts of some participants or groups that are reduced and represented in highly conceptualized and related terms so that we could generally explain what is going on. In the semantic networks we have related the categories and the sub-categories so that we could thoroughly explain aspects of the investigated social phenomenon. As a matter of fact, starting with the first investigated focus-group, we have linked the categories with their sub-categories, that is, we have noticed if the latter are conditions, actions, interactions or consequences. At any rate, the major categories have not been integrated yet to form a theoretical explanatory scheme. In order to achieve this we need a central category, *a nucleus category which contains all the products of the analysis concentrated in few words, which seem to explain "what this research is all about*".

We have devised the integrating diagram 1 starting from the idea that the school-family-community partnerships represent just a desideratum. It visualizes the causal conditions, the intervention variables and the intended strategy thus justifying why we have chosen this idea as a central category. As we have seen, the quality and the degree of parents' involvement in the students' home learning and in the activities at school are affected by two involving styles: reduced or "parental rejection" and authoritarian (excessive), the latter having a serious impact on the adolescents who seek for independence, freedom of choice and action regarding the issues thy consider to be their own concern. This thing represents one of the causal conditions that lead to the generation gap. The two negative styles we have mentioned create indifference and disagreement towards the parents' presence to the activities that take place in schools.

The subjects, either parents, or teachers or teenagers, invoked the lack of interest of some parents and the anachronism conceptions of the others, as well as they emphasized their lack of appropriate abilities so that their participation to the school's activities will not produce stress, frustration and dissatisfaction to the students. The analyses showed that the parents' involvement in the studying activities at home is reduced, most of it, at the insurance of the material condi-

tions and the necessary financial support. It also emphasized that the pre-university education institutions do not have various partnership activities that makes the parents, the school personnel and the representatives of the community support the scholar success of the students. Instead of that, there are 'festivities' and 'meetings'.



Integrating Diagram 1. School-family-community partnerships between desiderate and reality

The resistance to change of some parents and some teachers (especially the aged ones), the authoritative attitude of other parents and the paternalistic mentality of solving all problems at the centre, were identified as obstacles that interpose to the renewal of the spirit of education in schools. They are emphasized by the contextual conditions generated by the socioeconomic situation, by the characteristics of the communitarian life, by the particular interactions that characterize a pre-university education organization and the families' socioeconomic and educational variables that lay their mark on the school–family–community relationships.

The research reached at two conclusions that establish themselves as favorable premises of action for the development and the application of certain viable partnership programs in the schools of Alba County.

1. Almost all the families care about their children, wish for them to have success and they try to obtain as much information as they can from the school and the community, therefore they are good partners in their children's education.
2. Almost all the teachers and the school leaders would like to involve the parents in the scholar activities, but most of them do not know how to create positive and efficient programs, so they are afraid to try. This situation creates some

kind of “sterile rhetoric” in which the teachers feel “caught,” expressing their agreement for the development of the partnerships, but without undertaking any action.

On this base, we consider that it is possible to realize functional partnerships so that the parents and the members of the community could get involved in the process of educating the children and the teenagers. On the other hand, the investigation confirms what E. Stanciulescu shows concerning the researches made in other countries about the way the child or the teenager evaluates the familial educating environment.

> They (the researches) show that the perception of familial realities, attitudes and behaviors and of the parent-child relationships vary according to the evaluator’s position; the child interprets differently from the parents the educational style of the family, and this interpretation, mo matter if it corresponds to reality or not, influences his reactions and his psycho-social development.

Following the same way of approach, we believe that the evaluation and interpretation of the instructive-educational environment of the school by the teenager generates specifically reactions and contributes to his psychosocial maturity. In the light of the theory of the intersection of the influence spheres, the representations that were earned by the teenager in high school overlap the representations of the experiences from his family, offering a new and wider horizon of understanding the familial micro universe in its relationship with the scholar environment.

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LA CULTURE DE LA PENURIE: BIENS, STRATEGIES ET PRATIQUES DE CONSOMMATION DANS LA ROUMANIE DES ANNEES '80

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This article argues that the situation of shortage that characterized state socialist societies for long periods of their existence could inform in meaningful ways the theory on consumption produced about non-socialist settings. Unlike the political economy studies of consumption during state-socialism that focus on social relations, this article assumes a more limited definition of consumption that focuses on objects and practices. Using data from a village in Romania whose inhabitants were engaged in large numbers in shopping across Hungarian-Romanian border, the tribulations of obtaining consumer goods are described.

Sur le mode dont la consommation a été organisée en l'Europe de l'Est dans les années du communisme on a écrit une longue série de recherches. Une de celle-ci soumet à l'attention des problèmes et des thèmes qui ont été centraux dans les débats classiques de l'anthropologie, comme par exemple la nature des formes de distribution et d'échange (Polany, 1957 ; Mauss, 1967 ; différents concepts proposés par Marx), le thème de l'inégalité ou les relations patron-client. Dans cet article nous soutenons que, par une démarche comparative, la pénurie et ses dimensions culturelles peuvent enrichir la littérature sur la consommation produite au sujet des sociétés qui n'ont pas connu le socialisme d'Etat. L'accent principal sera mis sur les modalités dont les individus et leurs maisons faisaient face au manque des objets de consommation qui existait au niveau macro, et comment ces biens étaient utilisés, une fois à portée de la main. La pénurie a obligé les individus, et parfois des familles entières, lors de leur recherche à travers de longues distances, à faire la queue, à utiliser leurs relations, et à gérer ces biens selon des modalités différentes de celles d'une société affluente. Cet ensemble de modalités de faire face à la pénurie a conduit a des situations souvent inédites, où les magasins alimentaires et les autres magasins d'état étaient vides la plupart du temps, tandis que la majorité des gens possédait les produits introuvables dans le commerce. Cet aspect indiquait l'existence d'une économie secondaire très dynamique.

Notre but premier consistera en la description des stratégies utilisées afin d'obtenir des produits de consommation. Il existe toute une littérature sur l'économie secondaire au temps du socialisme, et nous nous en servirons pour décrire les efforts tentés par la population pour participer à la consommation. Le second but c'est de décrire l'emploi des biens de consommation rares comme une série de pratiques culturelles plutôt que des relations sociales (comme dans

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le cas de la description des stratégies). Les pratiques associées à la consommation (Campbel, 1995, 102) pendant cette période ressemblent à la situation des classes ouvrières occidentales d'avant l'apparition des Etats du bien-être et avec les rationalisations de la période de la Seconde Guerre, plutôt qu'avec les pratiques de consommation des pays occidentaux des années '80. Faisant appel à l'étiquette suggérée par Daniel Miller (1995, 16), nous organiserons la description de telles pratiques au moyen du concept de *culture de la pénurie*.

La première partie de l'article est un passage en revue des catégories analytiques de la littérature anthropologique de la consommation pendant le communisme. Les études ayant ce sujet sont structurées autour des relations sociales existantes dans le domaine de l'économie secondaire, mais nous croyons qu'une perspective théorique plus actuelle pourrait être acquise par le déplacement de l'intérêt du coté des pratiques. Dans d'autres mots, nous croyons qu'il est nécessaire d'opérer un déplacement de l'accent de l'étude de la relation entre la classe sociale et la consommation, vers l'étude de la relation entre le status et la consommation.

La seconde partie de notre étude essaie de présenter la façon dont les habitants de la commune de Sântana (département d'Arad) réussissaient à obtenir des biens de l'étranger. De nombreuses stratégies utilisées ont été décrites dans d'autres études d'ethnographie qui prenaient en discussion la distribution et la consommation socialistes. C'est pour cette raison qu'on a choisi de nous arrêter sur deux niches spécifiques à cette localité, plus exactement le petit trafic de frontière en Hongrie et les réseaux transnationaux, qui incluaient les Allemands émigrés dans l'ancienne République Fédérale de l'Allemagne (RFA).

Dans la troisième partie de cette recherche, nous allons discuter les pratiques de consommation spécifiques à la pénurie, plutôt que les modalités dont les biens étaient informellement distribués. La question principale qui se pose porte sur ce que l'on peut apprendre sur la consommation en général, si l'on prend en considération les modalités dont les gens utilisaient les objets à cause de la pénurie des années '80.

La prééminence relative des approches d'économie politique sur les approches symboliques dans l'ethnographie de la consommation socialiste

Les 30 dernières années, le problème de la consommation a acquis le statut de sujet central dans l'anthropologie culturelle. Différentes critiques du paradigme marxiste (Miller, 1995 a ; Appadurai, 1986) ont suggéré que l'attention centrée exclusivement sur la production n'est pas suffisante. Arjun Appadurai situe ce changement de centre d'intérêt dans le contexte de la critique de J. Baudrillard concernant la modalité, où la pensée du XIX-e siècle a décrit les sociétés

industrielles ou agraires comme ayant seulement de la production (Appadurai, 1986, 8-9). Il soutient qu'on devrait accorder une attention supplémentaire à la « trajectoire totale de la production, échange, distribution et consommation » (Appadurai, 1986, 12).

Selon James Carrier et Josiah Heyman (1996), il existe deux paradigmes principaux des études sur la consommation. D'une part, il existe la préoccupation pour le pouvoir d'achat et pour la position de l'acheteur dans un système d'inégalité. Le principal sujet dans de pareilles recherches le constitue la relation entre la classe sociale et la consommation, intérêt qui soulève des questions quant à la capacité de reproduction des ménages, la politique de classe ou le niveau des revenus et des relations. L'autre paradigme concerne les aspects sémiotiques et symboliques de la consommation. Les biens d'une certaine catégorie, disons par exemple des productions musicales, sont vus comme potentiellement interchangeables. Le choix des produits dépend de schèmes de classification, qui se traduisent en « culture », « styles de vie » ou « identité ». La relation importante dans ce cas s'établit entre le status et la consommation, et les sujets d'intérêt sont le style, les politiques identitaires et les mécanismes de production par les industries culturelles ou par les consommateurs mêmes de la signification attribuée. La consommation est vue à l'intérieur de ce paradigme comme relationnelle, ayant un coté social, et comme une intervention active dans le monde des biens (Pels, 1998, 96).

Tandis que ces préoccupations reflètent le contexte affluant des pays occidentaux, pour les anciens pays socialistes le domaine d'intérêt légitime a été constitué par la pénurie. La littérature importante qui traite du socialisme (Verdery, 1991 ; Kornai, 1992) a accentué la position centrale de la pénurie dans la dynamique de ces systèmes. Ainsi par exemple Katherine Verdery qui a posé l'accent sur le caractère redistributif de l'Etat socialiste, mais aussi l'importance de l'articulation des relations informelles du type horizontal sur ces bureaucraties pour la dynamique de la vie quotidienne (Verdery, 1991, 2000). Les pratiques informelles, réunies autour du concept *d'économie secondaire*, ont été largement traitées dans de nombreux travaux et ouvrages d'anthropologie sur l'Europe de l'Est. A coté de la littérature fournie par les sociologues hongrois et les anthropologues occidentaux sur l'économie secondaire, un autre concept important, du à la chercheur britannique Caroline Humphrey, c'est celui de *ressources manipulables*, qui porte sur le surplus par rapport au plan initial, non comptabilisé officiellement, et distribué de manière informelle. Ces ressources manipulables formaient la base économique des « trafiquants » et des « spéculants » (Humphrey, 1998, 9).

Tandis que cette littérature aborde avec efficacité les relations sociales crées par la production (Verdery, 1991 ; Humphrey, 1998 ; Berdahl, 1999 ; Ledeneva, 1995, 1999), la nature de la consommation pendant le socialisme a été beaucoup moins approfondie. Moins présentes ont été les approches

sémiotiques et symboliques concernant la possession des biens de consommation comme activité en soi, plutôt que point terminus de la production et de la distribution. Il existe ainsi la supposition que les mêmes types de pratiques de consommation dans une société affluente, comme dans une société de pénurie.

Une ethnographie plus récente qui traite de certaines pratiques associées à la pénurie est celle de Daphne Berdahl (1999) portant sur l'Allemagne de l'Est avant et après l'unification. A coté des divers types de capital suggérés par Pierre Bourdieu et la littérature mentionnée ci-dessus sur l'économie secondaire, Berdahl utilise –isolément, c'est vrai- un type d'approche associé avec celui d'Appadurai, c'est-à-dire une attention supplémentaire, spéciale portée sur la signification et la biographie des choses (objets). C'est dans cette direction que nous engagerons la discussion de l'ethnographie de Berdahl, car nous croyons que ces objets, vu leur rareté chronique pendant le socialisme, ont acquis une nature différente de celle qu'ils auraient eue normalement dans un contexte affluent. Des biens qui auraient été des marchandises dans une économie de marché empruntaient certaines propriétés des dons ou des raretés. Etant parfois extraits à la circulation, ces produits transcendaient la dichotomie marchandise-don par le rajout de certaines dimensions additionnelles comme l'aliénabilité – l'inaliénabilité.

Quels sont les éléments spécifiques à la consommation à l'époque socialiste que Berdahl a identifiés dans son ethnographie ? L'auteur a axé son étude sur les objets de l'Ouest, car ceux-ci constituaient la consommation productive par le fait que « par l'échange ou l'étalement, ces objets étaient une forme de capital par eux-mêmes » (Berdahl, 1999, 122)[1]. La suggestion de Carrier et de Heyman dit que « ce que nous apprenons sur la consommation dépend de la modalité dont nous sélectionnons les biens que nous étudions », comme d'ailleurs leur avertissement qu' « on ne peut pas se permettre d'étudier seulement certains biens, vu leur style, le marketing ou leur visibilité subculturels » (Carrier et Heyman, 1997, 362) sont très corrects. Les biens de consommation quotidiens jouaient un rôle essentiel dans la reproduction de l'inégalité dans le socialisme. Ils faisaient partie des schémas de pourboires et relations, mais, à la différence de leurs correspondants occidentaux, ces produits n'étaient pas « productifs » (Berdahl, 1999), c'est-à-dire qu'ils ne produisaient pas du capital symbolique.

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Les particularités incluaient certaines formes qui pouvaient paraître irrationnelles dans une économie de consommation. Un de ces phénomènes est représenté par l'emmagasinement, une pratique très courante dans les ménages » (Berdahl, 1999, 121). On a l'exemple d'une femme qui, pour la fête du majorat de son fils, a commencé de bonne heure à stoker des produits pour pouvoir nourrir tous les invités au jour prévu. Le recyclage des cadeaux est une autre pratique qui apparaît dans la description: « Etant donnée la rareté de la plupart des articles de consommation, il n'était pas rare ou impoli que les cadeaux reçus aient été offerts par la suite à d'autres » (Berdahl, 1999, 122). L'auteur mentionne encore la pratique du collage d'étiquettes (celles de bananes Chiquita) sur les appareils de télé, tout comme les étiquettes-réclames provenues de divers objets de l'Ouest, mais n'offre aucune interprétation d'ensemble pour de telles pratiques, sauf l'observation que tels biens gagnaient en valeur dans le domaine de la valeur d'étalage (Berdahl, 1999, 124).

Nous considérons que la définition implicite de la consommation qu'emploie Berdahl (elle n'en offre pas une autre, analytique) est fort réductrice. Il y a encore d'autres dimensions de la consommation qu'elle n'inclut pas dans sa description. L'anthropologue britannique Daniel Miller (1995 a, 16) a proposé la notion de *culture de la pénurie* dans le socialisme, quoiqu'il ne l'ait pas suffisamment élaborée. Si l'on adopte une définition plus large de la consommation, nous pourrions mieux décrire les dimensions de la notion proposée par Miller et partiellement traitée par Berdahl. Une définition plus complète de cette notion ajoute que celle-ci (la consommation) consiste aussi dans « la sélection, l'achat, l'utilisation, le maintien, la réparation et le renoncement à tout bien ou produit » (Campbell, 1995, 102). Quelques-unes parmi ces dimensions, comme par exemple le raccommodage, ou le renoncement tardif à des biens ont acquis une teneur spéciale dans les contextes de pénurie. Nous en reparlerons largement dans la troisième partie de cette étude.

Les exemples dont nous nous servirons ont été puisés dans le village (la commune) de Sântana, dans le département d'Arad, situé à la proximité de la frontière roumaine-hongroise. Pendant le printemps 1998 nous y avons réalisé des interwieus sur la période la plus dure de pénurie qui recouvre les années '80. La population actuelle de ce village est formée d'une communauté allemande vieillie, et qui se contracte de point de vue démographique, de même que de Roumains et de Roms. Dans le but que nous y avons envisagé, deux caractéristiques s'imposent à être mentionnées. Comme on le sait bien, à la fin des années '60, les Allemands ont commencé à émigrer en la RFA. Un nombre important d'immigrants ont continué à revenir à Sanatna à l'occasion des fêtes, tout en gardant ainsi leurs relations avec la famille et les anciens voisins. La circulation de ces personnes entre l'Allemagne et le village de Roumanie (Sântana) a constitué à la fois une circulation intense des biens et des faveurs.

En second lieu, tout comme dans le cas des localités situées dans la proximité des centres industriels (dans ce cas de figure, la ville d'Arad), la force de travail de Sântana connaissait une structure duale: il s'agissait des « ouvriers-paysans », en réalité une combinaison entre les hommes navetteurs et les femmes qui restaient dans le village, où elles travaillaient à l'association agricole communautaire. Ce fait a eu deux conséquences importantes. Tout d'abord, il a permis aux habitants du village de créer et de maintenir des relations avec diverses personnes de la ville d'Arad qui s'occupaient de la distribution des biens de consommation provenus de l'Ouest et des biens difficiles à trouver en général. A cela s'ajoute la division du travail selon le genre, qui a influencé la structure de la consommation par le fait qu'à la différence des hommes, pris avec un programme fixe dans les fabriques où ils travaillaient, les femmes bénéficiaient d'un programme plus flexible à la coopérative, ce qui leur permettait de participer au petit trafic[2].

Le trafic de frontière à Sântana : contextes nationaux et locaux

Bien que les économies socialistes n'aient jamais été généreuses en ce qui concerne l'offre des biens de consommation par rapport aux économies capitalistes, le long des années '60, '70, '80, les régimes est-européens ont abordé différemment le problème de la distribution vers la population. Tandis que la Hongrie ou la Pologne ont permis dans certaines limites la reprise d'une certaine partie des attributions que les économies centralisées ne pouvaient plus honorer, par les marchés, la Roumanie a préféré rester dans les limites d'une accumulation excessive de capital et de moyens de production. Malgré le fait que dans les années '60 l'Etat roumain a facilité l'accès aux biens de consommation, le long des années '70 et surtout '80 l'offre de biens et de services a été réduite au minimum.

Les gens se souviennent de la décennie passée comme d'une période de manques généralisés, bien que pas forcément de pauvreté. Les années '80 représentent une période différente de celles d'avant, lors de laquelle une série de nouveaux phénomènes ont parus, inscrits encore dans la matrice structurale du néostalinisme de Ceausescu. Pendant ces années, les services et les frais sociales pour la population ont rapidement diminué, inversement proportionnel avec l'augmentation des stratégies idéologiques de contrôle de la population. Pendant cette période se développent des formes culturelles (Chant de la Roumanie par exemple), selon le modèle et la ressemblance de l'accumulation excessive de moyens de production. Au fur et à mesure que les gens apprenaient des deux heures d'émission de la Télévision Roumaine qu'ils vivaient toujours mieux, ils se confrontaient à des manques de plus en plus sévères et évidents. A

[2] Pour une description des processus de cette commune, voir Chelcea et Lățea (2000).

cause de ces faits, ils étaient obligés à s'appuyer de plus en plus sur les réseaux informels et sur l'économie secondaire (Kligman, 1998, 38).

Après les espoirs engendrés par le bien-être relatif et la libéralisation des années '60 et du début des années '70, la période suivante, celle des années '80, a apporté le temps des queues[3] et de l'insécurité. L'Etat a imposé des restrictions sévères autant que frustrantes sur la quantité d'aliments accessibles à la population. L'an 1981 marque l'introduction des fameuses « rations » pour les aliments de base comme le pain, l'huile et le sucre, tout en limitant en même temps la consommation d'autres aliments. L'année suivante (février 1982) la rationalisation a été accompagnée de l'augmentation des prix de 220 aliments de 35 % (cf. Shafir, 1985, 117-118). Des frustrations supplémentaires ont été provoquées, à partir de 1982, par les interruptions fréquentes de l'énergie électrique fournie à la population. Souvent on interrompait le courant électrique plusieurs fois par jour, pour des intervalles qui variaient de quelques minutes à quelques heures. Bien qu'énervante en soi, l'imprédictibilité provoquée par la perturbation de la routine quotidienne contribuait à son tour au sentiment d'absence de contrôle[4] sur la vie quotidienne[5].

Le cynisme de cette situation était augmenté par les « recommandations » faite par la propagande par les mass-média. Comme Gail Kligman le dit (1998, 117), « la propagande occupait une place spéciale dans l'économie politique de la Roumanie. C'était l'une des rares activités où l'offre dépassait de loin la demande ». On recommandait aux gens de « ne pas trop utiliser les frigos, les aspirateurs, et d'autres appareils électroménagers » (Shafir, 1985, 118), tout en leur demandant en échange de « préserver la nourriture dehors, au frais, au moins pendant l'hiver, et de réduire au maximum l'utilisation des aspirateurs ou du chauffage centralisé » (Shafir, 1985, 117). Ces exhortations absolument pénibles dans les conditions des années '80, lorsque des sommes exorbitantes étaient utilisées pour des projets industriels qui se sont montrés voués à l'échec, étaient accompagnées par l'incrimination et la dénonciation dans les mass-média des situations impliquant « le gaspillage » ou « l'excès de consommation » de l'énergie électrique ou de l'eau. De façon semblable, la (sur)consommation d'aliments est médicalisée et pathologisée par l'intermédiaire de la littérature sur « l'alimentation rationnelle ». Mais la réduction de la demande de la part de la population était beaucoup plus difficile à réaliser que la réduction de l'offre.

Les manques dans les magasins ne voulaient pas forcément dire que les produits n'arrivaient pas chez les consommateurs, mais qu'ils y arrivaient par

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[3] Pour une analyse fort intéressante d'économie politique sur le phénomène de la queue, voir l'ouvrage de Pavel Cîmpeanu (1994).

[4] Nous avons appris que l'ancien journal Informatia Capitalei (L'information de la capitale) publiait des annonces qui indiquaient les horaires d'interruption de l'énergie électrique, horaires qui, dans la plupart des cas, n'étaient pas respectés.

[5] Pour ne pas dramatiser plus qu'il ne le faut, on dit que l'interruption du courant électrique était un motif de vraie joie pour les élèves de cette période, y inclus les soussignés.

des voies détournées. Par exemple, dans l'économie politique de la Roumanie, les habitants de Sântana avaient une situation à part. Il y existaient plusieurs stratégies et opportunités pour faire face aux manques du niveau macro-économique. Nous allons en mentionner quelques-unes, pour nous arrêter par la suite sur le tourisme de commerce dans sa variante particulière de Sântana, c'est-à-dire le petit trafic de frontière.

Une première possibilité, vraiment substantielle, était offerte par les touristes de l'ancienne Yougoslavie qui venaient à Arad (et dans toute la région de Banat) pour y commercialiser des vêtements, chaussures, jeans, montres électroniques, cigarettes ou bien des produits alimentaires. Ils arrivaient en cars touristiques, fait qui assurait une certaine constance de leur présence. Un jeune ouvrier qui était avant 1990 navetteur à Arad nous a dit que « le marché actuel existait aussi avant 1989, avec l'accord tacite de la police » (G. B., homme, 30 ans). Une autre possibilité, liée comme celle d'avant au contact direct avec les biens et produits étrangers était offerte par les ouvriers de Sântana qui travaillaient à l'Usine de wagons d'Arad. Certains parmi eux avaient eu l'occasion de travailler temporairement en Egypte, en Grèce ou en Syrie, d'où ils rapportaient des biens de consommation. On leur permettait de ramener une quantité importante de produits, et dans certains cas, même de transférer de la value en Roumanie. Une quantité importante de ces objets était vendue à la famille, aux amis.

Une autre stratégie était celle de la production indépendante de biens et services qui normalement auraient du être fournis par le système socialiste de distribution (ou de marché, dans le capitalisme). Par exemple, le même jeune ouvrier dont on vient de parler était dans les années '80 le DJ de la discothèque du village. Il nous a dit qu' »il y avait des studios-pyrate qui commercialisaient des cassettes, comme maintenant »[6] (G. B.). Un autre exemple de cette catégorie le constituent les installations artisanales de fabrication de l'alcool, dont l'utilisation par des personnes privées était illégale. Les « relations » et les « connaissances » étaient aussi une modalité importante dans l'obtention des biens de consommation. Avoir de la famille ou des amis dans des postes

[6] Il y a de nombreux exemples similaires de telles activités indépendantes. Par exemple, il y avait des individus spécialisés dans l'activité d'enregistrement de films sur des cassettes vidéo, qu'ils commercialisaient par la suite, en les louant ou en les vendant. Un ancien étudiant à la Polytechnique de Bucarest dans les années '80 nous a raconté comment il organisait des sessions vidéo. Il louait son appareil contre la somme de 500 lei par nuit, et il demandait par la suite une taxe à chaque jeune collègue qui voulait participer à l'évènement. Le programme standard de la soirée contenait une comédie, un *horror* et un film porno. A cela il ajoutait des services additionnels, comme des cigarettes et de la bière. De manière générale, les instituts polytechniques, les facultés de médecine, de sciences économiques et d'autre facultés qui avaient des étudiants étrangers (venus de Grèce, d' Irak, d'Egypte, Israël ou plus rarement de l'ancienne Yougoslavie) offraient des opportunités de trouver des produits de consommation rares, de même que de la value. Le milieu étudiant présentait une culture très originale et changeante, au moins pour ce qui est des possibilités de se procurer des biens de consommation rares. Il y avait encore les livres qui, dans divers contextes, étaient loués contre des sommes d'argent. Un autre exemple est fourni par les chauffeurs de taxis d'occasion, qui n'avaient pas d'enseignes sur leurs autos, mais qui abordaient directement leur virtuelle clientèle dans les arrêts de bus.

politiques ou fonctions administratives était un atout important[7]. Ce mécanisme est bien connu et il sert de référence constante dans les discussions sur le communisme.

Le sujet de ce chapitre porte cependant sur deux autres modalités de procuration des biens par les habitants de Sântana. La première est représentée par le petit trafic, le trafic de frontière avec la Hongrie. Le seconde modalité est représentée par les cadeaux, la marchandise et la value que les Allemands immigrés en Allemagne envoyaient ou apportaient avec pour les autres membres de la famille ou pour les amis restés à Sântana. Toutes les occasions énoncées ci-dessus étaient similaires au moins d'un point de vue, c'est-à-dire que pour pouvoir en profiter, les individus devaient avoir affaire, de façon ou d'autre, avec l'Etat. Ces deux dernières modalités occupaient une place à part dans l'économie de l'obtention des biens. Il existait une spécialisation des biens qui étaient procurés par ces deux niches: tandis que le principal avantage du commerce avec la Hongrie était constitué par la procuration de la nourriture industriellement procésée, le principal avantage offert par le circuit dans lequel les Allemands étaient engagés c'était la procuration de télé-couleur et d'électroménagers. Ils commercialisaient d'autres produits aussi, mais le point d'attraction le représentaient les électroménagers.

Le petit trafic en Hongrie

Le petit trafic est devenu une pratique de masse pour la population de Sântana vers la fin des années '70, lorsque la crise des biens de consommation devenait de plus en plus sévère. Cette opportunité avait existé aussi dans les années '60, à ce que disent les personnes interrogées, mais personne ne se souvient l'avoir pratiquée. Par contre, les gens se souviennent qu'avant les années '60, les habitants d'au-delà de la frontière venaient dans la région d'Arad pour acheter des produits qu'ils ne trouvaient pas en Hongrie. De même, on se rappelle que dans les années '70 les Hongrois venaient en Roumanie pour vendre non plus des choses qui y manquaient, mais des produits de qualité meilleure. A partir de la seconde moitié des années '70, les habitants de Sântana ont commencé à se servir de cette occasion lors d'une stratégie d'adaptation au contexte économique défavorable.

Le petit trafic était un privilège accordé aux habitants des localités situées à moins de 20 km de la frontière[8]. Dans cette section de notre étude nous allons décrire la manière dont on se servait de ce privilège, qui en étaient les

[7] Voir par exemple les « stratégies » du parrainage dans un village de Maramureş. De commun accord avec leurs parents, les jeunes futurs mariés choisissaient comme parrains des individus qui détenaient des positions importantes dans l'administration locale ou celle de parti (Kligman, 1998, 35 – 39).

[8] Sauf la frontière de l'Ouest, les frontières avec la Yougoslavie et celle de Bulgarie constituaient également des points d'attraction. Malheureusement, nous ne savons pas grand-chose sur la frontière avec l'ex-URSS.

bénéficiaires, un voyage de ce type, de même que l'expérience des villageois en Hongrie.

Le petit trafic permettait aux Roumains de ces zones de sortir du pays pour faire des achats en Hongrie. Ils avaient la permission de voyager en Hongrie sur une distance de 30 km, mais on leur demandait de rendre leurs passeports de petit trafic à la police, dans un délai de 24 heures après leur délivrance. Ces paysans avaient la possibilité de voyager dans ces conditions 12 fois par an, et la somme qu'ils avaient le droit de dépenser à chaque sortie du pays était de 250 lei, environ 1/8 d'un salaire moyen d'avant 1989. La procédure d'obtention d'un tel passeport était relativement simple. On devait rédiger une lettre de demande, et dans maximum 30 jours ils avaient leurs passeports. Tout passeport devait être renouvelé chaque année. A partir de 1984, on a restrictionné le droit à un passeport de ce type, un seul membre d'une famille pouvant en bénéficier, essayant de limiter ainsi la possibilité qu'avaient les Roumains de quitter leur pays. Théoriquement, tous les habitants de Sântana avaient ce privilège ; en réalité, les bénéficiaires en étaient de moins en moins nombreux.

Bien que la procédure ait été simple, ce privilège n'était pas distribué de manière égale aux habitants de la commune. La première catégorie de personnes qui n'avaient pas ce droit et qui formait la moitié de cette population, c'étaient les Allemands du village. Ceux qui avaient pris cette décision (à un niveau beaucoup plus haut que celui de l'élite politique locale) craignaient, et pour des raisons, le fait que de cette manière ces Allemands eussent pu quitter le pays. Et la « perte » d'un Allemand signifiait la perte de 8000 jusqu'à 20000 marks allemands, somme exigée par les employés de la Sécurité qui supervisaient l'attribution du visa de sortie pour l'Allemagne. Un officier de police de Sântana nous a raconté que chaque fois qu'un Allemand réussissait à sortir en Hongrie, le poste de police étaie durement critiqué[9]. Le même refus était valable pour les Roumains des couples mixtes. Ce n'étaient tout de même pas les Allemands qui se plaignaient de cette situation, car ils craignaient que chaque confrontation avec les autorités aurait pu affecter leurs chances d'obtenir des visas d'immigration pour l'Allemagne (voir à ce sujet Verdery, 1985).

Il y avait des cas de refus d'attribution du passeport à des membres de l'élite politique et administrative du village, car il aurait été de mauvais aloi pour le parti que son discours eut été contredit par ses tenants mêmes. Une personne de l'ancienne élite du village nous a dit que ces demandes de passeport étaient

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[9] Selon les dires de cet agent de police, l'expérience la plus courante d'un Allemand qui réussissait à s'échapper le portait soit vers un foyer de réfugiés, soit vers le travail illicite en Hongrie. Là où il était, ce réfugié attendait que sa famille, ou un ami paie la somme réclamée pour son arrivée en Allemagne. Cet agent de police était mécontent du fait qu'au lieu d'obtenir de l'argent de la « vente » des Allemands pour l'Allemagne ici, en Roumanie, c'était l'appareil hongrois similaire qui en profitait. Reste à vérifier si les autorités hongroises pratiquaient le même système que celui de Roumanie.

signées aussi par la Sécurité. Les gens sur lesquels on avait eu des renseignements qu'ils protestaient parfois contre ce qui s'y passait n'avaient plus aucune chance d'obtenir les passeports. Ces chances étaient également réduites pour ceux qui avaient de la famille à l'étranger. Quelqu'un avait formulé et justifié de pareilles restrictions en termes de moralité : « Les gens devaient être sérieux pour obtenir le passeport » (la famille Z.). Le « sérieux » portait sur une idéologie stricte du travail, à laquelle n'avaient pas accès probablement les Roms, les « spéculants » et les jeunes gens qui n'avaient pas encore un emploi stable.

On peut se poser une question légitime sur l'identité de ceux qui pouvaient bénéficier du petit trafic. Au-delà des restrictions liées à l'octroi de ce permis, il faut dire que tout le monde ne le demandait pas. Nous avons essayé d'obtenir quelques estimations sur le pourcentage de ceux qui étaient impliqués dans le petit trafic, mais personne n'a pu nous fournir des données exactes[10]. C'est surtout les familles à un standard moyen de vie qui le pratiquaient : « Ceux qui étaient pris dans le petit trafic étaient plus émancipés » (F. N. – femme, 29 ans). De même, les possesseurs d'une auto étaient d'habitude plus actifs lorsqu'il s'agissait d'obtenir un passeport, puisqu'ils avaient des facilités à se déplacer, et qu'ils pouvaient emmener avec d'autres habitants du village qui voulaient aller aux achats en Hongrie (service contre lequel ils étaient rémunérés). Pour les familles pauvres de Sântana, le petit trafic était un luxe qu'on ne pouvait pas se permettre. La première obstruction venait du fait qu'ils ne disposaient pas de l'argent nécessaire pour faire un pareil voyage. Un autre nous a dit qu'une autre raison pour laquelle certains habitants n'essayaient pas d'obtenir le passeport était constituée par leur peur d'être enquêtés une fois de retour.

Au début, ces habitants étaient contents et à la fois curieux d'avoir cette occasion de se procurer des biens que les autres ne pouvaient pas avoir, mais au bout d'un certain temps cela rentrait dans leur quotidien. Par rapport aux habitants d'autres régions de la Roumanie, leur situation était meilleure. Par exemple, pour les habitants de la capitale, les produits auxquels les paysans de Sântana avaient toujours eu accès (tout spécialement les jeans et le coca-cola) sont devenus accessibles seulement après 1989. Ce qui paraissait normal dans la zone de la frontière, était une chose à envier dans d'autres zones géographiques[11].

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[10] Pourtant, la plupart des estimations montrent que 15 – 20% de la population disposait d'un passeport. Si l'on tient compte du fait qu'on interdisait aux Allemands ce fait, et que chaque adulte possesseur d'un passeport agissait dans le cadre de sa famille, on peut imaginer l'ampleur du phénomène.

[11] Le commerce intérieur avec des produits provenus de la Yougoslavie ou de Hongrie était à son tour important. La ville de Timisoara était célèbre pour l'existence des produits étrangers. De nombreux Roumains d'autres régions du pays, comme la Moldavie, ou l'Olténie, s'y rendaient pour acheter des produits. Il y en avaient qui s'étaient spécialisés dans cette activité, bien que le commerce intérieur de ce type fut dangereux.

Le contrat social entre l'Etat et la population

Bien qu'il y eut des restrictions au sujet du nombre de sorties par an, du terme du voyage ou bien au sujet des produits qui pouvaient être transportés, on peut conceptualiser un contrat social entre les autorités et les habitants du village impliqués dans le petit trafic. Il consistait dans le fait de remercier les autorités de leur consensus tacite à la transgression des limitations imposées par l'Etat. La récompense était doublement orientée : vers les individus qui travaillaient dans les institutions, et vers les institutions.

Les gains individuels (des pourboires) étaient certainement un ingrédient important de la pratique du petit trafic. La plupart des gens que nous avons interrogés à ce sujet reconnaissent qu'ils ignoraient à bon escient toutes les restrictions. Rapporter de la Hongrie des biens qui dépassait la somme admise de 250 lei (situation valable dans la majorité des cas) créait un cadre de négociation avec les autorités locales, les douaniers et les agents de police du village. Le prix de l'ignorance des standards « légaux » par les autorités était le plus souvent un demi-kilo de café ou un paquet de « bonnes » cigarettes. Les divers degrés de contrôle/indifférence avaient des prix correspondants différents. Par exemple, si quelqu'un n'avait aucun problème mais n'était pas dispos à se faire contrôler à la frontière, un petit cadeau pour le douanier résolvait tout de suite sa doléance. On nous a raconté qu'il y avait des situations ou contre un petit cadeau on « oubliait » de mettre le tampon sur le passeport.

Probablement que moins connues que les bénéfices individuels étaient les « attentions » offertes aux institutions de l'Etat comme résultat de l'activité de petit trafic. Les autorités essayaient de gagner quelque chose non seulement au niveau personnel, mais aussi au niveau de l'institution. Les dernières années de cette période, lorsque les gens venaient pour prolonger leurs passeports, les autorités profitaient de cette situation pour conclure des contrats d'acquisition de produits agricoles obtenus par les paysans par leurs moyens individuels, par leur travail[12]. Certaines personnes interviewées se rappellent que lorsqu'on allait à la police pour prolonger ou renouveler le passeport, on devait savoir que l'institution manquait d'articles de papeterie. Alors, il était normal d'offrir comme cadeau de pareils articles, d'origine hongroise ou roumaine, peut importait. La situation était similaire pour d'autres institutions locales de l'Etat.

Au-delà des petits profits mutuels que la relation des personnes impliquées dans le petit trafic et les autorités facilitait, une autre partie du contrat social portait sur le silence imposé au sujet des voyages en Hongrie. Une jeune fille dans cette période qui accompagnait sa maman lors de ses

[12] A partir de 1984, comme suite aux mesures de recentralisation, le gouvernement a commencé à forcer les paysans à vendre à l'Etat une partie de leurs produits agricoles et animaliers (voir Shafir, 1985, 117).

déplacements en Hongrie nous a confié qu' « il y avait une sorte de secret à aller en Hongrie ; les gens n'en parlaient pas souvent » (F. N. – femme, 29 ans).

Trois types de tourisme pour le commerce

Ceux qui étaient engagés dans le petit trafic peuvent être rangés en trois catégories, selon qu'ils entendaient utiliser cette opportunité : les touristes orientés vers la maison (le ménage), vers le profit et vers les loisirs. Nous allons les décrire tour à tour.

Le groupe le plus consistant était formé par les personnes qui pratiquaient le petit trafic pour pouvoir aux besoins de la maison. Cela se traduisait en l'achat de produits qui faisaient défaut en Roumanie, mais qui n'étaient pas destinés au petit négoce. Les gens avec lesquels nous avons parlé disent que 9 sur 10 parmi eux allaient en Hongrie pour compenser au manque de produits de consommation nécessaires à la maison. Une femme qui dans les années '80 pratiquait le petit trafic à coté de sa maman nous a dit qu'on faisait le petit trafic « vraiment fort peu pour de l'argent. On le faisait pour pourvoir à sa famille, à sa maison' (F. N. – femme, 29 ans). La même personne, en parlant des touristes orientés vers le profit, a dit qu'il y avait « des individus qui allaient en Hongrie pour gagner de l'argent. Ils s'y rendaient très souvent. Mais pas nous (sa famille). Nous y allions seulement 3 ou 4 fois par an, lorsque nous avion spécialement besoin de quelque chose » (F. N.). Mais la fréquence de ces voyages variait beaucoup. Un autre nous a raconté qu'on y allait chaque fois que l'on avait besoin de quelque chose. Une autre femme se rappelle qu'elle avait surtout besoin de jus d'oranges et de café, et que pour ces produits elle se rendait en Hongrie surtout avant les fêtes.

Un aspect intéressant du tourisme « de maison » se trouve dans le fait qu'il était pratiqué surtout par les femmes. Cela s'explique par le fait que les femmes de Sântana constituaient, comme on l'avait déjà précisé, la principale force de travail engagée à la CAP, ce qui voulait dire un programme plus flexible que celui des hommes, qui travaillaient dans les fabriques à Arad. Leur liberté plus grande à planifier le temps, et, conséquemment, à voyager en Hongrie, était très importante dans ce contexte. Son succès dépendait des possibilités de se procurer la marchandise qui devait être vendue dans le pays voisin, de l'existence d'un moyen de transport (train ou auto), voire même des horaires selon lesquels travaillaient les douaniers[13].

De plus, dans la division du travail dans les ménages, c'est aux femmes que revenait de s'occuper de la cuisine et des enfants. Cela constituait un facteur

[13] On sait qu'ils existaient des douaniers enclins aux compromis, mais aussi de ceux qui étaient inflexibles. Les derniers étaient évités, pour ne pas risquer de se faire confisquer par eux la marchandise.

supplémentaire qui faisait que les femmes aient été présentes dans le petit trafic. Une autre femme qui dans les années '80 allait en Hongrie avec sa mère a dit qu'il « s'agissait en premier lieu des femmes qui n'étaient pas très jeunes, qui avaient dépassé la quarantaine. Vous savez, quand on est jeune, on n'est pas très à l'aise d'aller au marché et d'y rester tout le jour pour vendre quelque chose. Mais les femmes plus âgées ont plus de courage, plus d'expérience, plus d'aptitudes à communiquer » (L. N. – femme, 30 ans).

Un voyage habituel impliquait des préparatifs qui commençaient une semaine avant. Le premier pas, c'était de se procurer, par des voies personnelles, des biens qui pouvaient être vendus en Hongrie. Puis, on devait s'intéresser auprès des autres et voir s'il y avait d'autres possibles compagnons ou quels étaient les produits dont les amis et la famille avaient besoin. Car apporter des choses dont les autres avaient besoin était une pratique très courante. Ces produits étaient destinés aux proches et aux voisins le plus souvent. Cette distribution directe, de personne à l'autre, était favorisée aussi par le fait qu'avant 1989 le commerce avec des produits de l'étranger dans les marchés était défendu. On ne tenait pas toujours compte de cet interdit, on continuait à vendre des produits, mais on risquait de se les faire confisquer.

Le plus souvent, ceux qui pratiquaient ce type de tourisme voyageaient par petits groupes, la destination étant toujours la Hongrie (aller – retour). Ces groupes comptaient de deux à cinq personnes. Une fois arrivé dans les villages du pays voisin, le groupe se séparait, chacun cherchant à vendre ses produits. L'argent obtenu, chacun faisait ses achats et on se rendait par la suite dans les lieux établis (les gares ou les parkings). Une autre séparation se produisait au point de contrôle de la frontière, bien qu'ici encore les touristes aient convenu de s'entraider (par exemple, reprendre la marchandise à quelqu'un que l'on avait refusé à la frontière).

Mais qu'est-ce que les touristes vendaient en Hongrie ? Une réponse simple ce serait : des choses similaires à celles qui existaient en Hongrie, mais à des prix moins chers. Les acheteurs de produits apportés de Roumanie étaient des personnes qui vivaient de salaires moyens ou minimums en Hongrie. Un habitant de Sântana nous a raconté qu'on vendait au marché « des choses qui étaient moins chères que là-bas. Les Hongrois aisés faisaient leurs achats dans les beaux magasins, ils ne fréquentaient pas les marchés » (F. G. - femme, 56 ans). Un autre raconte que « les Roumains réussissaient à vendre leurs produits parce qu'ils les vendaient à des prix très bas, et c'était du neuf … Les Hongrois appréciait cela » (L. N.). Il y avait certaines catégories de produits que l'on vendait bien eh Hongrie : assiettes, verres, tasses, équipement, porcelaine ; équipement pour les installations d'eau ménagère ; articles de lingerie : dessous, pyjamas, draps, soutien-gorges ; meuble ; fleurs ; noix.

Pour se procurer ces produits, les habitants de Sântana avaient deux possibilités, les deux impliquant l'Etat en tant que producteur de biens. Les

produits fabriqués en Roumanie étaient achetés dans le système de distribution ou bien soustraits dans les fabriques où certains habitants du village étaient employés. Si on les trouvait dans les magasins, comme par exemple la verroterie et la porcelaine, tout était simple, pas besoin de complications supplémentaires. Mais si les produits recherchés en Hongrie étaient difficiles à trouver, il fallait mettre en branle tout un système de relations. Comme on l'a précisé ci-dessus, les appréciations de Janos Kornai quant au marché des vendeurs s'appliquent encore très bien ici : « Il existe une compétition des acheteurs pour les faveurs des vendeurs, ou, plus exactement, pour sa volonté à vendre [...] l'acheteur essaie de flatter le vendeur et à gagner sa bienveillance » (Kornai, 1992, 248).

Comme les produits fabriqués en Roumanie n'étaient pas destinés au marché de l'intérieur (les fameux produits pour l'exportation), les touristes devaient avoir des relations spéciales avec le producteur, c'est-à-dire les individus impliqués dans la production, mais surtout dans la distribution de ces produits. Le plus souvent, ces relations étaient en fait des liens spéciaux avec les fabriques ou avec le réseau de distribution (les magasins de campagne), des liens basés sur la parenté ou sur des relations d'échange. Par exemple, certains individus du petit trafic étaient renseignés par le vendeur que certains produits allaient arriver au magasin. Le jour suivant, toute la quantité de ces produits était achetée par les touristes du petit trafic. Même si, par exemple, un certain magasin de village avait un accord avec une fabrique d'équipement sportif d'une ville (Piatra Neamt), la plupart de ces pièces étaient commercialisées en Hongrie.

La seconde modalité de se procurer ces produits c'était de les soustraire au lieu du travail, à la CAP ou dans certaines fabriques. Par exemple, une femme qui pratiquait ce type de commerce pour en tirer du profit vendait en Hongrie des objets (des produits de linge intime et des serviettes) soustraits par son mari dans la fabrique où il travaillait (*Tricoul Rosu / Le tee-shirt rouge*). Celui-ci nous a raconté qu'il y avait une compétition très serrée entre les habitants du village à se faire des amis parmi ceux qui avaient accès à la fabrique et qui pouvaient en procurer des produits. Le caractère très « faible » de l'Etat socialiste permettait aux employés de voler des produits, dans les fabriques ou à la CAP. Cela ne veut pourtant pas dire que les ouvriers ou les administrateurs étaient encouragés à voler (malgré le fait que de pareils réseaux se formaient parfois avec l'accord des directeurs). Il ne faut pas oublier qu'il y avait des cas d'individus arrêtés et jugés pour vols. Dans de nombreuses situations, ceux qui étaient surpris au moment du vol le faisaient sans l'accord de leurs chefs ou du personnel de garde.

Une fois obtenus et transportés au-delà de la frontière, ces produits étaient commercialisés dans les marchés des villages et des petites villes à la proximité

de la frontière[14]. Les localités mentionnées le plus souvent sont : Gyula, Lokoshaza, Bekescsaba, Ketegyhaza, Mehkerek.

« Que nos magasins soient tout aussi remplis de marchandises ! » : l'expérience hongroise

Les voyages, mais surtout le séjour proprement-dit en Hongrie de ceux qui pratiquaient le petit trafic suscitaient la curiosité, et, en égale mesure, l'admiration enthousiaste envers ce qu'on y voyait et envers les Hongrois. L'objet de l'admiration était déterminé par la manière dont chacun comprenait la situation de là-bas. La plupart des gens étaient étonnées par le standard de vie et par la variété des produits dans les magasins. Une jeune femme nous a avoué :

Comment dire ? ... Quand j'ai vu tout le luxe qu'il y avait... et c'est si près de nous, à quelques km de la frontière. Ils avaient tout, on trouvait tout... Et chez nous, il n'y avait rien, ni vêtements, ni aliments. Nous apportions tout de là-bas [...]. Ils étaient nombreux ceux qui s'exclamaient : « Que nos magasins soient tout aussi remplis de marchandises ! » (A. M. – femme, 30 ans).

Quelqu'un d'autre nous a dit qu'il était fasciné par le fait que les étalages débordaient, et il ne savait pas comment faire pour choisir parmi tant de produits. Une autre personne, une adolescente de cette période a raconté :

J'éprouvais un plaisir très vif à aller en Hongrie. J'attendais avec impatience que maman me dise qu'il fallait y aller, pour acheter ou simplement pour regarder (L. N.)

La même personne se rappelle qu'elle avait été très impressionnée par l'aspect hygiénique, très soigné des aliments : « Leurs aliments étaient très propres. Tout était joliment présenté, emballé (?) en aluminium ou plastique. Chez nous, maintenant encore on peut toucher du doigt les saucisses et autres aliments » (L. N.)

Une autre femme a suggéré que la frustration provoquée par l'absence des produits de consommation a été à l'origine des changements de 1989 :

_Qu'est-ce qui était différent en Hongrie par rapport à la Roumanie ?

_ On savait bien que Ceausescu était un communiste endurci, et qu'on ne pouvait rien faire sans être arrêté dessus. On craignait toujours quelque chose. On se demandait comment ici, en Hongrie, tout près, la vie était si facile, et chez nous, on était comme enchaîné. Nous n'avons plus résisté... C'est pour cela

[14] Certains touristes, d'habitude ceux qui possédaient une auto, s'aventuraient plus loin, vers Szeged, Miskolc ou même Budapest.

qu'on a eu la Révolution de 1989 [...]. Je ne sais pas ce que nous aurions fait si l'on n'avait pas eu la Révolution (V. C. – femme, 32 ans).

Une famille d'intellectuels nous a raconté avec plus de détails leurs impressions liées aux différences des contextes économiques des deux cotés de la frontière. L'impression qu'ils s'étaient faite sur la Hongrie était soutenue aussi par le fait qu'ils avaient des amis à Gyula, avec lesquels ils se visitaient régulièrement. Selon eux, la situation en Hongrie était meilleure parce que « les Hongrois sont plus civilisés et ils avaient fait des réformes beaucoup avant nous ». Ce qu'ils y ont le plus apprécié ont été les chemins (les chaussées) et les maisons. Comme des gens qui vivaient ici à la campagne, ils ont été enchantés de constater que là-bas « il y avait le même confort, et les mêmes prix qu'en ville » (la famille Z.). Les maisons où ils ont été logés en Hongrie leur ont laissé une impression de bon goût, surtout parce que « il n'y avait pas autant de porcelaine, mais plutôt de la céramique, de la poterie de qualité' (la famille Z.).

Les touristes avaient peu de relations avec les Hongrois, sauf les relations commerciales qu'ils rangeaient dans les marchés. Ils racontent que les Hongrois avaient appris quelques mots en roumain, des formules de salut et des mots les aidant à s'intéresser aux prix. A leur tour, les Roumains avaient appris à compter en hongrois. Tous ceux que nous avons interrogés avouent qu'ils ont eu des relations positives avec les Hongrois. Une jeune femme se rappelle la joie qu'elle a éprouvée lorsque, dans un parc, après avoir rendu à un enfant qui y jouait le ballon, les parents du petit l'avaient remerciée. Une autre femme du même groupe d'age, lorsqu'on lui demande de nous parler d'un événement spécial de cette période, se souvient qu'une fois, un garçon de son age a acheté chez sa voisine un bouquet de fleurs et il les lui a offert par la suite. Toutes les personnes interrogées parlent des Hongrois comme de gens très civilisés. Mais en même temps, ces récits liés à l'expérience hongroise laissent transparaître un sentiment d'humiliation[15] produit dans la plupart des cas dans les épisodes du contrôle douanier. D'autres fois, cette sensation était produite au niveau individuel par le fait de se trouver dans une position inférieure et incertaine, étant accompagnée par l'idéologie du stigmate ethnique. En voici un exemple :

- Comment étaient-ils les Hongrois simples ? Comment vous traitaient-ils ?
- Comment dire ?... Je me sentais comme si j'avais quémandé quelque chose. Je n'aimais pas ça, ils nous regardaient avec mépris, comme s'ils avaient dit : « Ce sont des Roumains, des retardés... Quand on était au marché, ils fallait les supplier d'acheter quelque chose... Ce n'était pas agréable pour nous, mais nous n'avions pas d'autres solutions (C. B. – femme, 31 ans).

Le stigmate ethnique était accompagné parfois aussi par le stigmate de la pauvreté. Une autre femme nous a parlé de sa sensation de honte qu'elle avait

[15] Il est probable que ce sentiment ait été beaucoup plus présent que les interwieus ne le montrent. Par timidité ou autres raisons, il y avait une certaine retenue à parler d'expériences désagréables.

éprouvée à la frontière dans un de ses voyages. Ayant vu dans son sac du pain qu'elle y avait acheté, le douanier hongrois lui a dit cyniquement : « Vous n'avez même pas de pain... ». De pareilles situations sont communes pour les gens qui ont eu des expériences similaires (quel que soit le contexte). Les petits commerçants des marchés étaient d'habitude méprisés, et on ne leur accordait pas beaucoup de respect. Chaque fois qu'il s'agit d'étrangers, on les considère représentatifs pour la nation ou pour le groupe auxquels ils appartiennent[16].

Les touristes orientés vers les besoins de la maison disposaient de moins de temps et de moins de ressources pour s'appliquer aux activités spécifiques aux autres touristes. Leur voyage en Hongrie, bien qu'investi de beaucoup de significations et d'affects, était fort routinier. Cependant, à la fin de leur petit commerce, après avoir vendu leurs produits, ils « daignaient » prendre une bière (une bonne bière) ou un coca. La forme maximum de consommation qu'ils pouvaient se permettre et que la majeure partie de ces gens ont connue, c'était les saucisses (Kolbasz) qu'ils mangeaient au marché, juste avant le départ de leur train du midi.

Après avoir vendu leur marchandise, d'habitude en début d'après midi, les touristes faisaient leurs courses. Les biens qu'ils achetaient étaient décrits surtout en termes d'utilité dans ce contexte de la pénurie : « des choses dont on avait besoin et qui manquaient chez nous ». Quelqu'un de plus cynique, mais d'ailleurs très expressif, a sommairement décrit la situation de la manière suivante :

- Qu'est-ce que les gens achetaient en Hongrie ?
- Tout.
- C'est-à-dire ?
- Tout et n'importe quoi... Imaginez un vieil homme ou une vieille femme qui allaient à bicyclette jusqu'en Hongrie pour acheter un œuf. On y achetait tout ! (L. G. – homme, 56 ans).

Mais le plus souvent on y achetait du café, du cacao et des aliments. L'huile te le beurre, produits-fantome en Roumanie, étaient également très achetés, à la différence des vêtements ou des chaussures.

Les voyages en Hongrie n'étaient pas seulement une niche très profitable, mais sont devenus un indice de status. Une des femmes avec lesquelles nous avons parlé a affirmé qu' « on pouvait reconnaître quelqu'un qui avait été en Hongrie selon ses vêtements de meilleure qualité, et plus élégants » (C. B., 30 ans).

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[16] L'exemple le plus courant est celui des Bessarabiens ou Russes (nom générique pour les individus de l'ex-URSS) qui vendent des produits dans les marchés roumains après 1990.

Les touristes orientés vers le profit voyageaient en Hongrie au moins toutes les deux semaines, grâce aux relations qu'ils avaient établies avec les individus impliqués dans les institutions de l'Etat. Ceux-ci étaient tout de même très peu nombreux. Selon les informations qu'on a obtenues d'un agent de police et de deux anciens membres de l'élite locale, on sait qu'il s'agissait de 20 personnes, sur une population de 12000. Parmi ceux-ci, il y avait de nombreuses femmes. Les touristes orientés vers le profit ressemblent à ceux qui ont apparu en Roumanie après 1989, ou à ceux qui sont décrits par Yulian Kostantinov (1996). D'ailleurs, la plupart d'entre eux se sont transformés en touristes professionnistes après 1989.

La catégorie des touristes orientés vers le loisir était formée par ceux qui pouvaient assurer les frais de voyage (considéré comme loisir) par un peu de commerce. Une femme nous a raconté qu'elle avait vendu certains objets à Gyula seulement pour couvrir les frais de voyage, et pour quelques cadeaux. Après avoir vendu sa marchandise, elle est allée en ville se promener, et elle s'est arrêtée dans un café. Un jeune homme (adolescent à l'époque) qui a été peu de fois en Hongrie avec son père nous a dit :

La curiosité était grande. Qu'est-ce qu'on y voit ? Comment c'est ? Les gens étaient très curieux. Et lorsqu'on commençait à raconter qu'on entre dans un supermarché où on peut tout voir, tandis que chez nous, dans nos magasins alimentaires il n'y avait que des légumes en conserve et des crevettes de Vietnam… On voulait certainement s'y rendre et voir tout ça de ses propres yeux (M. N. – homme, 31 ans).

La famille d'intellectuels dont on a parlé déjà se range très bien dans cette catégorie. On a parlé du fait qu'ils avaient des amis à Gyula où ils allaient leur rendre visite. Leurs amis venaient aussi chez eux, en Roumanie, mais le plus souvent c'étaient eux qui allaient en Hongrie. Là-bas, ils les visitaient chez eux, à leur maison, mais ils pouvaient aussi « sortir en ville, prendre un bon café, manger un bon *gulas*, ou aller aux bains turcs » (la famille Z.)[17]. Pour cette catégorie, les voyages en Hongrie constituaient une occasion pour satisfaire certains besoins économiques mais aussi un besoin de se distinguer, associée avec la définition de la situation comme une occasion spéciale, qui valait des préparatifs spéciaux. Il faut dire que cette catégorie était faiblement représentée, tout comme celle des touristes orientés vers le profit, par rapport à la catégorie des touristes orientés vers les besoins de la maison. C'était un groupe formé de personnes qui allaient rarement dans le pays voisin, d'habitude à des occasions spéciales (fêtes religieuses, événements majeurs).

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[17] Ils faisaient aussi des achats, mais ils ont mis l'accent sur le loisir.

Les Allemands de Sântana et les produits de consommation : « colis » et « électroniques »

L'autre niche que nous allons décrire dans ce chapitre était soutenue par la population allemande, qui représentait une aide considérable dans les efforts de se procurer des électroménagers par les fameux « colis »[18] que l'on recevait de l'Allemagne.

Les Allemands de Sântana qui avaient déjà immigré en Allemagne essayaient d'aider leurs familles restées en Roumanie, de même que leurs amis. Il y avait deux moyens de le faire : soit par les biens qu'on apportait ou expédiait, soit par les avantages que fournissaient l'accès aux marks allemands. Souvent, les anciens Souabes de Sântana y revenaient faire des visites, apportant avec des objets de consommation, des électroménagers et de la value. Ils sont devenus de cette façon une ressource importante dans la situation de pénurie, et les liens d'amitié avec eux – un bien symbolique, à valeur pratique. De nombreux habitants du village ont laissé comprendre que les Allemands avaient une situation économique meilleure parce qu'ils recevaient des produits de l'Allemagne. On a aussi mentionné (plutôt de façon implicite) que des interactions constantes avec les Allemands immigrés ont été maintenues pour des raisons instrumentales. Tandis qu'une partie de ces biens était gardée pour l'usage personnel, le reste était distribué (vendu) aux autres habitants du village (Roumains ou Allemands). Ces produits étaient distribués ou bien par des réseaux d'amis, ou bien au marché du centre du village.

On avait le droit de recevoir des colis une fois par mois, ce qui assurait une relative indépendance par rapport à la pénurie qui régnait en Roumanie. Ces colis contenaient des cigarettes, du café, des cosmétiques, vêtements ou chaussures. Dans la plupart des cas, on les recevait déjà ouverts. Officiellement, le contenu devait être contrôlé à l'office postale où les colis arrivaient. Tout ce qu'il y avait dedans était contrôlé. Bien qu'il y eut un papier qui indiquait le contenu du colis, certains produits ici mentionnés n'étaient plus à trouver.

Les Allemands faisaient de petits dons à leurs amis roumains. Comme exemple de tels cadeaux on rappelle : des boites de noisettes, des stylos à bille, des rasoirs, des calendriers, etc. Dans les situations où les visiteurs allemands étaient logés chez des Roumains (ils étaient obligés de vendre leurs maisons avant d'immigrer), ou s'ils avaient besoin de leur aide dans certains problèmes (le plus souvent la charge des vieux parents restés dans le village), les cadeaux devenaient beaucoup plus consistants.

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[18] Avoir des amis ou des proches à l'étranger constituait un grand avantage dans l'obtention des biens de consommation, mais un obstacle dans la promotion politique ou professionnelle. Ce fait ne concernait pas seulement les groupes ethniques allemands. Par contre, le phénomène était répandu dans tous les pays communistes (nous remercions Mme Anne Wessely pour ces précisions).

On connaît surtout deux modalités par lesquelles les Allemands aidaient les Roumains à se procurer des électroménagers comme des télés couleur, des frigos ou des micro-ondes. La première était assez simple : un Roumain de Sântana avait un ami allemand qui à son tour avait un ami en Allemagne, qui était dispos à procurer et à apporter l'objet sollicité. Le sollicitant devait payer le produit à un prix que l'on avait négocié. La seconde stratégie était un peu plus compliquée en ce qui concerne le temps et l'effort réclamés. Supposons le cas où un tel revenait de l'Allemagne pour revoir sa famille. On devait changer les marks en lei ; comme le change offert par l'Etat était fort mauvais et que l'échange sur le marché libre était très risqué, les Allemands préféraient changer leur argent chez leurs amis roumains de Sântana. On avait besoin des marks allemands parce qu'à Arad, dans les grands hôtels, fonctionnaient les magasins du type « Duty free » (Shop)[19]. Un Allemand accompagnait son ami roumain dans ces magasins, il achetait ce dont l'ami avait besoin, et celui-ci lui donnait la somme correspondante en lei.

Une autre modalité d'obtenir des biens à l'aide des Allemands – plutôt aléatoire, mais d'autant plus profitable – était offerte par l'occasion où des familles d'Allemands immigraient en leur pays d'origine. On leur permettait d'avoir sur eux un nombre très réduit de produits lorsqu'ils quittaient la Roumanie. A cela s'ajoutait le fait qu'une fois le visas obtenu, ils essayaient de partir le plus vite possible, ce qui déterminait une vente de produits de l'Ouest à des prix très bas.

Les Allemands étaient également importants dans l'économie locale des biens en ce qui concerne les renseignements qu'ils fournissaient. La diffusion d'images portant sur la culture de masse de l'Ouest se réalisait par le prêt ou la vente de revues allemandes. C'étaient des catalogues de produits, des revues de mode (selon lesquelles s'orientaient certains couturiers de Sântana) ou bien des revues lues par les femmes. On demandait par exemple aux coiffeurs du village de s'inspirer de modèles vus dans ces revues. Des fois, c'étaient les objets mêmes qui remplaçaient les représentations :

- Est-ce que les Allemands avaient des électroménagers de l'Occident ?
- Oui, bien sur. Et on pouvait les voir chez eux.
- Pouviez-vous vous renseigner sur leur fonctionnement, sur leur mode d'emploi ?

[19] Ces magasins étaient destinés aux touristes étrangers. Le Roumain simple ne pouvait que regarder avec résignation tous les biens que l'on commercialisait dans ces magasins. Ceux qui avaient accès à ces magasins, c'étaient les, agents de la Sécurité, la direction des hôtels et d'autres chefs, moins officiels (qui étaient chargés du change de value). Ceux qui possédaient tout de même des comptes bancaires, d'habitude ceux qui avaient travaillé à l'étranger, étaient déconseillés et découragés dans ce sens. Détenir de la value imposait de la déposer dans une banque. Mais ici il y avait encore un problème, l'intérêt pratiqué étant de 7% par an.

- Si. Comme voisin, on pouvait demander « Mais qu'est-ce que c'est que ca ? » ; et ils montraient tout de suite à quoi cela servait. Oui, normalement, car ils étaient fiers de ce qu'ils avaient dans leurs maisons (M. N. – homme, 31 ans).

Au-delà des revues allemandes (Nekerman jouissait d'une fameuse réputation) et l'accès aux biens des maisons des Allemands, la communication directe avec ceux qui revenaient à Sântana pour visiter leurs prochains constituait une source efficiente d'informations sur ce qui se passait au-delà des frontières de la Roumanie. Quand nous avons demandé à une femme comment elle avait connu les micro-ondes (fours inexistants en Roumanie avant 1989) elle nous a dit qu'elle savait tout ça des ses amis allemands. « C'était le seul moyen par lequel nous pouvions encore communiquer avec l'Europe, avec l'étranger » (F. N. – 31 ans).

La culture socialiste de la pénurie : gérer les produits de consommation à la maison

Dans cette dernière section nous allons décrire les modalités dont les gens utilisaient ces biens, une fois obtenus. Nous insisterons sur la *culture de la pénurie* (Miller, 1995, 16), conçue comme un paquet de stratégies de management des produits de consommation rares. Nous utilisons la définition de la consommation proposée par le sociologue Colin Campbell (voir section no. 1). Nous avons été particulièrement intéressés par l'utilisation (la réutilisation), le maintien, le raccommodage de ces objets de consommation, de même que leur rejet (?), car les interwieus ont laissé entendre qu'il s'agissait là des stratégies-clés dans la culture de la pénurie.

L'obtention des biens : longs préparatifs, voyages et insécurité

Comme on le sait bien, l'achat des produits essentiels était beaucoup plus compliqué qu'il ne l'est actuellement en Roumanie, par rapport aux économies orientées vers la consommation. Janos Kornai a caractérisé l'achat dans les économies de pénurie plutôt comme un processus qu'un simple acte (comme dans le capitalisme). Cela veut dire qu'une personne devait prendre des décisions lorsqu'il s'agissait de l'achat d'un produit selon son existence ou inexistence. Les choix d'une telle personne qui s'engageait dans le processus de l'achat étaient les suivants : la queue, la substitution forcée, la recherche d'autres ressources, l'abandon de l'achat ou sa remise à plus tard (Kornai, 1992, 230 – 234).

Pour les habitants de Sântana, toutes ces alternatives étaient des choix auxquels ils étaient confrontés dans leur vie quotidienne. Le petit trafic, comme choix dans le processus de l'achat, supposait des préparatifs de longue durée, des voyages dans des lieux peu connus, un état d'insécurité. La même situation

était valable dans le cas de l'achat de services. Une femme nous a raconté que le médecin stomatologue chez lequel elle se soignait lui a suggéré d'acheter en Hongrie le matériau dentaire que l'on ne trouvait pas en Roumanie.

L'incertitude qui découlait de l'achat de produits pour ceux qui s'engageaient dans le petit trafic était assez grande. A la différence de l'incertitude engendrée par le manque d'informations utiles, spécifique aux touristes de l'Europe de l'Est qui voyageaient à l'étranger, ceux qui pratiquaient le tourisme pour le commerce détenaient assez d'informations sur les chemins, les lieux, les prix, et de façon générale sur le contexte hongrois qui les intéressait. En échange, pour eux l'incertitude apparaissait du coté de la quantité limitée de produits qu'ils pouvaient vendre, et par la suite acheter. On signale des situations où les commerçants du petit trafic ne pouvaient pas acheter grand-chose justement parce qu'ils ne pouvaient pas vendre une quantité importante. Dans ces situations, ils essayaient de trouver dans la localité de destination (du marché) quelqu'un qui puisse garder la marchandise jusqu'au prochain voyage. Une autre possibilité c'était de laisser la marchandise dans les dépôts de la douane lorsque les employés de cette institution refusaient d'établir un accord avec le touriste - commerçant.

Une autre incertitude était liée à la qualité. Parfois, il arrivait que ces gens achètent des produits expirés (périmés). Il arrivait aussi qu'ils ne sachent pas avec exactitude ce qu'un produit était, et quel était son état[20] . On signale des cas où ces « commerçants », ou même les touristes serbes qui venaient à Arad remplaçaient le contenu véritable des paquets de café, ou de Vegeta avec des haricots ou du sel[21]. Souvent, à cause de la présence des agents de police, on n'avait pas la possibilité de vérifier sur place l'authenticité de ces produits. Un cas similaire nous a été présenté par un jeune homme établi à Timisoara, qui voulait s'acheter des jeans « originaux ». Celui-ci avait trouvé des jeans chez quelqu'un qui les apportait de l'étranger.1800 lei la paire. Dès qu'il a payé, le vendeur s'est mis à crier : « La police ! Attention, la police ! ». Tout le monde s'est mis à courir. Au bout d'un demi-kilomètre, le jeune homme s'est arrêté pour regarder ses pantalons. Malheureusement, ils avaient été coupés en deux ; impossible de s'en servir et de récupérer son argent.

Les restrictions liées à la quantité de produits à acheter déclenchaient des comportements et des stratégies inhabituelles. En voici quelques exemples. Pour acheter plus d'essence que possible en Hongrie, de nombreux chauffeurs installaient des réservoirs cachés dans leurs autos[22]. Un autre exemple de

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[20] Bien sur, le problème de la langue dépassait de loin le moment proprement-dit de l'achat.

[21] De pareilles situations de falsification de produits étaient largement répandues. Un ancien étudiant à la Polytechnique de Bucarest des années '80 nous a fait connaître quelques-unes des manœuvres dont il se servait pour tromper ses clients. Il utilisait des flacons de spray célèbres pour leur nom, les remplissait d'autres solutions, très peu chères, et ils continuaient à les vendre au prix de la marque indiquée sur le flacon.

[22] Cette stratégie a été reprise avec succès par ceux qui « faisaient l'embargo » dans la zone de la frontière serbe vers les années 1993 – 1994.

déguisement de la marchandise dans des formes qui n'éveillent pas la suspicion était offert par une vieille femme habillée comme à la campagne. Elle nous a dit avec une certaine ironie qu'il y a tout de même quelques avantages au fait de vieillir. Maintenant[23] elle peut cacher des trucs sous ses vêtements, car les douaniers ne sont plus trop vigilants avec elle. D'une certaine façon, l'age conférait un plus de respect, d'une autre, les douaniers n'étaient plus motivés à effectuer des contrôles sévères, susceptibles d'une perversité quelconque. On a des récits liés aux tentatives du respect apparent des règlements concernant la douane. Un de ces récits parle du fait d'habiller plusieurs blouses à la fois avant de passer à la douane. Une autre histoire, suggestive à sa façon, est celle d'une jeune fille qui est allée en Hongrie avec sa maman, pour s'acheter une robe de fête pour la fin des études. Elle s'y est acheté des vêtements nouveaux qu'elle a tout de suite enfilés, tandis que ses anciennes nippes ont été jetées à la poubelle. Ces exemples se constituent selon nous en des arguments supplémentaires en faveur de la thèse que dans l'économie de pénurie la nature du procès d'achat est très différente de celle de l'acte homonyme dans les économies de consommation.

Bien que Janos Kornai ait décrit largement le processus d'achat, il n'a pas suffisamment élaboré la théorie de l'emploi des biens de consommation et non plus celle des profits secondaires dérivés de l'emploi. Nous en parlerons tout de suite.

L'emploi des biens de consommation : occasions spéciales et auto-rationalisations

Les interwieus que nous avons réalisées laissent voir deux aspects intéressants liés aux détails de l'emploi des biens destinés à la consommation. Le premier porte sur le fait que ces produits apportés de Hongrie ou d'Allemagne étaient utilisés de prédilection dans des occasions spéciales, comme la Noël, les Pâques, le Nouvel An, les anniversaires ou des visites de famille. De pareilles rationalisations de produits rares provenus de l'Ouest étaient fréquentes à Sântana. En voici quelques exemples :

- Si vous procuriez quelque chose que l'on ne trouvait pas, en de petites quantités, vous le consommiez tout de suite, ou bien vous en gardiez à plus tard ?
- Non, on ne consommait pas tout, car on ne savait pas quand serait la prochaine. Si l'on apportait par exemple dix chocolats, car chez nous ça n'existait pas, on ne les mangeait pas tous à la fois. On les gardait dans un lieu sur, et lorsqu'on avait envie de goûter un peu de chocolat, on prenait un tout petit peu. Maintenant, on trouve du chocolat partout (F. N. – femme, 29 ans).

[23] Elle parlait de la situation d'après 1989, mais de pareilles situations avaient été fréquentes avant.

Le revers de l'auto rationalisation, bien que fort rare, c'était la surconsommation. Une femme se rappelle qu'un jour elle avait reçu de sa tante venue de l'étranger un paquet de chewing-gum qu'elle avait consommé tout de suite. Elle a expliqué la situation de la manière : « Tout ce qu'on a eu a été toujours insuffisant. C'est pour cela que j'ai préféré manger tout d'un seul coup, à cause des manques trop fréquents » (A. G., 30 ans).

Malgré le fait que nous ne disposons pas de données suffisantes, nous pouvons supposer que la réutilisation de certains produits à emploi unique était assez connue. De même, l'exploitation à long terme de certains produits qui devaient être remplacés à certains intervalles était également répandue. De nombreux produits destinés à un groupe d'age (aux enfants par exemple) n'étaient pas jetés, mais raccommodés et réutilisés plus tard, par d'autres membres de la même famille, ou par des amis. Nous détenons de nombreuses histoires sur le recyclage et le raccommodage de biens de consommation.

La réutilisation créative des biens de consommation, leur reconditionnement et la renonciation tardive à ces produits

Les biens de consommation de l'Ouest, y inclus les produits alimentaires, étaient attractifs non seulement par leur qualité, mais aussi par un autre aspect. Ils gagnaient un plus de valeur grâce à l'aspect agréable de leur présentation, soit l'emballage de manière générale. A la fin de l'utilisation du produit, c'était le tour de son emballage ; on s'en servait pour décorer la cuisine, les chambres, pour d'autres activités ou seulement pour leur valeur affective. Nous en avons ici quelques exemples.

- On nous a dit que les gens gardaient les emballages des confiseries ou de trucs de ce genre. Est-ce que vous en savez quelque chose ?
- Oui, c'est vrai, nous aussi. Je me rappelle que le meilleur chocolat de Hongrie était Africana... Maintenant aussi peut-être. Moi, j'en gardais le papier.
- Pour quoi faire ?
- Rien. Il y en avaient qui collectionnaient toutes sortes d'objets, même ça, mais je n'en faisais rien (F. N. – femme, 29 ans).

Voici un fragment intéressant de la confession d'un homme qui, avant de se marier, habitait une rue où il y avaient beaucoup d'Allemands.

- Est-ce que tu gardais les boites vides ?
- Oui, je me souviens de quelques boites vides, de riz si je ne me trompe... Elles avaient un aspect spécial. Les nôtres étaient horribles. Les Allemands étaient habitués à cela. Tandis que nous, nous les utilisions comme décor dans la

cuisine, vides comme elles étaient. Ca donnait un air plus normal à nos cuisines qui paraissaient pleines de cette façon[24].
-Et d'où les aviez-vous ? Vous les demandiez aux Allemands ?
-Non... Ils les jetaient, ils n'en avaient pas besoin. Nous les récupérions aux endroits où ils les abandonnaient. Voilà. (M. N. – homme, 31 ans).

Le plus souvent, pour les cuisines on préservait les boites de jus de fruits. Un autre nous a raconté que chez lui on les utilisait dans la salle à manger, pour remplacer les bibelots qui en fait manquaient. Les boites de coca-cola et de bière servaient de «verres de café », ou de supports pour les crayons (G. D. – homme, 30 ans). Une femme nous a raconté qu'elle gardait tout ce qui venait de l'étranger. Elle préservait jusqu'aux étiquettes des produits, qu'elle collait par la suite sur le frigo ou sur les cahiers. Quand on lui a demandé pourquoi, elle nous a dit qu'à l'époque « les cahiers n'étaient pas si beaux que maintenant, ni si colorés. Le papier était de très mauvaise qualité » (A. G., 27 ans). Une situation représentative pour le changement de destination (de fonctionnalité) des produits étrangers, de façon que ceux-ci soient intégrés au contexte de la pénurie, était celle des savons. Les savons occidenţaux (Fa, Luxe) étaient gardés pour de longues périodes (parfois des années) sans être utilisés. Mis parmi les vêtements, dans les armoires, afin de répandre leur parfum, les savons remplaçaient ces produits qui d'habitude remplissent cette fonction d'assurer une odeur agréable dans un espace.

Un autre exemple d'activité de réutilisation est fourni par les stylos. Un membre d'une famille éduquée (études supérieures) nous a parlé de sa collection, ou plutôt de son « dépôt » de stylos. Une fois utilisé, aucun stylo n'était plus jeté. On les gardait tous dans un tiroir. Tandis que certains exemplaires étaient gardés seulement pour leur aspect spécial, d'autres présentaient l'avantage de pouvoir se combiner entre eux, conduisant ainsi à des « hybrides ». La valeur potentielle de réutilisation (par remplacement de parties) était importante dans l'appréciation de la valeur d'un stylo. Cette personne dit encore qu'un stylo qui peut être réutilisé est vraiment bien, à la différence d'un autre qui ne le peut pas, et qui est moins bien, évidemment (A. G., femme, 27 ans).

Le papier chocolat représentait un matériau paradigmatique pour les comportements associés à la pénurie. La même femme a dit qu'après la chute d'élan de collectionneur elle a renoncé à ces papiers, les ayant donné à sa mère, qui s'en servait lorsqu'elle préparait des poivrons cuits au four.

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[24] La référence à l'espace vide semble soutenir l'affirmation de Susan Stewart (1993, 157) selon laquelle « pour devenir une extension du *moi*, le milieu ne doit pas être modifié ou altéré ; on doit reconnaître son creux, et donc son besoin à être rempli ».

Un autre exemple d'activité de bricolage et de production de produits hybrides nous a été fourni par un jeune homme qui nous a raconté qu'il gardait le papier chocolat pour dorer les bonbons dont il ornait le sapin de Noël. Car les bonbons qu'il recevait d'un de ses proches qui travaillait dans une fabrique de bonbons de Timisoara (Kandia) n'étaient jamais emballés. Le même papier pouvait servir pour confectionner des décorations pour le même sapin de Noël. Ces exemples montrent sans conteste qu'à la différence des pratiques de consommation occidentales, dans le cas de l'économie de pénurie le renoncement aux biens (même après leur emploi), ou à des fragments de ces produits, était beaucoup plus rare, et l'emploi, de durée plus longue.

Les produits occidentaux (ou étrangers de manière plus générale) ayant une esthétique attractive[25] avaient une valeur affective spéciale pour les gens qui ont été nos interlocuteurs. Des activités comme celles que nous venons d'énumérer ici étaient un moment de prolongation du plaisir qui existait dans le processus (opposé, à nouveau, à un simple acte) d'utilisation des produits de l'Ouest. Garder et étaler ces objets qui représentaient l'Ouest c'étaient des actions qui supprimaient les narrations primordiales et individuelles de ces objets. Pour que les « narrations d'intériorité » et de liens affectifs avec ces objets puissent être articulées, il est nécessaire de découper le contexte d'origine (Stewart, 1993, 158). Leurs « biographies » initiales (le procès de production de masse, leur localisation dans le cadre du champ de la culture de consommation, etc.) étaient altérées pour favoriser leur topologie occidentale (Steward, 1993, 153). Entre la façon dont les producteurs occidentaux concevaient ces produits et la signification qu'ils acquéraient dans le contexte de la pénurie il y avait une relation de divorce. Peu comptait que ces produits collectionnés étaient inutiles à l'Ouest, ou que certains d'entre eux étaient ramassés à proprement parler à la poubelle. Ils acquéraient une existence nouvelle et durable, étant investis d'une valeur symbolique et géographique par leurs consommateurs qui vivaient dans la culture de la pénurie.

D'une certaine façon, ces objets étaient le revers des pratiques culturelles « primitives » par l'intermédiaire desquelles un objet prélevé à une certaine culture est exposé et étalé dans un milieu occidental, d'habitude celui d'un musée. De tels objets étaient considérés comme représentatifs pour tous les membres du groupe, et leur culture était considérée comme historiquement

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[25] Il est intéressant qu'avant 1989, l'Ouest, tel qu'on le comprenait par l'intermédiaire des produits de consommation, était une catégorie cognitive beaucoup plus large. Les biens provenus de Turquie ou du Proche Orient étaient inclus dans la même catégorie prestigieuse des produits étrangers de l'Ouest. Après 1989, à cause de l'influx massif de produits de cette région et du discours auto-occidentalisant selon lequel nous sommes en Europe, le prestige des produits de l'Orient a beaucoup diminué.

invariable[26]. Dans ce ces de figure, les objets devaient passer l'épreuve de la connaissance ethnographique (plus de signes d'appartenance à l'Ouest, plus de valeur), ils ne devaient pas avoir l'air vieux et impersonnel (comme dans les musées), mais paraître brillants et proches de la condition optime de fonctionnement. L'ingénierie symbolique de ces produits devait augmenter la modernité. Le fait que certains objets « de bon aloi » étaient exposés dans les cuisines n'est pas du au hasard. C'est l'espace où l'on étale d'habitude la technique moderne et sophistiquée (les mixeurs, les micro-ondes, etc), tandis que la salle à manger demeure le lieu d'une esthétique plus traditionaliste. Dépourvus de cette technique, les habitants de Sântana étaient réduits à étaler seulement le signe de la modernité et du progrès de l'Occident.

Conclusions: la culture de la pénurie et la « ghettoïsation » postcommuniste de la consommation

Dans cette dernière partie nous allons reprendre brièvement quelques-uns des éléments exposés dans cette étude, nous indiquerons trois problèmes d'intérêt plus large liés à ce cas, et nous situerons cette localité dans le cades de la différenciation sociale d'avant et d'après 1990.

Ceux qui pratiquaient le petit trafic n'étaient pas les « protocapitalistes »[27] du temps du communisme, comme on l'affirmait avec optimisme au début des années '90, bien que la mobilité du capital (dans ce cas-ci, très précaire), comme celle géographique en constituent des ingrédients nécessaires. Ils étaient plutôt dépendants du caractère « faible » de l'Etat. Cet ensemble de traits incluait la possibilité de « voler » des produits là où l'on travaillait, la disponibilité largement répandue à établir et à négocier, selon les situations, de ceux qui travaillaient dans les institutions de l'Etat, ou le phénomène de la « personnalisation » de l'Etat au niveau local.

La façon dont les habitants de Sântana se servaient de l'opportunité offerte par le petit trafic doit être conçue comme une extension de l'économie de maison, et non pas comme une activité individuelle et autonome orientée vers le profit. Le tourisme facilité par le petit trafic était une activité plutôt sociale qu'économique, puisque dépendante du contexte local des relations de famille, de voisinage et de pouvoir.

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[26] Voir l'étude de James Clifford (1988) et le livre édité par George Marcus et Fred R. Myers (1995) sur le primitivisme dans l'art et l'anthropologie. Des pratiques semblables à celles du primitivisme en art et anthropologie sont très semblables aux représentations nationalistes du discours folklorique.

[27] Conformément à Weber, le capitalisme apparaît lorsque les affaires sont administrées séparément de l'administration de la maison (v. Weber, 1994). Dans le cas du petit trafic, les ressources étaient gérées dans le cadre de l'organisation économique de la maison.

La division du travail, tant dans l'économie d'Etat que dans celle de la maison, « poussait » les femmes vers le tourisme du commerce. Elles avaient plus de liberté à disposer de leur temps, à la différence des hommes, qui pour la plupart travaillaient dans des fabriques à Arad, étant ainsi soumis à un programme plus strict. En Hongrie, les touristes vendaient les biens procurés dans le système de distribution d'Etat (de la porcelaine, par exemple) ou biens qu'on avait soustrait aux lieux de travail, les fabriques ou la CAP (par exemple du linge intime ou des fleurs). Le plus souvent, les touristes rapportaient de Hongrie des aliments, mais aussi des vêtements et des cosmétiques pour les membres de leurs familles.

Tandis que le commerce en Hongrie servait à se procurer des biens qui manquaient en Roumanie, la population allemande de Sântana, et surtout sa partie qui avait immigré en Allemagne, était d'un réel support pour les Roumains qui voulaient s'acheter des électroménagers. Les Allemands restés encore à Sântana recevaient régulièrement des colis de leurs proches immigrés, qui étaient souvent vendus ou offerts aux amis roumains ou allemands.

Un premier élément théorique nouveau que cet article apporte vise les aspects culturels de la pénurie. L'économiste Janos Kornai décrit très bien les choix auxquels se confronte une personne impliquée dans le processus de l'achat[28], mais son approche n'inclut pas l'usage que l'on faisait des produits rares. Il mentionne l'emmagasinage à long terme de ces produits, mais son analyse ignore leur utilisation symbolique (par exemple leur collection). Vu ces raisons, nous avons utilisé une définition plus détaillée de la consommation : « la sélection, l'achat, l'emploi, le maintien, le raccommodage et le renoncement à tout produit ou service » (Campbell, 1995, 102), et nous avons pu observer qu'il y avaient quelques éléments-clés qui y définissaient la *culture de la pénurie* dans le socialisme. Des comportements et des manifestations spécifiques pour cette « culture » étaient l'incertitude concernant la possibilité d'acheter des biens, ou leur qualité, et la tendance à s'imposer des rationalisations pour les produits alimentaires rares, ou leur emploi réservé à des occasions spéciales. Le raccommodage des produits difficiles à trouver constituait un phénomène important dans le contexte de la pénurie. Etant donnée la valeur affective attachée aux biens venus de l'Occident, on avait du mal à y renoncer, voire même à leurs emballages. Tout cela acquérait des valeurs symboliques, devenant une marque de *status*. Les biens de consommation de l'Ouest gagnaient encore en valeur à force de réutilisation et de redéfinition des contenants. Parfois, on leur attribuait une fonction utilitaire (l'exemple des boites de bière transformées en verres à café). On les redéfinissait parfois aussi

[28] Il ne mentionne pas la possibilité de voyager dans d'autres pays pour acheter des produits.

comme objets esthétiques, en les exposant dans des espaces fort visibles, comme les étagères de la cuisine, ou même dans les vitrines de la salle à manger, réservées le plus souvent aux bibelots.

En second lieu, la position de Sântana soulève des problèmes et des questions liés aux aspects économiques et sociaux de sa situation à la frontière, métaphoriquement, mais aussi concrètement parlant. S'ils n'avaient pas eu la chance et l'habileté à s'adapter vite à cette opportunité, la vie de ces gens serait devenue beaucoup plus difficile dans les années '80. Bien que la réponse locale aux conditions crées au niveau macro ait été prompte, les habitants de Sântana n'avaient aucun pouvoir à influencer la marche des choses. Par exemple, certains parmi eux se souviennent des années '50, lorsque personne n'avait le droit de s'approcher de moins de 10 km de la frontière. Celle-ci offre des opportunités spéciales, historiquement variables, pourvues de peu de propriétés immanentes.

La structure ethnique de cette commune soulève une question portant sur le rôle de l'ethnicité dans les contextes de pénurie. Grâce à l'aide reçu de l'Allemagne, les Allemands de Sântana jouissaient d'une certaine autonomie par rapport à la pénurie, au moins dans le secteur des biens de consommation. Les Roumains, à leur tour, mobilisaient l'ethnicité comme une possible variable utile lors d'une meilleure adaptation à la situation, mais ils renonçaient aussi aux sentiments chauvins envers les Allemands pour des raisons pratiques. Souvent, les Roumains de Sântana préféraient aller à Mehkerek justement parce qu'une bonne partie de la population de cette localité hongroise était d'origine roumaine. Ils pouvaient ainsi mieux se débrouiller dans les problèmes de communication. Il faut encore mentionner que le nombre réduit de Hongrois qui vivaient à Sântana pouvaient ainsi bénéficier à leur tour du contexte créé. Puisqu'il était beaucoup plus facile pour eux de se débrouiller en Hongrie, les Roumains les priaient de les accompagner là-bas lorsqu'ils avaient des questions plus élaborées à résoudre. Tout cela laisse facilement voir que l'existence de plusieurs groupes ethniques peut souvent constituer un avantage[29].

Paupérisation et ségrégation de la consommation

Envisagée dans l'ensemble des inégalités politiques et économiques de la Roumanie communiste, la situation de ceux qui pratiquaient le petit trafic était défavorisée[30]. Ceux qui étaient vraiment favorisés ne devaient pas faire appel à

[29] Il s'agit plutôt d'une analyse très attentive au niveau où l'ethnicité se constitue en contexte économique et social fonctionnel et dynamique, que des essais qui envisagent le groupe ethnique comme un phénomène « culturel » (entendu, dans ses variantes les plus inutiles, comme haute culture).

[30] Tout de même, par rapport aux habitants d'autres zones qui n'avaient pas accès au petit trafic, et non plus aux bénéfices de l'économie secondaire, les habitants de Sântana jouissaient d'une situation vraiment meilleure.

l'économie secondaire, car ils avaient accès aux magasins spéciaux de l'Etat (voir Cimpeanu, 1994). Cela renforce l'affirmation de Ivan Szelenyi concernant le rapport entre l'Etat et le marché dans la période du communisme : « Les inégalités sont créées par des allocations administratives, et ceux qui avaient des revenus réduits et un prestige similaire devaient opter pour le marché afin d'améliorer leur situation » (Szelenyi et al., 1994, 236).

La vérité de cette affirmation est devenue fort évidente après 1989, lorsque les gens dépourvus d'accès au processus d'allocation administrative ont commencé à pratiquer le commerce en ouvrant de petites boutiques, an allant apporter la marchandise de la Turquie, de la Hongrie ou de l'ancienne Yougoslavie. Ceux qui s'occupaient du management de la propriété de l'Etat avant 1989, tout comme ceux qui se sont impliqué dans la politique après 1989 ont procédé soit au transfert de cette propriété à leur avantage, soit à la spoliation du budget par des subventions qui finissent par combler des comptes privés à l'étranger. Les anciens pratiquants du petit trafic sont devenus, dans les meilleurs cas, des boutiquiers, de petits commerçants étalant leur marchandise dans les rues, dans les marchés, dépourvus encore des moyens d'un commerce civilisé. De leur coté, ceux qui contrôlaient le petit trafic ont vite amassé du capital par le moyen du « parasitisme bureaucratique » (Verdery, 1996, 213), réussissant à accumuler des sommes exorbitantes à la suite de coups célèbres, comme ceux qui ont menté à la disparition de la fondation d'aide mutuelle Caritas, des banques Dacia Felix ou Bancorex, ou le Fond National D'Investissements (FNI).

Après la chute du communisme, ceux qui se sont enrichis ont abandonné les pratiques de pénurie. De pareils groupes ont vite gagné de la fluence dans le processus de consommation du type occidental (à ce sujet, voir Berdahl, 1999). Pour ceux qui ont commencé à connaître la pauvreté de durée plus ou moins longue, de même que l'incapacité à participer aux espaces de consommation réservés aux riches, les années '90 ont représenté un retour au tourisme de commerce et à d'autres pratiques liées à la pénurie.

Normalement, la ségrégation sociale et spatiale de la consommation, un processus de plus en plus évident en Roumanie, pourrait indiquer une dérive vers le Tiers Monde. D'une part, une couche de « capitalistes d'Etat » (certains politiciens, directeurs de sociétés d'Etat autonomes, des gens d'affaires douteux, des policiers, des officiers du SRI et du MApN) peuplent tranquillement les dizaines d'hectares de villas du Nord de la capitale (« Le Paradis Vert », « Corbeanca », Mogosoaia, Snagov) et fréquentent régulièrement des magasins beaucoup plus chers qu'en Occident. D'autre part, spoliée par cette classe d'individus d'un cynisme inhumain, le reste de la population se distribue entre

des marginaux de toutes les nuances. Il faut tout de même préciser qu'en qualifiant exclusivement cette combinaison comme « le tiers monde » on risque de détourner l'attention de la manière dont le « Premier Monde » est indigénisé en Roumanie, les anciens privilégiés d'avant 1989, tout comme ceux qui le sont devenus plus récemment à force de capital appartenant au « Premier Monde » du point de vue de la consommation.

OFFICIALISATION DE LA REPRESENTATION PRIVEE DE SA PROPRIE VIE

Etude de cas: le dossier de cadres d'un professeur universitaire, 1950-1965

Septimiu Chelcea – University of Bucharest

The articol presents a Romanian cultural figure, proffesor Ion Chelcea who major contributed in ethnographical and sociological researches, during the 19th century. The employees' files, in the way they were used in communist times, have been means to institutionalize someone's private life. Therefore, employees' files could be a new methodological approach and a way to contextualize professor Chelcea's life in the history of Romanian society. During communist times, until '70 employees' files consisted of: a document from the working institution about the number of employees, the data about the employee's education and origins, an autobiography, declarations and references, the references of the chief administrative, the personnel department evaluations. The author discusses all these parts of an employee's file, using professor Ion Chelcea as a case study.

J'écris l'histoire de mon père, le professeur Ion Chelcea (5. 02. 1902 – 9. 09. 1991), attablé sur la terrasse de ma maison de Boteni, dans le département de Argeş. C'est ici, dans cette maison à deux pièces et terrasse en terre battue au-dessus de la cave, comme il y en a tant dans la région de Muscel, qu'il est né et qu'il est mort. C'est à cette table que je l'ai quitté la dernière fois, fin août, pendant qu'il préparait un « petit travail », un article, une étude ou une note – je ne me souviens plus très bien. Le 8 septembre on a fêté « La Journée des fils du village ». Il a été invité d'honneur. On a marqué sa présence dans la ruelle du village dont il a souvent écrit et qu'il a toujours gardé en mémoire. Le lendemain, il a dit à l'une de ses soeurs qui habitait avec lui de prendre soin de la maison et... il est parti. Il avait 89 ans. Le « chroniqueur du village », TIon Ghinescu, lui aussi disparu à présent, lui a dédié un poème.

C'est mon tour maitenant... je suis le conseil de Spinoza : « Ne ridiculise pas, ne déplore pas et ne méprise pas mais efforce-toi sans cesse de comprendre les actions humaines ».

J'examine le « dossier de cadres » de mon père non pas pour mettre en évidence la personnalité de Ion Chelcea, ou faire l'éloge – éventuellement – de sa verticalité morale ou pour justifier son obédience – telle qu'elle a été – mais pour attirer l'attention sur un type de document social dont on n'a pas encore remarqué la valeur pour la reconstitution de l'histoire récente, de la période communiste en Roumanie. Je suis surpris par le fait que les gens ne tentent pas de voir leur dossier de cadres ou ceux de leurs parents, que l'accès aux dossiers de personnel n'a pas été réglementé, comme on l'a fait pour les dossiers de la

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Securitate[1]. Si seulement certaines personnes ont eu un dossier à la police secrète (Securitate), tous ceux qui ont travaillé dans une institution d'Etat ont eu un dossier au service de cadres (ou de personnel). Ce dossier nous a poursuivis d'un emploi à l'autre, il a changé de contenu dans les différentes étapes du communisme, de plus en plus volumineux d'une année à l'autre et surtout si la personne en question « avait un passé ».

Contenu d'un dossier de cadres

Il est question ici des dossiers de cadres de la période 1950-1965. Le dossier de cadres de Ion Chelcea couvre l'intervalle 1944-1968, bien que l'on y trouve également des documents plus anciens : copie du Dilpôme de doctorat (1939), appréciations et lettres de recommandation d'avant l'instauration du communisme en Roumanie. Je suis entré en possession du dossier en 1990. On me l'a envoyé du Musée du Village de Bucarest, où mon père a travaillé jusqu'à sa retraite (Décision 1254 du 17 juillet 1968) au moment où l'archive de l'institution a été réorganisée. Nous appellerons dorénavant ce document social le « Dossier I. C. ».

Quel était donc le contenu d'un dossier de cadres dans la période communiste jusqu'en 1968 ? Dans le dossier I. C. se trouvent :

A. fiche de personnel pour l'évidence des cadres (plusieurs variantes) ;
B. papiers officiels attestant les études et l'ancienneté ;
C. autobiographie (trois variantes) et des rajouts (quatre) ;
D. déclarations, références et délations au service du personnel (15 références)
E. appréciations des chefs administratifs ;
F. appréciations des chefs du service du personnel.

Je me limiterai à analyser dans ce qui suit les trois premiers types de « pièces » du dossier, avec l'intention de continuer l'analyse du dossier de personnel en tant que document social dans une prochaine étude plus ample.

On peut se poser dès le début la question si tous les dossiers de personnel de la période 1950-1965 comprenaient toutes ces « pièces ». La réponse est plutôt négative. Les « travailleurs » (« oamenii muncii ») n'ont pas été tous dénoncés au service du personnel. Les dossiers n'étaient pas tous aussi chargés d'autobiographies, références, etc. Pour de nombreuses personnes, par contre, le service du personnel a fonctionné comme un tribunal : le verdict des cadres pouvait compromettre une carrière ou bien propulser quelqu'un bien au-dessus de sa valeur. Iosif Visarionovici Stalin n'avait-il pas dit : « Les cadres décident de tout » ?! Ces paroles, dénaturées, ont été le mot d'ordre en Roumanie, pendant les premières décennies du communisme. On peut douter du fait que

tout dépend des gens – des « cadres », comme l'avait dit Staline -, mais à l'époque, le service du personnel décidait entièrement de la vie professionnelle et même extraprofessionnelle des gens.

Fiche de personnel pour l'évidence des cadres

Dans le dossier I. C. étaient enregistrées quatre fiches de ce type datant d'années différentes. Chronologiquement, la plus ancienne datait du 19. 01. 1951. Du point de vue de l'investigateur social, la fiche de personnel représente un questionnaire de type administratif, avec des questions factuelles.En analysant la structure du questionnaire (la fiche de personnel), on peut se faire une idée du climat social du moment où l'on a commencé à l'utiliser, on peut évaluer assez correctement l'échelle de valeurs en fonction de laquelle on décidait d'accepter une personne, de la maintenir en fonction, de la promouvoir ou de l'exclure de la vie professionnelle. Tout le long de la période communiste, l'échelle de valeurs a subi des modifications et, en fonction de cela, la structure des questions a changé elle aussi. De cette perspective, la fiche de personnel, tout comme le dossier dans son ensemble, constitue une « trace » laissée par les changements sociaux.

La fiche de personnel de I. C. relève le fait que, tout de suite après l'installation du régime communiste en Roumanie, les gens étaient évalués, avant tout, en fonction de leur origine sociale, de leur état social (la fortune) des parents. Les questions portant sur l'origine sociale sont placées en premier (après les questions d'identification de la personne et de la nationalité). La même fiche relève l'importance de la situation militaire pour l'évaluation sociale de la personne. On accordait une grande importance au fait que la personne en question avait lutté sur le front, à quel endroit, quelles missions de lutte elle avait eues et la façon dont elle les avait accomplies. La situation politique du passé et du moment où l'on remplissait la fiche intéressait au plus haut degré : la fiche contenait quatre questions concernant cet aspect. Après la situation politique, quatre autres questions visaient la situation sociale (la fortune personnelle). Ensuite, le service du personnel s'intéressait aux relations avec les étrangers (visites, membres de la famille à l'étranger). Finalement, on demandait les noms des personnes l'ayant recommandé et qui le connaissait. Les autres informations de la fiche de personnel (état civil, études, profession, casier, domicile) complétaient les données d'identification.

Tout comme dans un questionnaire d'investigation sociologique, où les réponses peuvent être distortionnées pour différentes raisons (v Chelcea, 2001, pp. 171-261), la fiche de personnel dévoile en général la tendance de présentation favorable de la personne. Favorable, c'est-à-dire en accord avec ce que, socialement, correspondait à l'esprit de l'époque. D'ici dérive la valeur de document social de la fiche et du dossier de personnel dans son ensemble.

Dans les années ’50, la présentation favorable signifiait avoir une « origine sociale saine », être fils / fille d’ouvrier ou de paysan pauvre, ne pas avoir combattu sur le front d’Est, ne pas avoir eu de relations avec des étrangers (de l’Ouest), ne pas avoir été membre d’un parti historique, mais être membre du Parti Communiste Roumain ou au moins du syndicat et, enfin, ne pas posséder de fortune. Cette exigence sociale se détache de la manière dont I. C. a rempli la fiche de personnel, ainsi que de la manière dont il a fait son autobiographie, comme on le verra tout de suite.

I . C. est en effet issu d’une famille de paysans peu fortunés – selon les papiers de mise en possession (2001), environ 5 hectares. Dans la fiche de personnel, on n’en a déclaré que 2. De la fiche de personnel résulte que I. C. n’a pas combattu sur le front. En ce qui concerne les relations avec les étrangers, I. C. « omet » le fait que, sauf l’Autriche, où il avait fait un stage de trois mois, il avait été aussi en Italie. Bien que cela n’apparaisse pas dans le dossier, on apprend d’un autre texte que ce fut une expérience importante pour lui. Décrivant son expérience italienne, I. C. la raconte de la façon suivante :

Mon intention était de lire Dante en original. Je suis passé par la Yougoslavie – Zagreb, Fiume – et je suis arrivé a Ancona. J’avais 16 ans. Mon intention était de rester ici au moins une année ou deux, pour apprendre la langue, afin que je puisse bien comprendre la culture italienne. D’Ancona, je me suis dirigé vers Ravena, où j’ai vu la tombre de Dante. A Florence, j’ai connu Alexandru Marcu, notre attaché culturel, futur professeur d’italien à Bucarest. Il m’a conseillé de retourner en Roumanie, puisque là-bas les temps étaient difficiles. J’ai suivi son conseil et je suis revenu dans le pays. J’ai ramené quelques livres importants, qui dépassaient sans doute mes possibilités de compréhension mais que j’avais achetés, ayant l’intuition de leur valeur. Parmi eux, Estetica come scienzia dell’espressione...et Saggio sullo Hegel de Benedetto Croce (1988, p. 98)

La situation politique de I. C. avant 1950 est plus difficile à préciser. Dans la fiche de personnel, à la question 15 : « De quel parti politique avait-vous fait partie dans le passé ? », I.C. ne mentionne rien. D’aucune des références des personnes qui l’ont connu, des appréciations du service du personnel non plus - à une seule exception – il ne résulte qu’il aurait été membre d’un parti politique ou qu’il aurait déroulé des activités politiques. En plus, dans les *Déclarations d’enquête de Anton Golopenția* (17.01.1950) concernant l’orientation politique de l’équipe qui recensait les Roumains d’au-delà du Boug dans les années 1942-1943, on précise : « Moi-même, ainsi que MM Retegan et Ion Chelcea, nous ne faisions et n’avions pas fait de politique » (Golopenția, 2001, p. 6). Pourtant, dans l’appréciation du service de cadres du 11 novembre 1963, on attire l’attention sur le fait que dans le passé – « selon certaines informations des organes de l’Etat » - I. C. a eu des sympathies anticommunistes et dans les ouvrages publiés il a eu des manifestations nationalistes.

Le dossier de I. C. met en évidence – si cela était encore nécessaire – que le service du personnel accomplissait ses attributions en étroite relation avec la Securitate. Voilà pourquoi « les cadres décidaient de tout ».

Nous reproduisons la *Fiche de personnel* que nous avons évoquée.

FICHE DE PERSONNEL pour l'EVIDENCE DES CADRES

1. Nom : *Chelcea*. Prénom : *Ion*
2. Date de naissance : jour *5*, mois : *Février*, année : *1902*
3. Lieu de naissance. Commune : *Boteni*, Département : *Muscel*
4. Nationalité : *roumaine*
5. Origine sociale :

   a) Nom et domicile des parents : *Gheorghe* et *Ecaterina* +
   b) Etat social des parents (fortune) : un terrain de 2 hectares
   c) Occupation de base des parents : agriculteurs
6. Etat civil : marié en 1932
   Nom de l'époux : *Viorica*. Acte No. 17/932. Commune *Voineşti*, Département *Muscel*
   Occupation de l'époux : *femme au foyer*. Appartenance politique –
   Enfants a) Nom · b)Date de naissance
   Ligia Chelcea 1934
   Maria Chelcea 1937
   Septimiu Chelcea 1940
7. Situation militiare
   Section: em Ctg 1924, grade : *sergent*, cercle de troupe auquel il appartient : *Muscel*, territoire où il a été recruté : *Muscel*
8. Etudes générales ou de spécialité
   Ecole élémentaire : 1909-1912. Lycée 1918-1928 (interruption des études 1924-1926)
   Université de Cluj : 1929-1934. Diplômé de l'Université de Cluj 1934-1939 (années de spécialisation)
   Diplôme de docteur en ethnographie
9. Profession de base (occupation) : *Maître de conférences d'ethographie à l'Université*
10. Période pendant laquelle il a travaillé : depuis 1930
    Fonctions détenues deuis le début de l'activité professionnelle, y compris les interruptions à cause du service militaire ou mobilisations temporaires :

Office PTT de Cluj	16.03.1922 – 31.08.1922, employé
Mairie de la Ville de Cluj	15.10.1923 – 31. 12.1923, payé à la journée
Questure de la Police de Braşov	01.11.1925 – 01.12.1926 sergent de ville
Lycée Industriel de Braşov	01.12.1926 – 30.10.1927
Inspectorat scolaire de Cluj	01.01.1928 – 31.05.1929 secrétaire
Ecole primaire de Lujerdiu	01.10.1929 – 01.03.1940 maître d'école
Musée Ethnographique de Cluj	01.101929 – 01.03.1940 assaistant stagiaire, maître assistant
Institut Central de Statistique de Bucarest	01.04. 1940 – 31.03.1943 chef de service
Faculté des Sciences de Iaşi	01.03.1943 –jusqu'à présent maître de conférences

11. S'il détient d'autres fonctions dans d'autres établissements ou autorités : -
12. Langues étrangères connues : *français, allemand, italien*
13. S'il est membre d'un parti politique : -
14. Période : -
15. S'il a était membre d'un parti dans le passé : -
16. S'il a été membre d'un syndicat et depuis quand : *Enseignement supérieur Iaşi, 1945*
17. S'il a prêté serment envers RPR (République Populaire Roumaine) : *oui*
18. Etat social, fortune personnelle : *un terrain d'un hectare*, son épouse : *un terrain de ½ hectare*
19. S'il a possédé ou s'il possède une firme propre ou en association et laquelle : -
20. S'il a représenté ou s'il représente la succursale d'une firme étrangère et laquelle :-
21. A été ou est actionnaire à une société et laquelle : -
22. Mobilisation temporaire : *1940*
23. S'il a combattu sur le front, où, à quel moment, dans quelle unité, grade, en quelle qualité, missions accomplies : *je n'ai pas été sur le front*
24. Décorations reçues : *je n'ai aucune décoration*
25. S'il a été traduit en justice, par qui, en quelle année, la raison, la sentence : -
26. Voyages à l'étranger *: Autriche, 1943 (trois mois), spécialisation en ethnographie et muséologie*
27. Parents à l'étranger, lesquels, le moment où ils ont quitté le pays : *je n'en ai pas*
28. S'il a des frères ou des soeurs, on indiquera leurs noms, occupations, à quel parti ils ont appartenu ou appartiennent et s'il sont inscrits dans le syndicat, lequel et depuis quand :
29. Qui l'a recommandé en société : *prof. Romulus Vuia*
30. Qui il connaît en société : *prof. Janrenaud Pierre (Iaşi)*
31. Personnes qui le connaissent à l'occasion des différentes activités (scolaires, militaires, professionnelles, politiques) : *D. Gavrilă, président du syndicat de l'enseignement de Cluj, Valer Butură, maître de conférences à l'Université de Cluj*

Signature
I.Chelcea
Date : *19. 01. 1951*. Domicile : *Iaşi 1, rue Xenopol*

Les pièces officielles du dossier de personnel

Attestation des études et du parcours professionnel, par des papiers officiels, tels que diplômes, certificats et, le cas échéant, le livret de travail, apparaissent dans tous les dossiers de personnel. Dans le dossier de I. C. se trouve aussi le Diplôme de docteur en philosophie, discipline principale *éthnographie,* discipline secondaire *sociologie.*

Ce diplôme a, lui aussi, la signification d'un document social, surtout si on le compare aux diplômes de docteur délivrés pendant les décennies suivantes. Comme on le sait, en 1948 a eu lieu la réforme de l'enseignement. La tradition européenne de l'enseignement supérieur roumain a été interrompue brutalement. Le modèle soviétique a été imposé : idéologisation et orientation de l'enseignement vers la pratique. La phrase : « C'est une règle précieuse de nos ancêtres ... « contredisait l'idéologie communiste. Quant à la rédaction en latin des diplômes de docteur ès sciences, il n'en était plus question du moment que

l'on tentait par tous les moyens d'inculquer l'idée de l'influence slave et ensuite russe sur l'histoire des Roumains. L'exemple de l' *Histoire RPR (République Populaire Roumaine). Manuel pour le cours moyen,* sous la direction de l'académicien Mihai Roller (1956) est éloquent dans ce sens.

Les autres papiers officiels (livret de travail, les certificats, etc. du dossier) du dossier de I. C. dévoile des aspects de la vie sociale du milieu du XX siècle, présentant un asez grand intérêt : la relation individu – institutions de l'Etat, valeurs sociales et leur chngement, contrôle social, etc.

Les autobiographies des dossiers de personnel

On a beaucoup écrit sur la valeur des (auto)biographies en tant que documents sociaux. Nous ne reprendrons plus ce que nous avons déjà développé dans le manuel universitaire de méthodologie de la recherche sociologique (Chelcea, 2001), pp. 493-511). Nous précisons le fait qu'il n'existe pas – ou, du moins, l'auteur de cette étude de cas ne connaît pas – une recherche sociologique s'appuyant sur les autobiographies des dossiers de personnel. L'utilisation de tels documents fertiliserait l'imagination sociologique. On ne doit pas oublier que les analyses sociales classiques promeuvent l'idée que « chaque individu, d'une génération à l'autre, vit dans une certaine société ; qu'il vit une biographie et qu'il la vit dans une certaine séquence historique. Par le simple fait de vivre, il contribue – si insignifiant que son apport soit – à la configuration de sa société et à son évolution historique, bien qu'il soit en même temps un produit de la société et de ses secousses historiques » (Mills, 1959/1975, p. 34). En lisant l'autobiographie de I. C. (la première du dossier de personnel, avant 1950), on ne peut ne pas être d'accord avec les affirmations du sociologue américain C. Wright Mills.

Autobiographie

Je suis né dans le village Boteni, département de Muscel, de parents agriculteurs, analphabètes, tous les deux. Ils ont passé leur vie à cultiver le maïs sur les terres des boyards. –

J'ai fait les classes primaires au village. Mon plus grand désir dans la vie ce fut de m'instruire mais les parents, n'ayant pas de moyens de m'entretenir à l'école, me faisaient garder les vaches. Le temps s'écoula ainsi jusqu'à l'âge de 18 ans, lorsque, après l'occupation allemande de 1916, je me suis enfui (réfugié) en Moldavie. A Roman, j'ai refait les quatre classes primaires en privé, puisque je ne possédais aucun papier. J'ai fait le lycée, pour la plus grande partie en privé, en travaillant en même temps, tel qu'il résulte des papiers existants.

Puisque je suis allé plus tard à l'école, j'ai fait mon service militaire avec toutes les « recrues » ; les officiers me regardaient d'un mauvais oeil puisque je

lisais quand j'étais libre et je n'aiamais pas le service militaire. Je l'ai achevé avec le grade de soldat.

Après le service militaire, j'ai continué le lycée en VI-ème à Braşov, en gagnant ma vie tout seul. Je peux dire que mes parents ne savaient même pas où j'ai fait mes études. Ma pauvre mère appelait l'Université « aversitate ».

J'ai été assez tôt attiré par l'étude des gens simples du point de vue ethnographique. De sorte que, lorsque j'étais en VII-ème j'ai envisagé de faire la monographie de mon village natal. Cette recherche m'a conduit directement vers l'atelier de travail du professeur Romulus Vuia de l'Université de Cluj, qui occupait à l'époque la chaire d'Ethnographie et Folklore, auprès de laquelle je me suis formé, en parcourant toutes les étapes hiérarchiques, depuis le musée éthnographique de la Transylvanie, attaché à la chaire d'Ethnographie de Cluj.-

Après avoir été promu maître assistant, avec l'ancienneté que j'avais, je suis parti à Bucarest comme chef de recherches ethnographiques à l'Institut Central de Statistique, d'où j'ai été appelé ensuite, vu mon activité dans le domaine ethnographique, comme maître de conférences d'Ethnographie à l'Université de Iaşi, où, entre autres objectifs, j'ai eu aussi celui de donner à la Moldavie un Musée Ethnographique, qui reflète d'une manière fidèle le mode de production fondé sur des moyens de production du peuple roumain de cette partie du pays. Je peux dire que, malgré la période difficile de la guerre, j'ai réussi mais je peux dire aussi que j'aurais mieux réussi si je n'avais pas rencontré quelques esprits malvaillants parmi les professeurs de l'Université dont j'attendais plutôt un soutien. Je garde encore le souhait de me dédier à ce but, puisque l'enseignement réaliste est le fondement même de la nouvelle orientation scolaire à tous les niveaux en RPR (République Populaire Roumaine). –

Du point de vue politique, je n'ai pas été indifférent au mouvement de libération politique et économique d'orientation marxiste. La preuve c'est le fait qu'à un moment donné, en 1929, je participais illégalement à certaines réunions communistes à Cluj (à la périphérie de la ville), la nuit, dirigées par un certain hongrois, Victor Aradi (?), mais il semble que la vague nationaliste ait eu quand même une influence sur moi. Malgré cela, j'ai été et je le suis encore, le partisan du progrès, quelle que fût l'atmosphère de l'époque, la preuve c'est qu'en 1936, je soulignais dans un article publié dans la revue *Izvoraşul* (*La Source*) No.2 les efforts qui se font en URSS pour la recherche ethographique, et en 1940, l'année de l'entrée de la Roumanie en guerre contre l'URSS, cet article a été réimprimé. Mais, je le reconnais, je dois encore travailler dans cette direction. – Comme amis, je cite deux noms :

Ioan Gavrilă du Musée Ethograpohique de la Transylvanie, secrétaire du Syndicat de l'Enseignement, me semble-t-il.-

Valeriu Butură, maître de conférences de Géographie Régionale, Université de Cluj.-

I. Chelcea, maître de conférences d'Ethographie, Univ. de Iaşi

Les autobiographies du dossier de personnel (A.d.p.) s'encadrent dans le type de biographies officielles provoquées (curriculum vitae). *N'étant pas spontanées mais, par contre, obligatoires, la question pourquoi on les écrivait ne se pose plus. Mais au moment où on les utilise comme source d'informations, le sociologue doit insister sur la manière dont elles ont été écrites. L'histoire non seulement met son empreinte sur la biographie (la vie des gens), mais déforme aussi la biographie (l'histoire de la vie, surtout dans le cas de l'A. d. p.). Les gens se rappellent ou oublient des moments de leur vie en fonction des commandements du temps. De même, ils s'expriment non pas avec leurs mots mais avec ceux de l'époque. Pour exemplifier mais aussi pour comprendre l'atmosphère de l'époque, la pression psychique exercée par le service du personnel par la demande répétée de faire son autobiographie, par les compléments imposés, nous reproduisons encore une des quatre A. d. p. de I. C.*

Autobiographie

Je suis né dans le village Boteni – Muscel (1902) de parents agriculteurs. Mon père et ma mère étaient analphabètes. Puisqu'ils ne possédaient pas de terres, ils cultivaient du maïs sur les terres des boyards (à Valea Bradului chez Niță Popescu).

J'ai fait l'école primaire au village. Dès un âge jeune j'aimais lire. Mais mes parents n'avaient pas la possibilité de m 'entretenir è l'école. Pour cette raison, j'ai beaucoup souffert : après l'école primaire j'ai dû rester à la maison garder les vaches des autres.

Entre-temps je suis entré comme apprenti chez un pelletier du village (Niță Bidilică) mais il me faisait faire d'autres travaux que le métier que j'étais venu apprendre et j'ai dû arrêter. A la même époque, puisque mon père était un homme dur, j'ai été obligé de m'enfuir de la maison et je suis entré comme garçon de boutique à Piteşti. Mais le commerce ne me plaisait pas. Je n'y suis resté que quelques mois.

Et j'ai continué à garder les vaches presque six ans après la fin de l'école primaire, jusqu'en 1916 quand les impérialistes allemands ont occupé mon village natal. Alors j'ai quitté mère et père et je me suis réfugié avec l'armée roumaine en Moldavie. Je me souviens qu'en courant j'ai perdu l'une de mes chaussures paysannes dans la boue et j'ai continué à courir comme ça, un pied chaussé et l'autre nu...

Je suis arrivé jusqu'à Focşani. Ici, un adjuvant en chef m'a acceuilli dans sa famille, à Panciu, où nous sommes tous tombés malades de typhus. Hospitalisé, j'ai eu la chance d'être soigné par des médecins russes et j'ai guéri.

Puisqu'une partie de la famille est morte de typhus j'ai eu peur et je suis parti de Panciu à Nicoreşti. Ici je suis entré au service d'une dame, propriétaire d'une vigne où je gardais ses vaches.

Chez cette dame habitait aussi (en 1917) un général de brigade, artilleur - son nom était Gheorghiu si je me souviens bien -, qui avait l'habitude de se promener de temps en temps dans la vigne. Un beau jour, comme je gardais les vaches tandis qu'il se promenait, j'ai pris mon courage à deux mains et je lui ai dit tout ce qui me peinait. Je ne lui ai pas parlé de ma mère qui me manquait terriblement ce qui me faisait souvent pleurer, mais de mon grand désir de faire des études...

Plusieurs années s'étaient écoulées depuis que j'avais fini l'école primaire : j'étais devenu presqu'un analphabète. Impressionné peut-être par mon insistance, le général m'a emmené et m'a fait entrer dans un régiment, comme enfant de troupe (Régiment 24 infanterie) afin que, à la fin de la guerre, je puisse continuer mes études. En effet, la campagne finie, le régiment se retira à Roman où je repris l'école. Mais il y avait des difficultés : j'étais parti de la maison sans rien, sans mon certificat d'école primaire. J'ai été donc obligé de passer encore une fois l'examen de fin du cycle primaire (en privé) pour pouvoir m'inscrire au lycée.

J'ai passé l'examen et j'ai fait la première classe de lycée à Roman. Mais j'avais 18 ans ! Je peux dire que je commençais le lycée à l'âge où d'autres le terminait.

De la sorte, j'ai dû faire mon service militaire en Vème classe de lycée. Je l'ai fait pendant deux ans, avec toutes les recrues. Je l'ai achevé avec le grade de soldat.

Entre-temps je lisais beacoup : littérature et philosophie. J'aimais surtout Maxim Gorki ...

Après le service militaire ma première pensée fut de continuer l'école. Comme une sorte de vengeance (ambition) aussi contre toute l'humiliation que j'avais subie de la part des officiers qui se moquaient de moi.

Je ne pouvais rien attendre des miens. Je fus donc obligé de poursuivre les études en privé. Et je me suis inscrit au Lycée « Andrei Şaguna » de la Ville Stalin, Braşov à l'époque, en Vème. Ce fut l'année la plus difficile. J'ai dû faire le sergent de ville pour vivre... Mais sous peu je réussis à entrer comme moniteur dans une école d'apprentis de la ville, devenue plus tard école industrielle. Entre-temps j'assistais presque régulièrement aux cours du lycée. Les enseignants avaient une bonne opinion de moi en voyant mon intérêt pour l'étude. Grâce à cela, je suis devenu, sous leur recommandation, précepteur dans la famille du compositeur Tiberiu Brediceanu.

C'est toujours ici et au même lycée que j'ai passé le bacalauréat.

En 1928, quand je pouvais dire que j'avais un diplôme, je me suis inscrit à l'Université de Cluj. Ici, tout comme à Braşov, se posait le problème des moyens d'existence. J'ai été nommé instituteur dans un village du Département de Someş (dont j'ai également fait une monographie) et détaché comme

secrétaire à l'Inspectorat scolaire de la ville de Cluj. Je pouvais dire que j'avais un emploi. Mais quelles études choisir ?

J'avais depuis longtemps l'idée d'une étude ethnographique de mon village natal. Mais comment la faire ? Je n'avais aucune méthode et je ne savais pas par où commencer. J'avais déjà accumulé certains matériaux folkloriques. J'avais entendu dire qu'à Cluj il existait une Chaire d'ethnographie et folklore. Bien que je fusse inscrit comme étudiant « extraordinaire en droit (dispensé d'assiduité), j'ai commencé à fréquenter sans être inscrit le Séminaire d'ethnographie et folklore, dirigé par le professeur Romulus Vuia, qui, voyant mon intérêt pour l'ethnographie me proposa de devenir son collaborateur ; au début, comme „surveillant" du Parc ethnographique de Hoia, ensuite comme assistant stagiaire, assistant, maître asssitant.

J'ai travaillé ici plus de dix ans (1928-1939), en faisant mon apprentissage au Musée Ethnographique ; c'est ici également que je passai ma licence, mon doctorat et que j'acquis la technique et l'art muséographique. Le Prof. Romulus Vuia avait une expérience remarquable dans le domaine. Le Musée Ethnographique de Cluj était le mieux organisé de toute la région du sud-est de l'Europe. Mais aujourd'hui ces principes d'organisation ne correspondraient plus aux exigences.

Avec le souhait d'être plus près de la maison, de Cluj je suis venu à Bucarest, à l'Institut de Sciences Sociales, comme ethnographe, où j'ai fonctionné peu de temps car l'Institut a été supprimé et j'ai été muté à l'Institut Central de Statistique (1940-1943). Ici j'ai subi certaines injustices surtout au moment où j'ai été engagé. C'est pour cela que je pris la décision de partir à la première occasion. C'est ce qui explique le fait que, au moment où on a ouvert à Iaşi un poste de maître de conférences, j'ai postulé pour ce poste.

Une fois admis, j'ai compris qu'ici il y avait beaucoup de travail à faire. C'est pourquoi je ne me suis pas contenté de donner uniquement les cours mais j'ai initié et mis les bases d'un musée, d'une archive de folklore dans le cadre du musée, d'une bibliothèque de spécialité qui possède plus de 600 volumes (bien qu'à mon arrivée je n'aie rien trouvé, même pas un livre ou autre chose).

Nos réalisations auraient été encore plus importantes si l'étroitesse d'esprit du professeur Gheorghe Năstase n'avait pas été un obstacle. Moi j'étais maître de conférences (et je le suis encore) dans la cadre de la chaire dirigée par le professeur. Il soutenait - et la loi était de son côté – que non seulement le poste de maître de conférences d'ethographie mais aussi le futur musée ethographique devaient être rattachés à sa chaire (Géographie humaine). Moi je soutenais, au contraire, que le musée devait être mis à la disposition du large public, qu'il doit exister comme institution indépendante et ne pas apparaître comme une simple collection didactique.

Je n'aurais peut-être pas gagné cette bataille si je n'avais pas joui d'une conjoncture politique favorable. Les cadres du parti de Iaşi connaissent la question et ils ont eu assez de temps pour se convaincre de la vérité.

Ion Chelcea
8 juin 1953.

Autobiographie (Complément)

1. Service militaire : Bataillon 1, Chasseurs.
2. Période (par fusion) au bataillon 24 Chasseurs, en 1941. J'ai été fourrier, avec le grade de soldat (du fait que, au moment du recrutement, je n'avais pas fini les études et, par conséquent, je n'ai pas pu faire un service militaire réduit).
3. Je me suis marié le 7 août 1932. Ma femme habite Bucarest, rue Lăzureanu, elle a été femme au foyer, ayant 3 enfants à l'école. Nous possédons ensemble un terrain d'un hectare.
4. Ma femme a deux frères : Gogu et Nelu ; Gogu travaille dans les chemins de fer, Nelu est agriculteur. Ma femme a 5 soeurs : Lizeta, Puiţa, Veta, Lucica et Elena – ils sont au total 8 enfants en vie.
5. Les parents de ma femme s'appelaient Cheorghe et Paraschiva, les deux sont décédés. Il a été pope, elle femme au foyer. Ils ont possédé environ 10 hectares.
6. Etant toujours loin d'eux et de leur maison, à Cluj, à Bucarest, à Iaşi, je ne sais pas exectement quelle politique ils ont fait. Nous n'en avons jamais parlé. C'était un pope de campagne accablé par les soucis quotidiens – étant préoccupé par l'avenir des enfants, surtout que ses fils n'étaient pas attirés par les études, comme il l'aurait souhaité.

Ion Chelcea
8 iunie 1953

Autobiographie (complément)

Ma femme a deux frères : Nelu Muşatescu, agriculteur, - domicile commune Valea Mare Podgoria, rayon de Piteşti – il possède 3 hectares. A ce que je sache il n'a pas fait de politique.

Ma femme a 5 soeurs : Lizeta, femme au foyer, marié à Bambulici, enseignant à Câmpulung Muscel – je ne sais pas quelle fortune il a et s'il a fait de la politique. Veta Muşatescu, femme au foyer, mariée au pope Eana – possède 3 hectares. Je ne sais pas quelle politique ils ont fait. Puiţa Muşatescu, femme au foyer, mariée à l'enseignant Preda Ionescu – elle habite Piteşti ; je ne sais pas exactement quelle fortune elle possède, quelle politique elle a fait non plus ; Lucica Muşatescu, femme au foyer, mariée au pope Aurică Petrescu - commune Voineşti, rayon Muscel, région Argeş. Elen Muşatescu, femme au foyer, mariée au pope Moise Vişoiu, pope à Bucarest, le Parc Rahova.

Les parents de ma femme s'appelaient Gheorghe Muşatescu et Paraschiva Muşatescu. Gh. Muşatescu a été pope, il a habité la commune de Voineşti, rayon Muscel, région Argeş. Il a possédé environ 10 hectares. Je ne sais pas quelle politique il a fait. Sa femme a été femme au foyer, possédant la même fortune.

Ion Chelcea
26. 06. 1953

Tout comme dans les réponses aux questions de la fiche de personnel, les gens essayaient de se présenter le plus convenblement possible, le plus près possible du profil psychomoral de la personnalité exigée par le projet de la nouvelle société. Quel était ce profil ? Quels étaient les éléments qui constituaient l'axe de la personnalité du nouveau type humain ? Nous rappelons que la réponse à de telles questions constituent la raison d'être même de la recherche sociologique. Etablir quels types d'hommes et de femmes prédominent dans une société, dans une période déterminée, analyser comment sont „sélectionnées et formées, émancipées et réprimées, sensibilisées et opacifiées" les personnes, montrer comment se révèle la nature humaine „par la conduite et le caractère" dans une société à un moment donné et „quelle signification a pour la nature humaine chacun des traits de la société que nous examinons" – représente selon C. Wright Mills (1959 / 1975, 36) la perspective spécifique des études sociales. Le dossier de personnel est utile à un telle perspective. C'est encore une raison pour laquelle je conseille les jeunes sociologues de ne pas ignorer dans leus études sur la période communiste le dossier de personnel comme sourçe d'information, comme document social.

Dans l'A.d.p. successives de I. C. l'élément travail est constamment souligné : dès un âge jeune « j'ai gardé les vaches des autres », à 11 ans « je suis entré comme apprenti chez le pelletier du village », à 15 ans j'étais « garçon dans une boutique » à Piteşti, à 16 ans, il gardait les vaches comme « domestique chez une dame » de Nicoreşti. Pour faire ses études, I. C. a été enfant de troupe à Roman, sergent de rue et moniteur dans une école professionnelle à Braşov, surveillant au Parc Ethnographique de Hoia (Cluj). Le travail, l'effort physique étaient la prémisse de la formation du nouveau type humain durant les premières décennies du communisme en Roumanie. C'est ce qui explique l'insistance sur le travail dans les A. d. p. Non seulement I. C. a travaillé dur mais ses parents aussi ont « travaillé la terre, tous les deux analphabètes », étant « obligés de cultiver du maïs sur les terres des boyards ». A propos de la famille, I. C. parlait non du fait que ses parents ont été des « paysans pauvres » mais qu'il provenait d'une famille de paysans libres. Dans l'entretien avec Iancu Filipescu (1988, 97) il disait : « Je suis né dans le village Boteni, l'ancien département de Muscel, dans une région représentative du point de vue ethnographique. C'est probablement la principale raison qui m'a orienté vers une préoccupation ethnographique. Je pense surtout aux gens, au fait que je suis descendant de paysans libres du village de Boteni. Ce sont eux qui ont influencé ma conscience, ont déterminé, je peux dire, mon intérêt pour la recherche ethnographique. Ces paysans libres ont toujours été présents lorsque j'ai réalisé des choses importantes ».

L'attachement à la classe ouvrière et l'adhésion à l'idéologie communiste ont constitué, après l'installation du gouvernement Groza en Roumanie,

l'élément de référence du nouveau type humain. Au moment de la prise du pouvoir, PCR (le Parti Communiste Roumain) comptait moins de mille membres. A la chute du communisme, PCR était un parti de masse, ayant eniron 3,5 millions de membres. A propos du fait que le nombre des « illégalistes » (activistes clandestins, avant l'officialisation du PCR) avait augmenté de façon exagérée - étant donné les avantages dont ils bénéficiaient, tout comme les « révolutionnaires » de 1989 aujourd'hui – on disait « Nous étions nombreux, nous sommes restés peu ! ». Après les événements de décembre '89, la formule a changé : « Nous étions nombreux, aucun n'en est resté ! ». Rien de plus vrai que l'assertion du chroniqueur Miron Costin : « Non pas les temps dépendent de l'homme mais le pauvre homme des temps ».

Après l'instauration du communisme en Roumanie, à la suite du marché conclu à Yalta entre les Grands Pouvoirs, certains intellectuels – je crois qu'ils n'étaient pas peu nombreux – se sont souvenus de leurs opinions de gauche pendant leur jeunesse. La réactivation de leur mémoire aurait pu être détérminée aussi par le besoin de contrecarrer les appréciaitons négatives (le stigmate des « réminiscences bourgeoises ») afin de pouvoir rester dans le « champ du travail ».

En ce qui concerne I. C., tout comme dans le cas de beaucoup d'intellectuels formés dans la période précommuniste, il semble que c'était cela l'explication. Après avoir été « comprimé » (obligé de prendre sa retraite à l'âge de 45 ans) en 1947 et après avoir été « libéré de l'enseignement » en 1951, I. C. notait dans sa première A. d. p. (1951) qu'il n'a pas été indifférent « au mouvement politique et économique sous forme marxiste » et il reconnaissait que « la vague nationaliste n'a pas laissé de l'influencer ». Dans l'autre autobiographie (1953), il déclare qu'il n'aurait pu fonder le Musée d'Ethographie de Iaşi s'il n'avait pas „bénéficié d'une conjoncture politique favorable" et il se rappelle que pendant sa jeunesse il lisait beaucoup de „littérature et philosophie" et „qu'il aimait surtout" Maxim Gorki. Il a dû aimer les écrits de Maxim Gorki traduits à l'époque, *Parmi les étrangers* et *Sur le côtes d'Italie* – tel qu'il le précise aussi dans l'autobiographie (I. C. a vécu lui aussi parmi les étrangers ; lui aussi a été sur les côtes de l'Italie). Je sais qu'en famille il parlait souvent avec une véritable vénération de Lev Nicolaevici Tolstoï, qu'il ne cite pas dans l'A. d. p. A l'âge de 88 ans il avouait que, étant élève „je voulais absolument, sous l'influence de mes lectures, connaître deux choses : d'abord Iasnaia Poliana, voir la maison de Tolstoï et, deuxièmement, connaître l'Italie" (Chelcea, 1988, 98). On a a pu constater à quel point I. C. a bénéficié du communisme : il a été „comprimé" de l'enseignement, il a été „détaché de la chaire", il a supporté l'action d'"épuration", pour ne plus parler des enqêtes de la Securitate. Il a pris sa retraite en 1957, avant l'âge-limite. Depuis 1957, après la parution de l'étude-délation politique de Ion Vlăduțiu (1957, 229-284), jusqu'en 1964, on lui a interdit de publier dans les revues de

spécialité, son nom étant „mis à l'index" – tel qu'il le disait avec amertume mais non sans humour I. C.

Jusqu'à la moitié des années '60, il était important de montrer que l'on avait sympathisé et on avait adopté l'idéologie de la classe ouvrière et que l'on a toujours eu une attitude pro-URSS et que l'on apprécie au plus haut degré les réalisations du „pays du socialisme victorieux". Après le IXème congrès du PCR (1965), les choses avaient partiellement changé : on n'exigeait plue que l'on aime „le pays voisin et ami" (voir l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie par les armées de l'URSS et des pays du Traité de Varsovie, à l'exception de la Roumanie). L'autre exigence était encore valable. Les gens, surtout les intellectuels „à problèmes" se faisaient le souhait : „Que la classe ouvrière t'aime !" . Mais personne n'aime sans qu'il soit aussi aimé. Ceux qui construisaient leur A. d. p. comme une confession connaissaient cette „loi psychologique". Dans l'une de ses autobiographies, I. C. déclare : „Je suis le partisan du progrès, quelle que soit l'atmosphère du temps", avançant comme argument le fait qu'en 1936, il avait écrit dans une revue (*Curentul*) sur les efforts faits par la Russie soviétique pour la recherche ethnographique et qu'il avait réimprimé l'article respectif en 1940. Si nous envisageons strictement cette A.d.p., on pourrait tirer la conclusion que I. C. a été enthousiasmé par ces efforts et, par conséquent, il a eu une attitude positive envers l'URSS. Mais en lisant l'article, on constate que I.C. tire un signal d'alarme à propos de „notre douloureux présent", de notre situation de „cendrillon" de l'ethnographie en Roumanie. Dans l'article en question, I. C. montre que „Le tsar rouge, Lénine, a fait naître un nouveau folklore en Russie : histoires, légendes, chansons, épopées, ballade… En plus, l'ancien régime s'est couvert de sarcasme et d'une acide critique sociale. Les koulaks, les grands propriétaires des villages, ont, eux aussi, polarisé autour d'eux toute une littérature de ce type" (Chelcea, 1940, 31). On ne pourrait pas dire que I. C. a admiré trop le pouvoir soviétique – tel qu'il aurait voulu le laisser entendre par son A. d. p.

Les performances scolaires, les réalisations scientifiques, dans les années '50-'60, comptaient moins même pour les services du personnel de l'université. Il y a eu des cas d'assistants universitaires qui, au moment de la réforme de l'enseignement de 1948, sont devenus professeurs sans une oeuvre significative. Certains d'entre eux dirigeaient même des thèses de doctorat sans avoir un diplôme de bacalauréat.

C'est ce qui explique le fait que, dans les A. d. p. de I. C., les références à ses publications sont quasi inexistantes. I. C. mentionne seulement le fait que « depuis longtemps je pensais à une étude ethnographique sur mon village natal » et qu'il avait passé son doctorat avec la thèse « Accompagnements (tovărăşii ?) de garçons et filles dans la vie du peuple roumain ». Mais ce doctorat n'a jamais été reconnu et I. C. n'a jamais bénéficié de l'augmentation salariale prévue par le titre de docteur ès-sciences . I. C. ne mentionne pas les

publications d'avant l'instauration du communisme (*La race et le pays*, 1940 ; *Les « Rudari » de Muscel*, 1943 ; *Les Tziganes de Roumanie*, 1944). Serait-ce une simple amnésie ? Pourquoi I. C. n'oublie-t-il pas de mentionner que « entre autres buts que j'ai eus ce fut aussi celui de donner à la Moldavie un Musée Ethnographique » et qu'il a réussi cela à une époque difficile, pendant la guerre », qu'il a encore organisé « une bibliothèque spécialisée du musée et une archive de folklore » ? Les informations de l'A. d. p. sont souvent non seulement lapidaires mais lacunaires aussi, comme dans ce cas. Dans l'entretien avec le prof. Iancu Filipescu apparaissent des éléments nouveaux qui rendent compte des époques antérieures. « En 1943, lorsque j'ai commencé le cours [d'ethnographie à l'Université de Iaşi – n. n.], j'ai adressé un mémoire au Ministère de l'Education Nationale – le ministre d'alors était Ion Petrovici, originaire de Moldavie lui aussi – par lequel je demandais l'organisation urgente d'un musée ethnographique à Iaşi. C'est avec surprise que j'ai reçu l'approbation, je ne m'y attendais pas. En plus, j'ai même reçu une subvention de 300 000. Pour commencer c'était important » (Chelcea, 1988, 100). Quant à la bibliothque du musée, I. C. se souvient : « Etant à Fălticeni, j'ai rencotré Artur Gorovei. Il m'a bien accueilli, en me faisant visiter sa maison, devant sa riche bibliothèque, je lui ai demandé : « Monsieur Gorovei, qu'est-ce que vous avez l'intention de faire avec cette bibliothèque ? » Il m'a répondu qu'il voulait en faire une donation à l'Académie [A. Gorovei était depuis 1940 membre d'honneur de l'Académie Roumaine – n. n.]. « Alors », lui dis-je, M Goorvei, l'Académie est riche. Ne serait-il pas mieux de nous la donner à Iaşi, au Musée Ethnographique ? Les étudiants n'ont pas de source d'information pour un travail de séminaire ». Et je continuai : « Je regrette qu'un Valaque plaide la cause de la Moldavie devant un véritable intellectuel moldave comme vous, mais je me sens obligé de faire cela. ! » (Chelcea, 1988, 100). « Juste deux semaines plus tard, j'ai trouvé la bibliothèque emballée [quelques centaines de volumes de spécialité – n. n.], prête à être expédiée à Iaşi. [...] Artur Gorovei, cet homme aux yeux bleus et un coeur d'enfant espiègle, peut ainsi être considéré comme le deuxième grand donateur du Musée Ethnographique de la Moldavie » (Chelcea, 1978, 57). I. C. apprécie que Iuliu Pascu, conseiller au Conseil Législatif de Bucarest « s'inscrit comme le premier grand donateur du Musée Ethnographique de la Moldavie. [...] Il a donné au musée toute une collection d'objets ethnographiques : environ 400 pièces de musée, en grande partie des objets textiles, de la céramique, des costumes populaires. [...] Dès que la collection fut entrée dans le patrimoine du Musée, on a procédé à l'inventaire, avec l'aide des étudiants et des étudiantes qui suivaient les cours d'ethnographie » (Chelcea, 1978, 57).

On peut constater que dans l'A. d. p., le temps se dilate ou se contracte : on raconte beaucoup de choses sur certains événements ou périodes, tandis que sur d'autres, ayant la même durée ou une signification sociale similaire, très peu

ou pas du tout. On rencontre le phénomène de dilatation / contraction du temps aussi dans les (auto)biographies spontanées, mais selon une autre logique que dans le cas de l'A. d. p.. Dans ce dernier cas, nous avons affaire à une « logique sociale » (on dilate les épisodes souhaitables du point de vue social au moment des relations) ; dans les (auto)biographies spontanées, on accorde une large place aux circonstances à résonance affective au moment où elles se sont passées : il s'agit d'une « logique psychologique ». certains intervalles de temps se contractent tant, qu'ils disparaissent complètement. On voit apparaître le phénomene d'amnésie sociale volontaire ». La personne en question ne se souvient pas – volontairement – certaines choses. Ces choses sont conservées mentalement. Un bon exemple c'est l' « épisode Italie » (1917) et sa participation au travail de recensement des Roumains entre le Boug et le Niestre effectué par l'Institut Central de Statistique (1942) – dont nous avons déjà parlé.

L'examen des autobiographies du dossier de personnel de I. C. permet de formuler une réponse à une question à valeur méthodologique plus générale : la vie de l'homme est-elle un parcours, un trajet préétabli, a-t-elle une finalité ou bien elle est purement et simplement une succession de positions spatiales et sociales que l'individu occupe pendant une durée plus ou moins longue ? Pierre Bourdieu avait raison quand il affirmait que « essayer de comprendre une vie comme une série unique et autosuffisante d'événements successifs, sans un autre lien qu'un nom propre, c'est presque tout aussi absurde que d'essayer d'expliquer le trajet d'un métro sans tenir compte de la structure du réseau, c'est-à-dire la matrice de relations objectives entre les différentes stations » (Bourdieu, 1986 / 1988, 83). Je considère, en accord avec le sociologue français cité antérieurement, que la biographie d'une personne se définit comme la totalité de ses « placements » et « déplacements » dans l'espace social. J'apprécie, de même, que la « description officielle » de la vie (l'autobiographie du dossier de personnel) impose des « contraintes et des censures spécifiques » qui l'éloignent de la « logique normale de la confidence ». L'éloignement de cette logique est d'autant plus accentuée que le « modèle officiel » s'implante plus brutalement, emmenant avec soi des sanctions pénales ou d'une autre nature. Il s'agit de l'ordre social instauré en Roumanie après le 23 août 1944 par la souffrance généralisée nommée la « dictature du prolétariat ».

Conclusions

L'officialisation de la représentation privée de sa propre vie sous la forme des autobiographies du dossier de personnel dans la période du début du régime communiste en Roumanie a suivi la logique stricte de la contrainte et de l'(auto)censure, non pas celle de la confidence.

La valeur du document social du dossier de personnel résulte plutôt de l'analyse des questions de la feuille de personnel que de l'analyse du contenu des autobiographies officielle (*curriculum vitae*). L'utilisation des autobiographies officielles pour la reconstitution du passé récent, pour réaliser une esquisse psychologique du communisme, présuppose la compréhension de la biographie comme « placements » et « déplacements » de l'individu dans le champ social, ainsi que l'appel à la méthode « triangulaire », la vérification du récit de la vie par l'intermédiaire d'autres modalités d'étude : biographies non officielles, interviews, témoignages, analyse des produits de l'activité cr éatrice et des documents officiels, analyse du contenu.

La réalisation de telles collections de dossiers de personnel pour des catégories sociales comme intellectuels, fonctionnaires de l'administration publique, officiers, ouvriers, etc. dans les différentes étapes du communisme en Roumanie pourrait offrir la possibilité de faire des analyses psychosociologiques comparatives et d'élaborer des typologies des « hommes soumis aux temps » fondé sur des données empiriques, conformément à la « théorie bein fondée ».

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THE IMAGINING OF NATIONAL SPACE IN INTERWAR ROMANIA. GEOPOLITICS AND GEOHISTORY

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Anthropogeography, geopolitics, the dialogue and the polemics opposing sociology and geography are central elements in the process of imagining the national space in the interwar period. A dense network of competitions, alliances and counter-alliances is coming together in this area of scientific legitimacy and representativity.

The birth of this new disciplinary subdomain offers us the chance to track down the external influences, to see how the central scientific canon(s) are replicated and transformed at the periphery and how the romanian culture finds itself sincronized with the dilemmas, themes and tensions of the european culture. This sincronicity is taking place – it is one of the thesis of this paper – under the sign of „reactionary modernism". This perspective has the ability of questioning the uniqueness of the modernity process. Is modernity a package deal or are there other ways of spelling modernity?

This appropriation of the „reactionary modernism" discourse for the analysis of romanian anthropogeography and sociology is, in itself, an example of translating/ transforming scientific discourses on a central-perifery axis.

Political and cultural contexts. The role of polemics

In pre-war Romania, but especially in the interwar period, there is a large and important coming together of various intellectual disciplines under the sign of romanticism and reactionary modernism, a massive scientific, intellectual and cultural redefinition and reworking of different disciplinary canons.

A number of sub-domains are being constantly formed, criticized, expanded and contracted in the quite prolific intellectual atmosphere of the period. One of these sub-domains is forming in the region between geography, sociology, ethnography, historiography etc. sometimes called, in a German manner, anthropogeography or geopolitics, or, under a French influence, human geography.

This rather new sub-disciplinary field is quite a significant element of this study, for a number of interrelated reasons. The first one consists of the fact that it explicitly integrates the discourse on national space in the construction of the national self imaging in the social, geographical, historiographic and ethnographic sciences in interwar Romania. The second reason would be represented by the fact that, analyzing the emergence of this new scientific (sub) domain, we would have a privileged access to the historic articulation of a political language (Pocock 1989, Pocock 1987). The last one is connected to the

fact that we'll have the opportunity to trace down the foreign influences, the ways in which occidental and „central" scientific canons are replicated and transformed in the peripheries, the fascinating synchronicities of the interwar Romanian culture with most of the dilemmas and tensions of European culture.

We will concentrate mainly on the interwar period since we believe that during this period a certain paradigm shift took place, or, in any case, an important mutation in the cultural mechanisms of national identity reproduction.

The 1918's, apart from its direct territorial and institutional effects, is highly significant, in the economy of this paper, as it sustains a new pattern of relations between national-culture experts on one side and state bureaucrats and political elites on the other side. A new generation of intellectuals, bred in the new Romanian academic system, deriving their legitimacy from an expertise in the national culture but also from their mastery in the occidental scientific canon, collided with the older, established generation of national-culture experts and, even more important, with the new political and state elites, less dependent now on legitimacy from this new intelligentsia, and less able to absorb the huge mass of cultivated youngsters produced by the national educational system. (Livezeanu 1998).

What seems to happen, at the level of the organization of the mechanisms of national culture, is the collapse of the old and unified *national pedagogy*. This pedagogy was unified not necessarily in the sense that we can speak of a thorough unity of cultural groups but concerning the sameness of ideological and scientific resources and the kind of cultural-academic discourse used for "educating" the nation. The pre-1918 *Teachers of the Nation* who, quite successfully, transposed the herbartian, individual pedagogy to the collective, national self, are entering now a very different, i.e. competitive, arena. The polemics on the topic of who held the right criteria for defining the "real", the "authentic" national-identity, national spaces are multiplying and becoming very harsh.

The field of interwar anthropogeography and geopolitics is not a very homogenous one, not even by the criteria valid in this context, as a number of oppositions and contradictions arise right in the core of it. Is it a sociologically-based discourse, a geographically centered one or is it just another type of *Völkerpsychologie*? How can we understand the regions and the nation in a unique, scientifically based, discourse? The dispute is an open one as this disciplinary field will not be able to close itself in clear cut definitions; there will be different and concurrent definitions but, interestingly enough, a discursive identity will emerge.

The creation of a new image, a new national investition of space is probably the most important product of this interdisciplinary field.

A methodological point of view

According to our opinion, one of the best approaches to this „discursive formation" (Foucault 1972) or, at least, interdisciplinary field, consists in mapping the debates that structured its options and specified its major themes. These debates will be contextualized and situated in the frames of the "representative biographies" (Murphy 1997) of some of those involved.

In mapping external discursive influences I try not to use just a simple "borrowing" model – who is a potentially essentialist one, but, instead, try to reveal the strategic way the "marginal" thinkers are using the ideological and scientific discourse of the more or less "canonic" West to solve local problems and appease local concerns.

The peculiarity of thinking from the margins is, probably, that it consciously tries to keep enough resemblance to the "core" theories that legitimize the central and east-European scholars as scholars, while trying to use the same theories for purposes not always similar to the original ones.

Sometimes talking about disputes between two different scientific canons, one major, the other minor, one central, the other peripheral, can be misleading. Especially because, at the time when these disputes appeared, the "minor" tradition was quite synchronized to the major ones so these disputes became in a way internal, even if tuned to specific interests and locally centered and powered.

Anton Golopenția and the new „science of reality"
The sociological pillar

The representative biography of Anton Golopenția is an essential part in our attempt to understand the sociological pillar of interwar geopolitics. We understand by "representative biography", according to Jerry Muller (Muller 1987), the condensed story of an individual where the study focuses on those social and cultural contexts that he shared with those who followed a similar intellectual and political trajectory, but also on the differences, the turning points and the alternative intellectual, political and cultural trajectories. The narrative will therefore shuttle back and forth between texts and contexts trying, in doing so, to illuminate a more abstract and general model without losing the connection with the concreteness of historical experience. This model, this larger European twist of mind is that of the radical conservative.

The radical conservative shares many of the *concerns* of more conventional conservatism, such as the need for institutional authority and continuity with the past, but believes that the processes characteristic of modernity have destroyed the valuable legacy of the past for the present, and that a restoration of the virtues of the past therefore demands radical or revolutionary action (Muller 1987, 19).

The defense against the cultural and political effects of modernity on the body politic is thought to require however a homeopathic absorption of the organizational and technological hallmarks of modernity.

This understanding of radical conservatism or what Jeffrey Herf calls reactionary modernism (Herf 1986), is, more or less implicitly, questioning the idea that modernity comes as a package deal. There is just one sole brand of modernity or are there alternate ways of spelling modernity, some of them not very pleasant, even abhorrent from a moral point of view, but still modern. Even if the package-theory was, and still is, very widely sustained, having its quite important theoretical and pragmatically insights, it has been attacked from different view points, starting with Hugo von Hofmannstahl, Thomas Mann and the weimarian conservative revolutionaries and continuing with Karl Mannheim to the more unpassionate analysis of Jeffrey Herf, Fritz Stern, Stefan Breuer and many others.

Geopolitics is one of the most interesting discourses of reactionary modernism. It represents more than a type of argumentation used by a group of scholars and pseudo-scholars grouped around Karl Haushofer and *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik,* being one of the important political and cultural languages of Weimar fragile democratic setting. In the case of Romanian, as we'll see below, this language is not so important, it is not so central as it was in Germany, although it blends very well in the discourse on the unity of the new Romanian state, and, typically for its pragmatic and eclectic twist, is trying to reconcile the German *Geopolitik* and the French human geography of Vidal de la Blache. The badge of geopolitics will be adopted thoroughly and enthusiastically by a larger cultural and academic group only in the context of the political crisis triggered, during the war, by the Viena Diktat and the losing of Transylvania.

A new rhetoric, dynamism, anti-positivism on some levels, trust in science coupled with anti-urban and pro-rural discourses and so-called applicability and realism are the new traits defining geopolitics (Murphy 1997, Agnew 2002 etc).

Anton Golopenția: representative biography

I will not present again Anton Golopentia's intellectual and cultural personal trajectory, the very important influence of Hans Freyer's "science of reality" and the German conservative revolutionaries, I want just to draw your attention to a few facts I wasn't able to present to you at the last workshop and who are quite interesting and important, at least from this paper point of view.

In Berlin, Golopentia attends the lectures of Nikolai Hartmann, Edward Spranger, Vierkandt, Ludwig Klages, Werner Sombart and Hans Günther. The intellectual atmosphere from the Berlin University will be quite a shock for the young neophyte. In a letter to Ştefania Cristescu, his future wife, he wrote: „The

lectures are dull, not even the better professors are doing their best, with the maybe exception of Nikolai Hartmann [...] The professors' obvious weariness, especially Sombart, made me wonder whether I really should desire for myself accomplishments on the land of scholarship." (Golopenţia 1999, 114).

In this context, he considers making his PhD thesis with a professor from Bonn rather in the field of ethnography and folkloristic, than in the field of sociology. "Apparently, I'll be preparing my thesis with a professor from Bonn. We'd have there the most renowned philologists of Germany [...]. The interesting for us lies here, with the folklorists and philologists, not with the professors of sociology" (Golopenţia 1999, 136).

But the journeys to the "working camps" of the German Youth Movement from Silezia, Löwenberg, at Boberhaus, the contact with an elite group from *Jugendbewegung*, were going to change his plans. We believe that he had a "geopolitical" experience *avant la lettre* in Boberhaus meetings and conferences: "Especially the Hungarians represented a great surprise for me. Now, when we, panic struck, are about to become chauvinists, they and their reviews almost openly criticize the insanity of their up-to-now politics; they strive to know their villages, their motto is: 'first a minorities regime in present Hungary, then claims of revision'. The Bulgarians made me see how neighbors we are and understand how inevitable the fight for the Cadrilater is. I heard then a young Ukrainian who displayed maps on which Maramureş, Bucovina and parts of Basarabia were places among the borders of his future country. My image of Romania enriched substantially: I saw it also through the eyes of our neighbors. Moreover, I saw both with the Bulgarians and the Hungarians, the will to have an own economic and cultural destiny" (Golopenţia 1999, 148).

In 1934, Anton Golopenţia moves to Leipzig, where he becomes a PhD student of Hans Freyer (Golopenţia 2002, 1xi-1xii).

In Leipzig, Anton Golopenţia will enter a "Romanization" process of his study interests; he will be lecturing on Romania and its present problems. He considers writing for Hans Freyer (who intended to publish a "south-east" library) an analysis of the actions of The German Historical School ideas on Romanian conservative thinkers and politicians (Kogălniceanu, Eminescu), and Schopenahuer's and the neo-kantians' on Junimists. Moreover, he wanted to publish, in the same context, "a booklet on Romania as it hadn't been written ever before" (Golopenţia, 1999, 156)

The first subject of his PhD thesis will be one related to the French positivism: "The problem of positive philosophy. The contribution of French positivism to a fundamentation of exploring the realities of history". He will motivate his choice saying that it is related to a personal reaction to German historicism, which he felt himself to be "soaked with" (Golopenţia 1999, 177).

However, eventually, his thesis will not be dedicated to positivism and to the French school. In a letter from 1936, the Romanian sociologist considered

that he had attained a new conception on sociology that could fundament "Romania's present situation, of the neighbouring countries, our past and other's, the fundamentals of knowledge and the integrant features of social reality, the principles and the history of social sciences" (Golopenția 1999, 203). Social sciences appear as an arsenal of means capable of diagnosing social realities and the actual circumstances of the home country in order to facilitate its survival among neighbouring states and great powers. It is what he will later, more modestly, call geopolitics.

From the point of view of this system, concocted under the powerful influence of Hans Freyer's[1] theoretical position, Golopenția can criticize then what appears to him as an inconsistency of the monographic project sustained by The Sociology School from Bucharest: "The professor (Dimitrie Gusti – n.n.) ascribes to the monography the mission of an informational tool for the political leaders, but our research focuses more on the folkloric issues of certain villages...We shouldn't stick ourselves in the mud of individual actions (the monography of all villages), we should be able to balance the recording of the particular and the general, to face the stringent issues of the village (social, economic, health, representations of the state, politics, economy etc), to deal also with Romania's towns (the workers and suburbanites, the leading bourgeoisie), to know how to gather information on our neighbouring countries and on the great powers"(Golopenția 1999, 203).

The German geopolitical discourse, especially that of the Haushofer school, is quite rarely used in Golopenția's geopolitics who favors the freyerian construction of a cameralistic sociology in the service of the state. The reference to the European (German) scientific "canon" is creative through a selective lecture and a transformation of the discourse recognized as "geopolitical" in the European scientific space. This adjustment, translation, can be framed, when successful, in the limits of the recognizable. We have, with Golopenția but also with the entire interwar Romanian "geopolitics", an example of the complex and ambiguous relationship wrought between the "center" and the "periphery", of the adjustment and transformation of western scientific languages in Romanian social sciences and of the perpetual double game between the modification of the discourses and the scientific instruments and the maintaining of the criteria through which they can be accepted and recognized by the "central" western canon.

[1] In one of his letters to Tudor Vianu, Golopentia characterizes Hans Freyer: "a nietzschean of a remarkable capacity of doing what Germans called *Geistesgeschichte*, but also a skilled manipulator of statistics and sources and an alert observer" (Golopenția 1999, 334)

A few polemics

After returning from Germany, Anton Golopenția will quite rapidly reintegrate in the Bucharest Sociology School, taking an active part in the defending of its position either from certain "dissidents" such as Dumitru Cristian Amzăr, or from the critical stances coming from Celestin Bouglé or Helmut Klocke.

This paper doesn't want to give a detailed account of the tensions and the arguments existent inside interwar Romanian sociology, however, we will briefly attempt to illustrate Golopenția's stand in this context. The answers to the attacks started in 1937 by the former monographist, D.C. Amzăr, in *Ideea românească, Însemnări sociologice* (review published by Traian Brăileanu in Cernăuți) and in *Rânduiala*[2] are given by H.H. Stahl, Traian Herseni and, last but not least, Anton Golopenția. The theme of the debates is an essential one. Is monographic sociology "the science of the Romanian nation"? Is, in this respect, sociology a synthetic science made up of different particular sciences or it can directly, without the use of intermediary sciences, realize the "science of the nation"?

A. Golopenția is very careful in not being seen as sustaining the anti-gustian, socio-ethnological and philosophical dissidence that grew around D.C. Amzăr and Ernest Bernes. "D.C. Amzăr mentions in a note my article [...], considering that my interpretation of the science of the Romanian nation is quite similar to his. I believe that D.C. Amzăr didn't take into consideration what I had said there, since I couldn't find any resemblance between our driving ideas." (Golopenția 2002, 80). It was a good opportunity for Golopenția to restate his "geopolitical" stand. Even if this term doesn't appear at all, the resemblance with *Însemnare cu privire la definirea preocupării ce poartă numele de geopolitică* is obvious: "...I believe that the role of sciences is to help people and nation assert themselves. The role of social sciences, of the sciences dealing with the communities man lives in, is to help the leaders of these communities. First of all, the role of social sciences appears to me, since nation is the most important of these communities, *to help the leaders of the State of their own nation (neam), by perfect information made by specialists for the political leaders.* Social sciences fulfill their mission by clarifying through concrete research the current situation and the evolutive tendencies of the nation, both within it and in relation with the fiend and friendly nations" (Golopenția 2002, 80). The articulation between national research – that we, considering *Însemnare cu privire la definirea preocupării ce poartă numele de geopolitică* can define as geopolitics – and the general theory of social reality (the theoretical part of sociology) is performed on the concrete/abstract binome, overlapping the national/universal one: „Concrete research is national, it clarifies the situation of

[2] The review of the „disidence" to Gusti school, led by D.C. Amzăr, E. Bernea, Ion I. Ionică and Ion Samarineanu.

one's own nation; general theory is relatively universal, usable by all the nations which have a similar structure." (Golopenția 2002, 81). The last accusation formulated by Amzăr, concerning the impracticability, unrealism of the Gustian project is rejected by Golopenția less vividly, the Romanian sociologist having, of reasons others than Amzăr's, his own abstentions.

A. Golopenția points to D.C. Amzăr – who was during that period actively involved in The Legionary Movement (Iron Guard) – a "canonic", external scientific discourse as template, as discourse, as syntax and common scientific vocabulary: *Wissenschaft vom deutschen Volke* (Golopenția 2002, 81). But the two use this "canon" in very different ways. Golopenția sustained cameralistic approach have little in common with the ethnographical – spiritual perspective on nation and the destiny inherent to Romanian ethnos embraced by the philosopher D.C. Amzăr.

D.C. Amzăr's perspective surely deserves a more complex approach than we'll be able to do here. His national self-knowledge project presupposes the clarifying of the bond between 'thought' and 'word', an understanding of the Romanian spirit, ethos "on the line the Greek ethos followed when it first became conscious of itself" (Amzăr 1935, 35). The difference between the ethnical – ontological tendency represented by Amzăr and the cameralistic one represented by Golopenția becomes visible when Amzăr speaks of "the young generation" and of the exceptional role that they have to play in history. Founding part of his discourse, like many other interwar thinkers, on a reformulation of the classical dichotomy form/fond, and criticizing the modern Romanian non-substantial change of political elites or of superficial laws and institutions, D. C. Amzar expects redemption through a virile embodiment of the new generation: "His thought (the personification of the new generation) is of renewing the life of the Romanian society not in its forms, but in its *spirit*, not in its external appearance, but in its *inner order* [...] This means a change in the *man himself*, in his way of being, of thinking and of working and not a mere replacing of people with other people. This means reaching, through inner growth, a new human level [...] which would take the Romanian people to their true existence and self completion in their thought and historical deed." (Amzăr, 1935b, 421).

Anton Golopenția assumes, as we showed above, the role of defender of the monographic sociology perspective over the nation and the state in the inner disputes with various "sociological dissidences" or with the interpretation coming from the field of philosophy and ethnology or other attempts of "ethnic ontologies" (Antohi 2002). This role doesn't stop at the internal, national level as Golopenția gets involved also in answering to some external 'threats'.

The book *Les convergences des sciences sociales et l'Esprit international*, published in Paris in 1938, contains a critique of the gustian sociology made by one of the most important representatives of the durkheimian sociological school:

Celestin Bouglé. Gustian sociology is, according to Bouglé, nationalist and not general enough, too empiric, not contributing enough to the unification of social sciences. This national phase of sociology is, in Bouglé's view, prevalent especially in Central Europe (Bouglé 1938, 13).

As far as the monographic approach is concerned, a central one for the identity of the Sociological School from Bucharest, Bouglé, who sees it as resembling Le Play's, accuses it of a folkoric-nationalizing tendency. "In village monographies, engendered in Romania mostly by Mr. Gusti, a very powerful belief manifests itself...: if village research represents for our Romanian colleagues the true center of sociology, this is surely explained only by the fact that to them, rural population, preservers of precious customs and practices, are Romania's major force, both moral and material. (Bouglé 1938: 13 apud Golopenția 2002, 86).

Golopenția's answer is very prompt. To him, the construction part of a theoretical and methodological instrument "isn't ...the only role of the scientist specialized in the study of social realities". The entire theoretical-methodological construction doesn't have (anymore) an autonomous stake because it is formed "for a reason which transcends science: making easier the leadership of social life" (Golopenția 2002, 86). Focusing sociological studies on villages doesn't represent, in Golopenția's view, "the true core of sociology", at least not in the sense of an essential and self-standing interest, as Bouglé believed, but simply the result of "applying a method...in Romania's special context" (Golopenția 2002, 86). Villages are significant for Romanian sociology neither for the ancient customs and practices they preserved, nor for being in a process of urbanization and westernization but because "they represent *the body of the Romanian people*, to the unity of which the Romanian sociologists should participate, above all, through their research. (Golopenția 2002, 87).

Consequently, the stakes of the Romanian sociology seems to be overlapping the project of a harmonious social change, of well sociologically informed social engineering. The role of sociology appears to consist in the slowing down of the dissolution of socially important traditions and in hastening the receiving of salutary innovations; it "consolidates as much as possible the country traditional spiritual culture and promotes hygiene, modern agricultural techniques..." (Golopenția 2002, 87). Besides an exaggerated optimism, the way in which A. Golopenția presents the Bucharest monographic sociology as applied science, in the service of the state and of the administration, seems to exclude from this science any question referring to values and final stakes. This science, thinks Golopenția, isn't intrinsically more "nationalistic" than durkheimian sociology, whose distinguished heir Bouglé considered himself to be.

The lack of understanding that Celestin Bouglé showed towards The Bucharest School approach is far from being only conjunctural. We will not

begin here a systematic comparison between the Durkheimian School and Gusti's School, even though this approach is worth emphasizing. However, we find ourselves in front of an apparently more complicated situation. Anton Golopenția, one of Dimitrie Gusti's students, defends the Bucharest school with arguments coming from Hans Freyer, in front of one of Emile Durkheim's most distinguished heirs.

The sociology of modernity, as the master from Sorbonne instituted it, may be understood like a communitarian defense of liberalism (Cladis 1992, Stedman 2001) and as a critique of Tönnies's theories (Durkheim 1889), nevertheless there are several important aspects which are not very well articulated in durkheimian sociology. Modern society, grounded on the organicity of the social division of work and having individualism – a specific product of modern society - as its sole legitimate morality and ideology, is kept together by a moral order related to citizenship, education and professional groups but the reintegration of modern society, unlike the traditional or segmented one, implies, necessarily, the background of a homogenous and closed space.

Organic solidarity, as structure of the society, and corporatism, as a solution for the modern crisis, imply the existence of a national state, of a homogenous social national space that provides the background for anomy's drama and the complementarities induced by the social division of work. The fact that Durkheim's sociology emerges after that immense social, cultural, economic, military and communicational process that Eugen Weber dubbed as "the transformation of the peasants into Frenchmen" (Weber 1966) is probably not accidental. Durkheimian sociology is the sociology of a homogenous national state where traditional regionalisms were completely defeated and where nationalism became "common" (Billig 1995); "the national" being obscured behind the unfolding of "the social" forces. The founding of the Sorbonne sociology, the fight for education and the imposing of a new type of intellectual, artfully presented by Lepenies (Lepenies 1990), are pieces from a necessary "destructive analysis" (Handler 1988, Handler 1985) to which the entire European sociology should be probably subjected in order to gain access to the national implicit that often hides beyond very "positivist" formulations.

Due to the different phase in the "national construction" process and the different modality in which social sciences intervened in articulating this process, monographic sociology à la Gusti will show a relative indifference to durkheimian sociology. The lack of understanding will be reciprocal. The attempted monographic accomplishment of a science of the nation through the study of Romanian villages couldn't appear as realistic to a sociologist for whom a synthetic science of sociology was far from being entirely constituted[3].

[3] „Mais pour qu'on en puisse juger, celle-ci est-elle d'ores et déjà intégralment constituée? Nous en sommes loin. Et le sociologues ne sont pas les derniers à le proclamer. Qu'on mesure plutôt l'étendue du programme que lui

From this point of view, of great interest are the adverse reactions of the group of young scholars who went to study in France after a more or less prolonged monographic experience: Bernea, Brauner, Cristescu and Ionică. Their partial inability of adjusting to the sociological and ethnological French model is obvious in their letters sent to Romania (Golopenția 2005).

The group of "primitive" texts, cultures and populations on which French sociology fed (Mauss 1974) was completely uninteresting both for D.C. Amzăr and for A. Golopenția, even if for very different reasons. The distance between Trocadero in Paris and The Village Museum in Bucharest measures accurately the distance between the Durkheim's school and Gusti's school.

If, describing the dispute with D.C. Amzăr, we have the same national-institutional context but opposite discourses of construction and/or national consolidation (one – cameralistic, the other – spiritualist/ethnic), in the case of Celestin Bouglé's critique, the differences in articulating social sciences with the national project made the lack of understanding inevitable at the very level of fundamental vocabulary.

"National", from A. Golopenția's explicit[4] point of view, simply means the local application, on a space legitimated by the existence of a national state, of a general theoretical corpus. The problem of a possible incompatibility between social sciences' two levels of action is obscured by the creation of an instrumentalist image, through which sociology doesn't built nation through knowledge as it partly was the case with the Gustian *Sociologia Militans* but rather helps the state in this process.

"National", from the durkheimian sociologist's point of view, means the existence of a *particular* case, in a context in which the French *sociologism*, due to Marcel Mauss and his students, attempted a broad comparison of the diverse "particulars" with the future aim of accomplishing a synthetic sociology. The study of one's own national particular wasn't that interesting in a moment in which French sociology's national particular roots were almost obscured in an objective-scientific knowledge corpus which seemed capable of embracing the entire world, or at least the one marked by what was left from the French empire (Stocking 1983).

Anton Golopenția's stand towards Helmut Klocke's study, an ex-colleague of his, student of H. Freyer's and G. Ibsen's and assistant at the Hungarian Institute from Berlin University, (Landvolk und Dorf in madjarischer und rumänischer Sicht, in *Deutsches Archiv für Landes – und Volkforschung*, an

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trace M. Mauss dans son article sur les 'Divisions et proportions des divisions de la sociologie' (Année sociologique, nouvelle serie 1924-1925). Elle aurait à coordoner les résultats de recherches sociologiques spéciales – économiques, juridiques, religieuses etc. – en les raportant toujours à ces touts que sont les groupes. Elle mettrait en lumière ce qui constitue les systèmes sociaux et ce qui est dû à leur influence, elle relèverait la propagation des faits de civilisation par-dessus les frontieres des groupes. Toutes tâches qui supposent d'immenses enquêtes, des responses à des questionnaires méthodiquement établis, des études 'sociographiques' de toutes sortes, un travail cyclopéen" (Bouglé 1938, 93).

[4] We believe that there is different, implicit, level.

I, 1937, 4, 990-1023) published in 1939 in *Sociologia românească,* is interesting because Klocke seems to accuse gustian sociology of the same flaw that C. Bouglé underlined; that is its "ethnicism". However, the German rural sociologist's position is quite different from that of Durkheim's disciple. It isn't the existence of an abstract and systematic science which forms the criterion according to which the monographic approach of Romanian sociology is judged by, but "the etatic principle".

Hungarian rural sociology, strongly influenced by the sociology of Gusti School, is, says Klocke, ethnicist. The two rural sociologies, Hungarian and Romanian, are, in Helmut Klocke's view, interested only in their own kindred, indifferent toward the state which includes pieces of other nations (Klocke p. 1000 apud Golopenția 2002, 89). This time, there is a direct attack and it indirectly reveals, in an oblique way, we believe, through the lapidarity of the received answer and even through a certain clumsiness and aggression rarely to be found in the texts of the Romanian sociologist, a difference between the Golopenția's geopolitical cameralism and the monographic-cumulative science of the nation coming from Gusti. The only answer that Golopenția was able to find, was the following: "we began with a series of Romanian regions because they are of great interest for us. But we will continue just like both professor Gusti and some of us said, with the study of foreign infiltration villages and the other social layers from Romania, for the sake of our dear state" (Golopenția 2002: 90).

In the case when at least one of the roots of the nation can be traced, in what Anton Golopenția, following Hans Freyer, defined as the *ottocento Geist*, its disappearance in a world which became geopolitical – in the peculiar sense of this term attributed by the Romanian sociologist – leads to a change in the intimate structure of the nation itself. If the nation is seemingly absorbed by the national state, "the radical imaginary" of the nation and nationalism disappears completely in front of its "institutional imaginary" (Castoriadis 1987).

However, A. Golopenția's position appears to be rather one of ignoring the changes that the emergence of a geopolitical world implies in the very constitution and reproduction mechanisms of the nation. The nation is understood as having a strong natural-organic setting and as existing behind scientific discourses. Thus, the primordial national community is implicitly constructed as a substrate which sustains and nurtures the scientific discourses; in this process they become tainted with meanings different from the explicit arguments. This un - or under-formulated stances can be seen and deciphered either in the context of arguments, or in the context of unexpected agreements between different scientific positions, behind which one may guess this diffuse, common ideology, of the organic, primordial character of the nation.

Ion Conea, geohistory and geopolitics

Following the discordances, but mostly the understanding and the recognition between apparently irreconcilable positions, we believe we may reach a certain episteme (Foucault 1972) that would offer a broader comprehension of the inter-war national construction type in social and geographical sciences. I will not present you in any detail, Conea's position, as I've already done that at our last workshop, but I want to point out how our analysis can enrich itself and gain depth by comparing the cameralistic - geopolitics with the Geohistory-geopolitics

In the late 30s, as far as the disciplinary field of Romanian geography is concerned, the references to geopolitics gain importance and enter in an area of common, even if at some times still silent, acceptance of the term.

As early as 1935, in an article dedicated to one of the leading characters in Romanian geography, Vintilă Mihăilescu speaks about the "antropogeographical and geopolitical research" (Mihăilescu 1935, 15) made by George Vâlsan.

The same author, in a "Report on the geographical sciences in Romania during the past ten years" (1925-1935), writes a column called "Issues of geopolitics and anthropogeography" in which he includes a relatively large number of books and authors. "Le pays et le people roumain" (Simion Mehedinți, Bucharest 1972), "Dacia pontică şi Dacia carpatică" (Mehedinți, Bucharest 1928 in *Buletinul Societății Regale Române de Geografie*, volume XLVII), "Cadrul antropogeografic al țărilor de peste munți" (Simion Mehedinți Bucharest 1929), „Mediul fizic extern şi capitalul biologic național" (G. Vâlsan, in *Buletinul eugenic şi biopolitic*, 1-2, Cluj 1928), „Transilvania în cadrul unitar al pământului şi poporului românesc" (G. Vâlsan, in *Transilvania, Banatul, Crişana, Maramureşul 1918-1928*, Bucharest 1929), „Basarabii din Argeş" (Ion Conea, in *Rânduiala*, Bucureşti 1935), „Țara Loviştei" (Ion Conea, in *Buletinul Societății Regale Române de Geografie,* volume LIII, Bucharest 1935), „O hartă a principalelor tipuri de aşezări rurale din România" (Vintilă Mihăilescu, in *Buletinul Societății Regale Române de Geografie,* tom XLUI, Bucharest, 1928. Other books regarded as of antropogeography and geopolitics are those of Gheorghe Năstase, Victor Tufescu etc. (Mihăilescu 1935b).

Apparently, we find ourselves in front of a retrospective action of geopolitical re-defining and re-naming a certain part of the foregoing geography and of contouring new expectancy horizons, based on these themes. Actually, Vintilă Mihăilescu will be one of the most diligent contributors, coming from the field of geography, to *Geopolitica şi Geoistoria* review. As far as the issues discussed here are concerned, an interesting renaming may be found in the first number of this review, when an older article belonging to Simion Mehedinți - *Chestia orientală, din punct de vedere geografic şi etnografic („The oriental issue, from a geographical and ethnographic point of view")* – published in

Buletinul Societății Regale Române de Geografie in 1914, becomes: *România în marginea continentului. O problemă de geopolitică românească şi europeană ("Romania on the border of the continent. A Romanian and European geopolitical issue").*

The adoption of a geopolitic terminology seems to coincide with the broader European (German) tendency. In the early 20s, the term "geopolitics" was still an exotic one, connected to Rudolf Kjellèn's translations from Swedish into German. The geopolitical sciences and the ideas related to it "were largely confined to a small circle of writers and thinkers on the fringes of the German geographic establishment" (Murphy 1997, IX). In 1928, geopolitics and the related themes become common among the German cultivated public milieus. According to Otto Maul, one of the famous *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* founders, "there may not have been a time, maybe neither that of the great discoveries, when geographical thinking were regarded with so much interest among those outside geographical sciences as it is today, a result of the high market value owned by geopolitics." (Otto Maul, 1928, Geopolitik, in *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 61 apud Murphy 1997: x).

On the other hand, in an essay published in 1932 in *Buletinul Societății Regale Romane de Geografie*, on "The military view point in geography study", essay in which we would have expected to encounter a harsh, haushoferian German geopolitical use of the term, general Al. Rizeanu, member of The Major State of the Romanian Army, doesn't show any sign that he had heard of general Karl Haushofer, writing a military geography entirely *à la française*.

Geopolitics isn't mentioned at all and everything is defined in the framework of a military geography. This may seem odd and may represent an argument against our hypothesis on the emergence of a new, "geopolitical" sub-theme in "the political language" (Pocock 1987) that gives shape to the imaging of the nation during the inter-war period. Nevertheless, I believe that this article doesn't necessarily imply the inexistence of such a sub-theme, but, instead, it provides us with a temporal and structural limit of this supposed language. We might say that, in 1932, geopolitics' "political language" hadn't been yet widely propagated in Romania. From a structural point of view, we may perceive here a breach between the academic and the political-military decisional milieus, a breach that we cannot demonstrate in this context, but which seems plausible in inter-war Romania. In the geopolitical field, this breach will be mediated after The Vienna Treaty of 1940 through an attempt to use a common language with those who were thought to be responsible for the decision leading to losing Transylvania: the German state and the German geopolitics.

He believes that the transformation that takes place in the formation of geopolitics as self-standing disciplinary discourse may be noticed in the transition from the geopolitical considerations present in books of political geography, to books and studies having as their main theme geopolitics itself.

This transition is closely related to the emergence in Germany of a constant interest in colonialism and to the emergence of German *Weltpolitik*[5]. *Geopolitik* or *Weltpolitik* are one and the same thing. The foundation of *Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft* in 1887 and Wilhelm II obsession with the central role that Germany should have in world politics were, according to Ion Conea, the instances that made possible the emergence of the geopolitical discourse in Germany. Referring to the founding instance of geopolitics, accomplished with the Uppsala professor Rudolf Kjellèn's writings, Conea believes that :"Swedish geopolitics had been drawn towards Germany and naturalized (almost monopolized there) by the *Weltpolitik* phenomenon ostentatiously announced and inaugurated by Wilhelm II" (Conea, 1937, 37).

However, geopolitics is, according to Ion Conea, a legitimate science. There are three general tendencies which play a role in the formation of the possibility and legitimacy space for the emergence of this new science.

- First, there is the tendency towards globalization. The earth becomes smaller, but no "global village" appears, as the subsequent idealists and utopians will believe. Nor is there a communitarian utopia in the way in sight. The main result of this "decrease" of Terra is the emergence of "frictions zones" of global importance and scope.
- Secondly, there is the tendency of nationalization. The nations are spreading in the entire world. One of the most important consequences of the nationalization of the world, says Conea, is the fact that people become strongly emotionally attached to marginal economical, cultural and geographical spaces.
- The third tendency represents the increasing importance held by geography in the public space. The entire world is fascinated with the local and the localization, with comparing countries on the maps, with spatial projection of the tensions and dilemmas which were once felt rather on a temporal level. Geography becomes, Conea says, "a daily nourishment for our spirit, the modern man's" (Conea, 1937, 33).

According to Ion Conea, globalization has even a psychological-cognitive side. The continuous tension resulting from the possible dangers, the continuous fear that "somewhere, can take fire the spark which may start at once burning and girdle the entire earth" (Conea 1973, 23) are all results of the cultural and political way of thinking which prevails over the new world: "pensée de peur" (Conea 1937). Unfortunately, the Romanian geographer doesn't insist on this revolutionary aspect which will transform the political thinking and practices in the world (see also Sloterdijk 2005).

A significant importance in the emergence of a globalized world seems to have, according to Ion Conea, the First World War: "...beyond the borders of

[5] The importance of German colonialist discourse for the emergence of geopolitics was recently brought in the fore ground by David Murphy's studies (Murphy 1997)

Europe, on the most backward continents, the world war came with a sum of influences and circumstances that favored the emergence of the idea of country in the conscience of the natives." (Conea 1937, 24). But this idea of a well defined territorial country also meant the idea of emancipation from the rule of the yesterday's or today's master. The notion of "territorial country" was born out of the junction of numerous and apparently heterogeneous factors which actually blend and intensify one another, in a world whose novelty fascinates all geopoliticians. This fascination with dynamism, the acute consciousness of the novelty of the world we live in, are the features that reunite the European sensitivities, also being one of reactionary modernism's most important features (Herf 1986).

Geopolitics isn't just a creation of this new world, its role consists also of activating it, passing it beyond the scientific research towards action and propaganda. It is not a mere science of determination, through earth, of the political events, but is also similar to an "arena of sportive competitions" (Conea 1939, 2). Passion, force, youth are words which appear in the attempt to legitimize geopolitics as a unifying discourse of scientific perspective and political implications: "...the interest in geopolitics fills more and more the minds and souls of young people around the world. It is about time to start filling also those of our youngsters. We live in a profoundly geopolitical time and the young people must be geopolitical too. The context, the period, the country demand it" (Conea 1939, 111).

This process of interdependency between the political, economic and ideological life of the states is a new phenomenon and has to be studied, the Romanian geographer says, by a new science. Political sciences, in their old meaning, or political geography, aren't able to assume this task, to explain these new ranges of phenomena.

Political geography represents only the geographical science of the state, of mankind in its politically compartmented appearance. Political sciences, working with uncertain typologies, are too abstract and too general. A science of inter-state relationships and tensions is needed, a science of the planetary political milieu. This science would have as legitimate and autonomous object of study the political and economical problems that appear in regions representing the great natural personalities of the planet (straits, isthmuses, commercial routes etc.) To Ion Conea, this science is the geopolitics (Conea 1937). Globalization or, as Ion Conea puts it: "the phenomenon...of interdependency in the political and economical life of the states...being a phenomenon *new* on the planet, it should require a new *specific* discipline for its study (Conea 1937, 68).

If for Anton Golopenția the confluences and the differences between sociology and geopolitics had to be highlighted, as far as Ion Conea is concerned, the problematic connection is that between political geography and geopolitics.

The paradigm shift, represented in geography by Fr. Ratzel's writings, is one of the benchmarks of political geography from where, due to a "reactionary-modernist" approach (Herf 1986), geopolitics begun (Farinelli 2001). Even if the notion "political geography" is present even as early as Turgot (Nordman 1998), only with Ratzel "the state makes geography its property and becomes its supreme object" (Farinelli 2001, 44). The way in which Fr. Ratzel succeeds in creating an explosive combination between and idealist perception of the state and a positivist-materialist theoretical shell taken over from biological evolutionism (Agnew 2002, 66) will mark political geography's and geopolitics' subsequent development.

The difference between political geography and geopolitics isn't related, Conea believes, to the absence or the presence of the dynamic feature, but rather to the existence of a new and autonomous object of study. If political geography studies the state from a geographical perspective, geopolitics will study rather *the globalization process* than *the state* (Conea 1937).

The interesting part for us in Conea's attempt to give a history of the concept of geopolitics, attempt setting him apart from Anton Golopenția, as they both connect to a western scientific canons, is the massive presence, and the continuous attempts of paralleling French political and human geography to German geopolitics.

The French political geography - which is almost totally absent from Golopentia's understanding of geopolitics - plays a significant part in Ion Conea's reading of geopolitics. Vidal de la Blache, Albert Demangeon, Jacques Ancel but also historians like Lucien Febvre and Ernest Granger are read, interpreted and used in showing and counterbalancing the irredentist and racist biases of German *Geopolitik.*

Ion Conea almost integrally appropriates Jacques Ancel's critique from *Manuel géographique de politique européene* to German geopolitics as being an intensely patriotized science and therefore un-objective. This is a "justified characterization...though a little exaggerated, of the German geopolitical school." (Conea 1937, 43). In our opinion, Ion Conea has here an unbalanced stand, maybe even incoherent, we might say, trying to preserve, for his own construction of the Romanian geopolitics, the militant nature of German geopolitics together with the French school's claims for objectivity and positivist scientificity[6].

"Should they be trustworthy in their belief and comments, German authors are too integrated in the German political conceptions and public life to be able to maintain their serenity when writing their geopolitics tomes. A totalitarian state – to use a fashionable terminology – as Germany is today, is

[6] This does not imply that the French vidalian approach is a strictly objective one, but that, it does not have, an explicit national and racial militantism as is the case with most German geopolitics (for a more detailed discussion see also Laurent Mucchieli, *De la nature à la culture. Les fondateurs Français des sciences humaines 1870-1940*, these de Doctorat, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris 1996)

totalitarian also in the sense of channeling all the knowledge towards German patriotic interests. Science itself is channeled [...] no other discipline, by its origin, object and methods, is as fit for this channeling as geopolitics. It serves both the German after-game spirit and racism." (Conea 1937, 43).

Maybe the reason why this lack of coherence between passion, militantism, dynamism and scientificism doesn't seem insurmountable in the Romanian geopolitician's discourse is due to an implicitly accepted conception which establishes and grounds his scientific discourse. This conception refers to the organic nature of the national state, basic for the true coming of a science which serves it and builds upon it. Hence the absence of sensitivity towards what, to us, may seem incoherent if we embrace a vision lacking the implicit base of this discourse.

What is nowadays geopolitics will be tomorrow history as all history was geopolitics therefore, so, Conea concludes, geopolitics can be understood only together with geohistory or geographical history and has a scientific status in the same way history has a scientific status. The two discourses are not the same, but they are complementary. (Conea 1939). The globalization study appears to be also a present history study. Behind this attempt to define geopolitics and geohistory together, there most certainly is Conea's interest in "the great natural individualities" of the planet: "geopolitics' object is represented by...the political and economical issues that the regions and great natural individualities of the planet pose...analyzing...the natural regions which, at a certain time, pose world economical and political issues" (Conea 1937, 92-93).

Consequently, there is a kind of geopolitical problematic *avant la lettre* that can be found, in a still diffuse way, in history. The globalization of the world, the acceleration of history will result in the fulfillment and subsequent connection of these *membra disjecta* in a coherent scientific corpus that would eventually grow more and more scientific, passing from analogies to types and laws, as the globalization phenomena become more and more obvious. In Conea's view, geopolitics will be an organic science, growing and completing alongside with globalization, but also with the nationalization of the world.

The distance between Golopentia's and Conea's geopolitics[7] seems quite important and not easily bridgeable. Nonetheless, the two scholars, even when disagreeing on substantial matters, such as geopolitics' appropriate object of study, acknowledge each other as speaking the same language, promoting the same discourse. For example, in Conea's ample essay, published in *Sociologie Românească,* in 1937, and explicitly referring to the definition and legitimization of the new science of geopolitics (Conea 1937), A. Golopentia is described as "a young researcher very deeply and seriously concerned with geopolitics" (Conea 1937, 30).

[7] It is quite interesting to see how Conea is trying to keep a franco-german balance in his discourse (e.g. L.Febvre vs. Hugo Hassinger)

The answer to this seemingly paradoxical „substantial" disagreement and „lexical" agreement between two different approaches to geopolitics is, in our view, at least twofold.

First, the answer might consist of the involvement of the two Romanian geopoliticians in a common project, a review presenting geopolitical issues: *Geopolitica şi Geoistoria,* which broadly debated the Transylvanian issue. Apparently, we find ourselves in front of a case of articulation of diverse utterings and discourses labeled as geopolitics almost only for external use.[8] This is as if the Romanian authors had tried to speak German geopolitics language in order to be clearly understood by the native speakers of this language. But this is only partially true. One of the simplest counterarguments that can be formulated against this explanation of the emerging of geopolitics, seen as simply a post-Viena propaganda instrument, is the chronological counterargument. In interwar sociological and geographical milieu, discussions on geopolitics had begun as early as five years[9] before The Vienna Treaty. We will refer further to this aspect.

The second part of the answer is a little more complex and, in our opinion, is related to the existence of a common political language that establishes the themes of national continuity and the organic nature of the nation. These play the role of a background against which both the cameralistic science of social reality sustained by Anton Golopenția, and the geographical and historiographical science of globalization and localization as defined by Ion Conea, can be expressed in a common project, mutually recognized as sharing the same meaning in this organicist context.

Apparently, we enter here a space where scientific discourses combine almost naturally objectivity, scientificity and positivist claims with nation's and national space primordialist construction pattern (see above).

Most certainly, beginning with the Swedish origins themselves of the term, or even with Friedrich Ratzel's laws of political geography, there has been a tension among an organicist and a technical discourse in geopolitics. With Rudolf Kjellèn geopolitics is a chapter of political sciences studying the positioning (*die Reichslage*), the form (*die Reichsgestalt*) and territory (*das Reichgebiet*) of the state as life form and the organicist metaphors are abundant:

"The state cannot float in the air; it is connected to a certain soil, just like the forest. From this soil it takes its nourishment and within its surface its

[8] In the Archive of Foreign Affairs Ministry, Paris Peace Conference Fund, there is a documentary file written by Anton Golopenția, dedicated to the Csango problem and drawn for the Comission for Peace Issues Study where we can find a article by Traian Stoianovici from one of *Geopolitica şi Geoistoria* issues which hadn't been yet released for the public. Consequently, we might conclude that one of the benchmarks for the operation of this review consisted of preparing analyses and useful texts for the issues stipulated by The Foreign Affair Ministry.

[9] We can even find 1928 references, but the significant writings that attempt to define and use the term for local theoretical and practical reasons appear only later, in 1935-1937.

particular trees mingle their roots" (Rudolf Kjellèn), *Der Staat als Lebenfrom*, Leipzig 1917, 53 apud Conea 1937, 10).

According to Richard Henning, states are "living ethnical and political organisms, equipped not only with a conservation instinct, but also with an expansion, fuller temporally living and longer spatially extended instinct" (Henning 1931, 24). Or, as Ion Conea puts it, approvingly quoting Rudolf Kjellèn: "The Great Powers are the most grandiose of all life forms" (Rudolf Kjellèn, *Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege*, Leipzig &Berlin 1935, p. 3 apud Conea 1937, 11). Ion Conea will frequently use this type of organicist metaphor and we shall give here only one example – which can be multiplied *ad libitum* – from one of Conea's most interesting texts: *Corectări geografice în istoria Românilor* (*Geographic corrections in Romanians history*) (Conea 1938). Referring to the importance of the roads in the emergence of the state – a position sustained in Romanian historiography by prominent figures, such as Nicolae Iorga or the younger P. P. Panaitescu – Conea gives a geopolitical flavour when saying that "the states emerged and sprang on the roads like buds on branches" (Conea 1938, 43).

The Romanian geopolitician doesn't forget to highlight science's ethno-politic value; referring to the location of the battle of Posada, he says: "the place where it happened should become, especially nowadays, when nations experience the fever of a violent self-consciousness, a sanctuary of worship especially for the young generation...because of two reasons: first, because in that battle and, consequently in *that place* sparkled – as the Hungarian historians themselves agree – the first thrill of Romanian national conscience and, secondly, because, nowadays, this consciousness lives in paroxysm, uniting, as never before, all the Romanians" (Conea 1938, 86).

We could make this part of our argument clearer by following Ion Conea's request for a *Romanian* geohistory, similar in project to what Vidal de la Blanche did in *Tableau de la géographie de la France* or Lucien Febvre in *La Terre et l'evolution Humaine*, but also Hugo Hassinger in *Geographisches Grundlagen der Geschichte:*

"...how backward we are! Keeping pace with France in this respect would be, indeed, almost as if we had...Coressi as an author of a work called *Comentarii geografice la expedițiile lui Traian în Dacia (Geographical comments on Trajan's expeditions in Dacia)*! But we do not have such a work, not even today. (And what a wonderful work it would be!). But, up to this moment, we do not know even the exact location of Decebal's capital, the *Dacian Sarmizegetusa*. Neither of the Dacian citadels (or their ruins) on several Sebeş mountains peaks - and all are waiting to be studied. No one unsettles their millenary peace. We don't have yet and up to this present moment, a single historian [...] who had walked on all those peaks under which the citadels

lie...But those who walked on them were an...Ackner, a Neigebauer, an...Davies[10]" (Conea 1939, 20).

Because of the weakness of historiography and of the weakness of historical time itself, of the absence of documents and evidences from the Romanian Middle Ages, the destiny of historical geography and geohistory, closely connected to geopolitics, is, according to Ion Conea, to "disperse much of the historical darkness of the Romanian nation" (Conea 1939, 21).

The articulation between science and an organic, natural process that would represent the basis of nation's historical assertion is quite clear with Ion Conea. With Anton Golopenția on the other hand, this phenomenon is more strongly obscured due to geopolitics' - cameralistic science apparent - technicism and instrumentalism. But eventually, this instrumentalism too is grafted, maybe in a less obvious way than with Ion Conea, on the existence of an implicit organic continuity between state, nation and history.

On the other hand, Ion Conea is very cautious as far as possible mitigations that can hamper a scientific research limiting it to a national area are concerned. We saw how he attempts to absolve geopolitics of un-objectivity, accusation formulated by French human and political geography against a Germanized science, seemingly captive in a very specific and subjective national irredentist project. He will do the same thing for historical geography, the beginnings of which go back to Vidal de la Blanche, Lucien Febvre and Ernest Granger. However, the Romanian geographer will be very cautious to mention Hugo Hassinger, in order to demonstrate that he doesn't simply represent the position of the "other side", that the discussion isn't about a "French" science (Conea 1939, 12).

This is as if a national, unspecified, scientific and objective instrument was needed, precisely for handling specific national issues; any lack of scientificity of the theory (meaning its exclusive German or French character) would have a negative impact on an own national project.

Setting social sciences, geopolitics and geohistory against a natural-organic background is also related to an image of an "ongoing" history fulfilling national energies. The abstract from Rudolf Kjellèn that Conea straightforwardly and enthusiastically sustains is, in our view, eloquent from this point of view.

"The People of a State resembles a plant system, is a product of nature. It flows through time like a river which always remains the same, even if the water circles and the water drops are different. The more intimate a nation strikes roots on a certain land, the more numerous the former generation that fertilized it with their blood and bones are, the stronger the solidarity with that land is, the more

[10] M.J. Ackner and F. Müller are the authors of the first homogenous collection of inscriptions coming from Romanian Dacia, *Die Römischen Inschriften in Dacien*, Viena, 1865. Their work was criticized by Th Mommsen. Ackner visited Hațeg Country in 1847. K. Goos is the author of the Chronik der Archäologischen Funde Siebenbürgens published in *Archiv des Vereins für Siebenbürgischen Landeskunde* from 1867.(n.n.-C.C.)

people and land express more than one reality. With every generation that, after completing its work on the ancestor's land, vanishes and is buried in it, the feeling of solidarity of the people with their land increases. This land is, at the same time, its arena, its workfield and its graveyard, as well as the filed supplying its food and his secured homeland." (Rudolf Kjellèn, *Der Staat als Lebensform,* p. 96, apud Conea 1941, 25).

Preliminary (and tentative) conclusions

Ion Conea's position draws heavily on a particular reading of the old and fateful disciplinary French connection, still existent in the interwar period, of history and geography, where geography is an instrument for history. The Romanian disciplinary setting is placed into a narrative of backwardness and lacking of scientific but also national responsibility towards the history and destiny of the nation. Geohistory being, as we have already seen, the most relevant aspect of geopolitics for Ion Conea.

The political geography stand is downplayed in the advantage of history. Geography is not able to assume a hegemonic position in the disciplinary field, not being able to form a self sustaining discourse about the nation. The comparison with sociology is again illuminating, as sociology is, in the interwar period, in the position of articulating all-encompassing scientific-national discourse, whose underpinnings we tried to show and even deconstruct. A. Golopentia is formulating these hegemonic pretensions in a geopolitical language understressing the technical, stately and administrative facets of Gusti's larger nation-building project and taking them to be the true synthetic and the possible rallying point of the science of the nation. His position is quite different from Conea's even if they will fully recognize each other as geopoliticians!

What unites, we believe, these 'geopolitical' men – and also the nationalist-regionalists like Ion Ionica – is a common diffuse ideology of organicity and continuity coupled with the attempt to construct a unified science of nation centered on the problematics of national space. This science, be it a la Freyer, a la Vidal de la Blache, a la Graebner etc is build around a strange mélange of monographical-sociological or monographical-geographical positivism and national history neoromantism.

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POWER AND STYLE
-THE ARCHEOLOGY OF POWER-

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Power makes itself visible inside a structure of human interactions, conduct and various attitudes. This the expressions of power are different form case to case, from person to person. Such differentiation also appears as a consequence of personal features of those who we usually call "leaders". Every form of power is also an expression of a leder's personal features but such a feet shouldn't be mistaken for the "personalization" of power, which leads to dictatorship.

The Archeology of Power deals with the rigurous study of the different "layers" of power, according to the type of personality exercising it(each person having his or her own style), as sedimented in history, especially during the last century, and in close connection with the political regime that enforced the respective type of personality.

Generally speaking, the exercise of power is being performed in a large area of relationships, behaviors and attitudes, and hence the different ways in which this exercise is being produced concretely.

This is how we see certain *systems of power* and *systems in which power is exercised*, aggregate and crystallize.

They differ though, mostly because of the different type of qualities of the person involved in the relationship of power and especially due to the persons placed at the hard pole of power, namely the leaders.

This is why, in time, different styles in exercising power have taken shape. Such a crystallization / sedimentation are being produced by the *personalization of power*.

Nevertheless, we need not mistake this phenomenon with the one of *instituting the personal power*, the latter leading sooner or later to a totalitarian system or to a tyranny.

Any form of power bears the imprint of the person exercising it.

Only an extreme burocratisation or mediocratisation of the act of exercising power could blur or diminish the imprint or the mark of the person or persons involved.

Paradoxically enough, if nowadays, democracy of the liberal type is a dominant in most parts of the world and in Europe we can even consider it ***exclusive***, the personalization of power has become nevertheless a fact / a piece of hard reality, felt especially in the world of business corporations.

Not only in the field of corporate governance can we see it, but also in the field of politics, even if here ***the democratic censorship of the civil society*** is very active in countering it.

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However paradoxical it may seem, the personalization of power does not mean dictatorship or tyranny.

A dictatorship or tyranny would imply an imposition of personal power as the constituting principle of the system. This is always exercised through mimesis: a tyrant takes for model another tyrant before him. Someone whose time had been, in one way or another, idealized, either by the people or by a certain political force.

What could be called the "personalization of power" does not imply the personality of the respective tyrant, which would be a particularization of the power phenomenon subjected to the features of a certain person, but it implies a personal character of a more general type, namely that **power is being exercised in a personal name** and that all its prerogatives bear the imprint of the person.

Therefore, we can see that there is a great difference between **the personal power** and **the personalization of power**. At the limit, we could say that these two are opposites.

Because the personalization of power individualizes responsibility, meanwhile the institution of the personal power liquefies it to the point of its exclusion as a reference. The very person invested with power and who is exercising it, is practically extracted from the common area of the rest of the persons and is considered above them.

None of the subjects can possibly, in a realistic and efficient way, succeed to tackle the issue of the responsibility of a tyrant, at least not during his / her life, and even less when the respective tyrant rules over a more or less isolated country. On the other hand, one cannot openly fight against a tyrant through democratic confrontation. Tyranny is in fact total violence and the answer to it cannot but spring from the same register, namely the field of violence. Usually tyrants can be removed only through physical death, owing to the fact that gradually, in their lifetime, they themselves eliminate all those around them, and there is no other possibility of separating them from power in a less violent way.

We may incur from this that the relationship of a person with Power can be viewed from at least two standpoints : the first perspective concerns the attraction exercised by power over a person and this person's strife to get hold of it, possess and maintain power into the same hand. Such an aspiration very easily slips towards an exclusive attitude and a wish to possess power in the absolute sense of the word, ruling out any sharing or other form of partnership which, sooner or later, could easily turn into competition.

The second perspective on the exercise of power takes more interest in the personal way to exercise power and in a determined style of the relationship with power, or, more specifically, in a certain style used to achieve the act of power. At this level, the focus shifts from the wish to possess power in the exclusivist sense to the original exercise of power and to the mark of the

personality laid over the exercise of power. Doubtlessly, this can entail both positive and negative consequences. Power *per se* is, virtually, limitless. It is especially through this feature that it produces fascination and an attraction close to sickness that drives so many persons to it. A well- known Indian proverb says: "If you want to really know a man, give him Power and watch him use it!" It is so because the virtual potential of the being can be activated only under the spell of power.

It has been claimed that power can pervert and it really perverts the person in a great majority of circumstances.

But, is this consequence really inevitable? The empirical observation according to which people start to change, to a greater or a lesser extent, from the very moment when they acquire power, cannot sustain in itself the idea that power perverts through sheer power, and in any circumstances. It is also debatable to what extent the person in question really changes; moreover, it is worth taking into account that power develops in a person potential qualities which couldn't have been detected otherwise.

The truth seems thus to be that power, being, through the possibilities and opportunities it contains, an exceptional human relationship, determines exceptional and uncalled for reactions in any individual, stimulating certain aspects of his or her human nature, revealing certain sides unknown to us till then.

This is how the individual comes to learn about himself that he is endowed with capacities or potential he had not been aware of, and hence he may easily become the victim of extremely perverse effects.

If his immediate surrounding exploits his "soft spot" and of course, if the answer he gives to these stimuli is a weak one, owing to the low intellectual dowry of his personality, an alienated leader will immediately turn into a tyrant, dominated by paranoiac predispositions.

Taking advantage of the situation of power he is in, he may turn either into a tyrant or into a blackmailer, or merely become a mediocre individual, with the sole purpose to maintain the level of power obtained, even if the real effects of the power he got become null in time.

From this point of view, we can establish three representative types of personality for the alienated leader:

The tyrannical personality – dominated by the obsession of power

The opportunist – exploiting any situation, explicitly or implicitly profitable to him, and

The mediocre man, who voids of its content any power relationship, in order to be able to make it pragmatically instrumental and to eternalize it symbolically.

We shall come back on these types later on in our work.

For now we shall try to point out very actual aspects of the inter-relation between individuals, persons, personalities and power.

Though we are used to consider our present day world as being the climax of human civilization and we keep wondering at the fact that "In the 21st century primitive things worth blaming still keep on happening" we should nevertheless recall that this world of ours is very diverse and entangles other worlds found in different historic stages of development and that in any world, at least from those known so far, all acts that human nature contains as potentialities are possible to happen.

It all depends on the nature of the social stimuli. That which we call primitivism or barbarism is but the "normal" reaction of individuals or communities to the life and survival conditions comparable or identical to those considered as "primitive" or "barbaric".

How else could we classify the amplitude and the refined cruelty of terrorist acts launched at the dawn of a new Millennium in the history of Christian western world? We could abandon ourselves to endless whining or moralizing but we think it would be by far more profitable to assume that terrorist acts at the beginning of this century unveil the necessity of a more profound archeological study over the phenomenon of power. Before all, it seems necessary to change the perspective on the adversities, an aspect the relationship of power is exaggerating and considering absolute through ideologies.

The first observation suggested to us by such a perspective is the fact that, from ancient times there has been a strong fascination, a mystical attraction to power. It is not an ideology or a faith, or even less, a cause; however high and worthy, that determines the commitment of individuals towards total terrorist acts, but on the contrary, it is the beatitude obtained through the ultimate liberty of bringing death to who ever is different. Especially to those who differ from yourself in such a way that your own faith is contested as deep as its very roots...

To cut the throat of one of those European infidels, guilty or not (and should he be innocent, even better, because the state of liberty in deciding over somebody's life or death, only then seems truly without boundaries), here is the supreme service to one's own Faith and the supreme proof of an invincibility obtained through exercises and through different exceptional hardships endured.

The heroic periods in the history of humanity, happening at different times and not at all the same for different areas and human communities of our planet, considered that a crime, if approved by the respective community or even glorified by it, should be cloaked in a mythical curtain and then passed on to the new generations as a true and worth-following act of heroism. This has left very deep marks in the consciousness of the people.

In time, these could have become recurrent acts sprung from the deepest areas of historic consciousness. At the same time, the delayed presence of such reactions in certain human communities, especially those who are far from the

level of prosperity of Western World societies, (a level of life setting totally different values and which pays a special attention to individual life), makes this mystical heroism encounter and fuse, at an unprecedented level, with extremely sophisticated technological device and possibilities of mass destruction obtained by combining agents or substances placed nowadays practically at anybody's disposal.

It is on this background that the entire heritage we spoke of is fueling up the obsession for absolute power in an increasingly high number of individuals. Ever more, by the day.

But being unable to reach such a level of supreme power for the simple fact that any human being is mortal, the tyrants made those individuals overwhelmed by their strife for power abandon this path.

The absolute power began thus to be searched beyond tyranny, beyond institutions – conservative and not at all perennial – to the borderline, a place where the individual becomes free in respect of his own life.

Only absolute freedom can grant absolute power. That is why terrorist suicidal acts constitute on the one hand an attraction for alienated individuals searching for power *per se*, and on the other, the most efficient path these individuals can use in order to reach the astonishing heights they had dreamt of in their exercise of power. And here we speak about a type of power with some of the most widely spread and more persistent consequences. The suicidal attempts transform thus the interior freedom of the individual into the best solution for this person to turn himself into divinity. All of a sudden he or she is sent among the saints and heroes of a most religious community. And for this, all he or she needs to do is cause the death of as many people as possible; a simple thing if you consider the present day means that any individual, even from a totally inadequate culture with a backward technological development, but enrolled into the simplest yet efficient organization has at his or her disposal.

It is strange that this type of power is placed at the same level, but at the opposite pole, with what was called "the power of the powerless", namely the power of those who do not hold any political or economical instrument of power and who have nothing left to loose. They still can reach and obtain unparalleled power by uniting themselves and by acting simultaneously and in full solidarity.

Power is always being exercised on somebody. And if the individual, the group or the people over whom this power is being exercised, merely cease obeying, then we may say that power is being exercised in vain.

Either this ceasing to obey is cloaked, or it breaks off at the very moment when it is exposed. In fact we may say that communism had crumbled down even before its dismantling had been asserted. Communism had managed to survive its own death through simulation, by repetition of the rituals implied by the act of power through which communism had been instituted. The crumbling down of communism represents the best example to illustrate the power of the

powerless. Moreover, it brings into light the climax of this type of power, reached through the simultaneous explosion of freedom in all social media and the spontaneous transformation of a whole political system into ashes. Such a climax seems to produce a general state of beatitude, which lasts sometimes more and other times less, pending on the violence of the social outburst.

Romania's case is, from this point of view, an exemplary one: six months after the dismantling of the Ceauşescu regime and even after the first democratic elections, so long awaited for, the state of beatitude generated by the exceptional power gathered all of a sudden by the population – and inside it by each and every active individual with initiative – had not vanished away.

Laws and regulations adopted, nevertheless, in a democratic way, have been blown away by the thrust of the explosion of liberty that practically contaminated huge masses of people.

This state is comparable to what the suicidal terrorist lives. Far from us the intent to associate these two states, which in fact are so different, especially in their effects.

But it seems fair enough to assert the fact that their origin is nevertheless the same: they both spring from the abyss of human nature so poorly explored until now in the modern world.

This clue is probably of unprecedented value in studying the real nature of the power phenomenon. To act against any rules or regulations is practically the same thing as to act in a total lack of rules or regulations when they simply do not exist.

Society is thus reduced to its primary stage, in fact to its primitivism. Nothing matters any longer, but raw power and its forms of assertion may reach the most outrageous acts. Bertrand de Jouvenele wrote, referring himself to these very outrageous forms of raw force during the Second World War: "nothing would have been possible, neither this widely spread participation, nor these barbaric destructions without the transformation of people through violent passions at unanimous level, allowing for their natural activities to be integrally perverted" (De Jouvenele, 1972, 11).

And the raw force under its most violent forms, coupled with a total lack of responsibility through an organization of a tribal / family type, where the individual identity blends fully through a mystic apology with false or falsified ethnic or religious connotations, imply a *personalization of power*, taken to the extreme, through which the person is being identified with the respective act of power.

At a moral level, power is unconceivable outside responsibility.

The personalization of power – or at least its positive side – means first and above all an assumed responsibility, even if only for the simple fact that power grants certain advantages to the one exercising it versus those in whose respect it's being exercised.

By compensation, these personal advantages necessarily imply personal risks. That is why we can qualify as worthless the declarations or the excuses of the ex members of the Executive Committee of the former Communist Party, who tried to justify their actions by saying that it was not them, but Ceauşescu, who had ordered in 1989 the army to shoot the people. The power they held into their hands was nevertheless sufficient to influence the decision of a criminal nature or at least to be able to weaken it by merely saying "no", even if their opposition wouldn't have borne fruit.

They claim on their own behalf that any type of opposition would have automatically meant for them the risk of being shot on sight, but we argue that even if this risk had been a real one, it is none the less true that it was a risk already assumed through the responsibilities incurred by their high level ranks and positions and that it was precisely owing to those positions that they had enjoyed advantages and a good life.

In the mythology of humanity, it is believed that any power has its own term, its own life or cycle of existence. In the Romanian one, this cycle of life is contained by the proverb "He who has taken power, has also put on the shirt of death" or better said he has embarked upon a fate of death.

So far no one has ventured considering this ancient belief as mistaken. On the contrary, so many books have been written on its account that libraries barely contained them. The folk tradition is yet not sufficient to create and maintain a climate of responsibility in the sphere of power. Especially that a constant trend of modern times is drawing a line between these two elements. It is therefore necessary for cultural elite to exist, a cultural elite who, in perfect solidarity should pledge that this message will be relayed from one generation to another. It must also be an elite playing the role of censorship in the exercise of power.

In the conditions of modernization, traditions are being turned upside down; cultural bridges between generations are being torn apart or even broken, crumbling down in the abyss of mercantilism and blind consumerism. In developing societies mostly, social groups isolated from their roots and disoriented, with no moral point of view become dominant in the representative social media and, step by step the belief that anything is possible creeps in.

Also the thought prevails that human action can be free from norms and rules, that for so many years have been the true binding solution for societies and the measure of their stability.

In the process of personalization of power immense risks await. Especially when this process takes place in situations of transition. This is due to the fact, as we have stated before, that there is an extremely complex "archeology" of the phenomenon of power, unfortunately insufficiently explored.

This is how we are left helpless and we cannot protect ourselves from the

expansion of ancestral aggression of mankind, especially when this aggression may reach unbelievable accents and effects owing to technological means of our time.

In Europe's recent history there has been an extremely tough warning, represented by the fascist Hitlerian regimes, which can be considered, without reservation, to belong to the category of suicidal terrorist political regimes, which find themselves greatly at the origin of present day expansion and exacerbation of terrorism.

Let us not forget, that the exaggerated fear of political instability, generated precisely by such antecedents, may as well trigger a yearn, in its turn exaggerated, for stability.

This is how different stages can be reached, leading to the suffocation of natural processes in the evolution of societies.

A mediocrisation beyond limits of the social organization can be but the opposite of the natural state, the same way as aggressive political voluntarism, be it of left wing or of right wing is so.

While the latter produces violent effects in a relatively short time, mediocrisation bears the same fruit through accumulation in time of the suffocation effects.

The need / wish for predictability may drain – sterilize – the system; this is how mediocrity sets in. Mediocrity in itself tries to install stagnation forever. The increasing need for creativity produces continuous stimuli that get into the system. And this system, once rendered mediocre, has a smaller capacity of integrating them in the social evolution. There has existed – and still exists – a temptation to answer this threat through social engineering, a well known reaction of simplifying the social relationship to the limit of its manipulation.

The rationalistic / primitive belief that man can build intentionally a new world develops a limitless optimism regarding the possible intervention of social techniques and technologies in shaping up social relations and human individuals.

Besides, in time, the origin of the phenomenon is not a new one, even if we feel the temptation to place it at the point of birth of modern societies.

We can situate it at the dawn of imposition of rationalism as a dominant attitude toward reality.

But, the substitution of a complex thought with specific engineering techniques applied to social politics or of strong willed social interventions in solving social conflicts, creates greater social distortions than the problems themselves which could have been solved through such methods. To this a contribution is brought both by the necessary simplifications supposed by any modeling operation, and by the manipulation implied by the methods of an engineering type. This manipulation brings into the social life new elements of distortion. On short term, the results are attractive, rather at imaginary level,

especially for tyrants. It is well known that Stalin enjoyed keeping repeating: "the role of the State of the working class is to create / shape engineers of the soul…" (C F Lefort, 1981).

Social life is always by far more complex than the capacity of understanding and of rational control of the people or institutions can grasp. That is why, in order to put into practice such a project of social engineering, social life is represented in a simplified and quite often simplistic manner, implying extrapolations, therefore manipulations, either direct or indirect, of actors involved in the targeted sector of social reality.

It is to be noted that manipulation has also negative effects. These effects produce themselves both when manipulation is taken note of, and under circumstances when the individuals are not aware of it. In the first case an exaggerated suspicion is born in regard to the altered elements of behavioral influence and thus a real anomic, even pathologic reaction may take place.

Secondly, the underground influence achieved through manipulation can alienate in such a degree behaviors, that the positive results become unnoticeable and the constant risk of outburst of the collective unconsciousness is present all the time, triggering, sooner or later, the crumbling down of the new construction.

Voluntary social intervention can be only an indirect one, at least for now, at the level of the possible knowledge phenomenon of our times. This is how the negative effects can in fact entail consequences beyond calculation.

The results of historic action are never those wished for by the involved actors, but very often they take a surprising form of manifestation for all participants in the "social traffic". The individuals, even if they are not equal among themselves through power or wealth, nevertheless fail to influence the historic action the way they wish to: … "As always, history takes note *en passant* of human intentions, even the intentions of the decision makers at national level. The real social transformations have not been intentional, or planned." (Hobsbawm, 1994, 212).

On the other hand, the study of "The Archeology of Power" reveals that behind "The Self-proclaimed Hero", the purest vendetta of a gangster-like character seems to lie. The "social engineer" dissimulates most often the consciousness of a superior master of the others, a master who only leans over them in order to bring them to the rank of a humanity that he himself postulates in a very poor reference system.

But also moral idealism may become harmful through the perverse effects that it triggers, even through the mimesis that it may induce among the young generation. Both attitudes in fact are of discontent towards the others, combined with the wish to change them according to one's belief. They dissimulate or hide the comeback of raw force about which Bernard Russell used to speak in his relationships of power.

The new mask for basic, elementary raw power is provided for by the sophistication and the refinement of the media employed, along with the capacity for dissimulation of the discourse able to motivate the *violent act of power*.

"The main characteristic of raw power is of a psychological nature" (Russell, 154). Its use as a current means of establishing relations is characteristic to human natures found in conflict.

The conflict, real or induced, represents the "normal" state instituted through this type of power, which is fueled by it.

The instinct of the raw force seems to no longer be able to be contained because the XXI Century was preceded by a "Century of the extremes", when all limits of exercising power through violence have been exceeded and because the borders separating different fields of exercising power have disappeared.

The World War in the XX-th Century "was led for unlimited purposes and differs from the previous wars, which were engaged on account of limited, punctual, objectives, and were motivated by limited purposes. In the Age of Empire, the political and the economical have merged. It is true that international political rivalries used to be fueled by economic growth and free competition, but their common characteristic laid precisely in the fact that they had no limits".

"The national frontiers" of a corporation such as Standard Oil, Deutsche Bank or Debers Diamond Corporation used to be practically, the limits of the Universe, or, more precisely, the limits of their own expansion capacity." (Hobsbawm, 1987, 318).

"If the XX-th Century led us to a restless intensification of violence, most unfortunately, the beginning of the new Millennium announces, in a very spectacular way, the disappearance of any limit implied." (Măgureanu, 2003, 67). Nevertheless, it seems that in no society can raw force be totally eliminated from the manifestation of power. "Power must exist. Be it in the hands of the Government, or be it in the hands of anarchist adventurers. Raw power itself is necessary, as long as there keep being rebels against the governments or common law criminals. But if, nevertheless we wish for the life of the great majority of mankind to be more than a continuous gloomy suffering, only here and there with scattered moments of the most profound horror, then we must act in such a way in order to have the existing raw power percentage as high as possible.

If we wish the exercise of power to be more than a mere cause of unjustified and uncalled for suffering, then, power must be limited through security measures that are in close connection with applicable Law and local customs, measures of security that should be established *only after very careful deliberation* and entrusted to individuals who, in their turn, *can be placed under close democratic oversight,* in the interest of all those they lead" (Russell, idem, 170).

In order to achieve this, the existence of an influential social group is needed, one to ensure that the purposes of power coincide with the vital interests of the community.

Present day transition in former communist countries demonstrates that, in the absence of such a bond, the personalization of power becomes a harmful phenomenon, producing endless suffering and despair to an increasing number of people, both on account of the moral inconsistency of the persons we speak of and on account of the pulverization of local habits, customs and laws – all denied as a whole, but far too sluggish in being replaced and far too difficult because of a process governed by sectary interests and incompetence.

The more we shift our focus towards the East of our continent, the more we find that the field of manifestation for raw power is wider, owing to the fact that personal interests and savage yearning for illicit riches and welfare prevail. This generates corruption and lack of respect for community values and for the people. We deal here, in different proportion and from country to country, with the distribution of power according to a *vote-catching* relationship.

Springing from the ashes of the former regimes, this *vote-catching* relation remains the prevailing one for social solidarity and is meant to ensure, in time, a real social stability, without producing on short term extremely painful inequities.

Important social groups become the victims of the transition process, paying not only the price required in such times from everybody, but also an extra tribute for the welfare of the "nouveaux riches".

And for quite some time, it has been known for a fact that, as Russell puts it: "in a stable community, we should not find any social group of relatively great dimensions and importance, who feels and considers itself utterly wronged and disfavored." (Russell, idem, 168).

Aside from the instability risks entailed by such a situation, other type of risks are triggered, namely the moral and spiritual emptying of certain human communities, pushing them to the limit and categorically influencing the younger generations who are led into total confusion, lose their own sense of belonging to a certain community and start migrating at random, without compass.

Obviously, the archeological study of power offers an opportunity to assess once again the criminal character of different acts of power performed in totalitarian regimes or dictatorships. At the same time, it provides the chance to eliminate harmful elements from the process of political decision making.

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THE NECESSITY FOR A NEW DIRECTION IN THE SOCIAL POLICIES IN ROMANIA

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This paper is arguing in favor of re-orientation of the social policy in Romania. Currently, the social policy system is strongly under-financed. Consequently, it is extremely, important to change to a social policy that is appropriately financed and that can allow a proper utilization of both society's general development potential and population's support for the respective social policy. Adequate financial resources and high quality management of social domain would contribute to catching-up with European Union countries which are far ahead of Romania in this respect.

In the following paper I revert once more to a subject that I approached many times, next to many other authors, in the attempt to contribute to the development of a system of social policies in Romania that is in agreement with the overall changes of the society and with the systems functioning both in the European Union Member states and in other states (I. Mărginean, 2004a). Actually, this is about making use of the development potential of a properly articulated social policy and about developing in Romania a EU compatible social system (pattern) having the quality of life of the population as fundamental mark, expressed by a set of objective and subjective social indicators (I. Mărginean, 2004b).

The reason I want to revert to this subject is because, although during the past 15 years Romania has adopted several social policy-related legal provisions specific to the market economy that added to the already existing social insurance components (mainly represented by the unemployment benefits and by the minimal wage), as well as other regulations of social protection (granted minimal income, various social benefits for the family, for the persons with disabilities, etc.), a system of social policies directed towards economic and social development and towards a high level of the quality of life of the population specific to a mature welfare state has yet to be established. On the other hand, the recent (January 1st, 2005) introduction of the single taxation level (16%) for the income and profit brings in new elements relevant to the projection of changes in the sphere of social policies.

As shown by the past experience of several older or newer EU member states, the social policy may fulfil several essential functions in the modern society such as economic and social development, social integration and inclusion, support for the disfavoured categories of population, improvement of the conditions of living and, on a more general scale, of the quality of life of the

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population. To be more precise, this is about reaching those standards of quality of life that allow any individual to assert as well as possible in the society, based on access to education and jobs, to material resources of living and to health care, based on observing the individual rights and liberties, on a high level of social inclusion, integration and participation, of satisfaction and personal happiness.

Given the importance of the quality of life topic and of the involved areas they enjoyed special attention as soon as they were introduced on the political agenda, materialized in studies and analyses, in conducting surveys and in developing monitoring programs with the purpose to direct the public policies (I. Mãrginean, A. Bãlaşa, coord., 2002). This is no coincidence, therefore, that reaching a high standard of the quality of life of the population is a major EU target. With this view the European Foundation for the Improvement of the Living and Working Conditions (established in 1975, with headquarters in Dublin, Ireland - Fahey et al, 2003; I. Mãrginean, 2003b and 2004b, c) started and is currently coordinating a program for quality of life survey and monitoring. Among the latest achievements of this program is the series of 7 reports and of a synthesis on the "Perception of Living Conditions in an enlarged Europe" published in 2004, on the basis of Eurobarometer and Eurostat data. The analytical reports refer to Fertility and Family Problems, Migration Trends, The low Income and Deprivation, Perception of Integration and of Social Exclusion, Work and the Standard of Living, Satisfaction from Life, Health and Health Care. Four zonal seminaries organized in 2004 presented these reports to the EU member states. Also in 2004 were published the preliminary results of the largest quality of life survey conducted in the 28 EU members states and candidate countries at that moment; the final results are to be disseminated in the near future. The field survey was conducted in 2003 in 15 EU Member States - Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italia, Luxemburg, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden – and in 13 candidate countries - Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary. Ten of these states joined the EU in May 2004, while Bulgaria and Romania are scheduled for 2007. Turkey will start negotiations in 2005 but it is likely that some west Balkan States starting with Croatia will join the EU before Turkey. Very large differences can be noticed between the populations of the EU member states ranging from 400,000 inhabitants (Luxembourg) to about 80 million (Germany). Romania (21.5 million) will rank 7, in 2007, after Poland (38 million) and before the Netherlands (16 million). Romania has the equivalent population of 8 of the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004.

The comparative analyses of the 28 countries, single or by groups, reveal their similitude and the elements that distinguish them in a given area of the quality of life, their rank in each surveyed area, their strong or weak points. In agreement with the survey conducted in Romania (I.Mãrginean, A.Bãlaşa, coord., 2002; I.Mãrginean, I.Precupeţu, A.Preoteasa, 2004), the EU studies reveal a very low level of the material resources available to the population and one of the highest income polarization. The situation in Romania looks better concerning the subjective well being expressed by the level of satisfaction, of happiness, of the feeling of affiliation and of social integration. Even though the values recorded for Romania are lower than the overall (EU 15) average level of the Member States, they are higher than in some of the older member states and than in some of the newer member states. This fact confused some commentators (The Larnaca, Cyprus, Conference, October 2004), for instance, why are the Romanians more optimistic than the population of wealthier states, because the precarious material status does not justify such feelings. These are false (narrow) determinist interpretations ignoring the effects of more general factors related to society and education, values, creed, etc. However, if the Romanians are not as unhappy as they should be, this is no reason not to improve the state of things concerning the material and psycho-social domains. Revealing is that the domain of material goods expressed by per capita GDP and by household incomes shows Romania either at the bottom of the list of 28 states, or on before-the-last position (before Bulgaria or Turkey, or before both of them).

The more than precarious situation of the sphere of conditions of living for much of the Romanian population is only partly due to resource scarcity because it is also affected by the distribution and redistribution of resources. The interference between the quality of life and the social policy refers to the fact that the latter may influence both the production and distribution of resources (minimal wage, taxation, etc.) and their redistribution as well (cash social transfers or transfers in kind and services). It is only obvious that the social policy promoted in Romania during the past 15 years did very little for the target of development. As a matter of fact, a modern system has yet to be implemented, properly articulated by regulations, programs, resources and benefits allowing it to fulfil its functions. The social policy promoted in Romania remained residual even after 1990, having a rather low addressability, with domains and segments of population socially excluded or marginalized (and with stipulations granting privileges to others), with low levels of the social benefits. These shortcomings require *the replacement of the current system of social policy by a new system directed towards development and social support.* (I.Mãrginean, 2004 d).

A survey of the social policies in the 13 candidate countries published in 2003 (Social protection in the 13 candidate countries. A comparative analysis) ranks Romania on the bottom positions as social expenses during 1996-2000, situation which did not change afterwards. It is worth noting that the data used in the paper do not include for each country the same categories of social expenditure. This is about the effect of the manner of working. First, country reports were published in 4 volumes then the synthesis was elaborated depending on what and how the information was presented in the preliminary reports. The synthesis provides, however, the details required not to create confusions. Thus, for some countries (such as Romania) only the social expenditure from the systems of pension and unemployment insurance and for health care were reported, while for other countries the expenditure for social welfare were also include (the normal thing to do); for other countries the expenditure with education was also included. However, the OECD practice, also adopted by EU, stipulates that the public expenditure with education is to be considered an investment rather than social expenditure. As a matter of fact the financing of education is done quite differently in the western countries – significant private contribution by taxes – and in the former socialist countries – preponderantly public expenditure. Aside this, the public expenditure of the developed countries – where there is the practice of taxes, on a large scale except for the compulsory education – is much higher both as proportion of the GDP and as absolute value per pupil than in the countries where the state education is finance by public budget.

Coming back to the social expenditure presented in the mentioned Report, in 1996 Romania was on the bottom position of 12 countries (NA data for Turkey) with 10.6% of the GDP as expenditure for pensions, unemployment and health care being preceded by Bulgaria (12% of the GDP among which the expenditure with social welfare) and Lithuania (15.2%), while at the top there were Hungary (24.8%), Slovenia (25.5%) and Poland (31.0%). However, the latter countries also reported the expenditure with education. If we also add the expenditure with social welfare, about 1.5% of the GDP, Romania equals Bulgaria, both on the bottom position as actual social expenditure of the GDP. If we also add the expenditure with education of 3.6% (as the former socialist countries did), we produce a total of 15.7% of the GDP for 1996, which is just half the proportion of what Poland, country regarded as having done a successful transition, spent (I.Mărginean, coord., 2000).

The average EU value for social expenditure in 1996 was 28.4% of the GDP (not including the public expenditure for education). Finland, France and Denmark spent 31%, Germany, The Netherlands and Austria spent 30%, while Portugal and Spain spent 22%, the closest level to the minimal value.

The value of social expenditure for 2000 (mentioned by the same Report) increasing to 13.9%, and to 15% if we include the social welfare and to 18% if we include the public expenditure for education still rank Romania among the countries spending very little, in relative values, for the social domain, being followed by Turkey only. The average EU value for social expenditure in 2000 was 27.6% of the GDP. In 4 years Bulgaria increased by 5.8% the level of its social expenditure of the GDP. In other countries the level decreased slightly (1-2%). It may be observed that the general pattern of social expenditure used by the former socialist countries was to increase the level when the problems were acute with a possible subsequent reduction. An exceptional social policy was adopted in response to an exceptional state induced by transition, which incurred very high social costs (C. Zamfir, 1999). It is very clear that Romania missed the opportunity of using the social policy as instrument of establishing the proper conditions and of making use of the development potential by the massive introduction of active policies of occupation and creation of properly paid jobs, by the achievement of adequate levels of social transfers facilitating social integration by entering or returning to the labour market, by allocating the proper sources for education and health care. These observations are founded if we consider that the capacity of family intervention declined, as well as the degree of occupation of the active population, that the population aged somehow, that the number of pensioners increased spectacularly, that the number of beneficiaries of the system of social insurance doubled between 1989-2002 (from 2.332 to 4.665 million persons), as well as the number of pensioners for work period and age limit (from 1.5 million to 3.2 million), that the number of pensioners for invalidity increased very much (3.5 times, from 204 thousands to 706 thousands persons) due to early retirement avoiding thus unemployment (much lower values than in other transition countries), all this slowing down the economic reorganization. The number of agricultural pensioners increased 1.7 times (from 1 million to 1.7 million persons). The overall number of pensioners increased in 13 years from 3.326 million to 6.342 million, which also include the beneficiaries of inheritor pensions (1.4 times increase from 481 thousands to 672 thousands).

On the other hand, though, Romania ranks among the top countries as income taxation and as contributions to social insurances (the standard level is 50%, of which 33.5% the employee and 16.5% the employer, namely the whole share paid by the insured self employed, which is among the highest worldwide – Denmark has 52%). (I. Mărginean, coord., 2001). The public budget was undersized by reducing the number of contributors and by some companies and physical persons that avoided paying their taxes. The resulting resources were not directed with the needed priority toward the social domain. All this resulted in very high social costs of the transition that have been and still are born by a

large share of the population. The policy of restraining the consumption for a long period and of allocations to the social domains only had a limited efficiency and delayed the economic development. The savings and the social expenditure, when the latter should solve acute social problems, cannot be regarded as a wise policy neither for the country (the problems get more acute) nor for the EU partners (because it externalises a part of the social costs by illegal immigration and by undesirable behaviour of some Romanian citizens in EU countries).

Within this context one must not overestimate the role of the low level of consumption of the population (value expressed by specific expenditure) in judging the macroeconomic indicators. Of equal or even higher importance are the indicators concerning the quality of goods and services that were consumed and their origin. Several adverse implications come from the large imports of food (that could have been produced in the country) and of durable appliances due to the inherited misbalance of the Romanian economy. The situation did not change after 1990 by shifting the production of some companies toward such high quality appliances. The disproportional import related to the export stressed the deficit of the trade balance. The consumption of the population becomes a factor of development by the shift in production. This is why a good policy of national interest is not to limit consumption, but to use credits to stimulate the development of the industrial sector of appliances, of services, etc.

Also noticeable is the adverse role of importing second hand goods due to their destructive effect on some local economic sectors.

By its residual social policy Romania distanced from most of the former socialist countries candidate to accession. As mentioned by the Report, the former socialist countries were affected by the "recession of transition" started by the changes in the economic sector and by the structural adjustments. The most acute level of recession was in 1992-93, but Romania and Bulgaria, as well as the Baltic countries, also experienced drops in 1997-98 and in 1999, respectively. The balance for 1991-1999 showed that Romania (as well as Bulgaria) displayed an annual rate of 1.9% GDP decrease (- 4.1 for Lithuania and – 4.8 for Latvia), while Slovakia experienced an average rate of 4.6% GDP increase, Estonia +3.6, Turkey +3.3, Slovenia +1.7 and Hungary + 0.4. The start of development in Romania was much delayed and it had a lower pace than in the other countries. Thus, in 2000, GDP increased by just +1.8% in Romania, compared to 6.9 in Estonia, 6.8 in Latvia, 5.8 in Bulgaria, 5.2 in Hungary. In 2001 Romania displayed the third value of GDP increase (of the 13 countries: 5.3, compared to 7,7 in Latvia and 5.4 in Lithuania). This trend also continued in 2002-2004.

No doubt, the high pace of GDP increase of the past years are related to a much lower per capita GDP value, lower in Romania than in the other former socialist countries used for comparison purposes.

At the same time, Romania is one of the countries most affected by inflation. The highest inflation after 1996 was in 1997 (154.8%, compared to 1044.7% in Bulgaria, but also to 9.1 in the Czech Republic, 15% in Poland, 185% in Hungary). Some of the countries in the group of comparison already had inflation rates below 10% in 1996. Starting with 1999, only Romania had an inflation level of two figures. The expected inflation rate for 2004 will probably be lower than 10%.

Persevering in the policy of inflation control by cutting the consumption expenditure of the population and under the conditions of important losses in economy, the deficit of the consolidated budget is under 3% of the GDP, fulfilling thus one of the conditions of participating in the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), part of the community acquis (therefore compulsory). This was done by the restrictive policies concerning consumption and the wages of the budgetary sector and following the social policies which the WMF insisted upon. This deficit will probably be around 1.6% of the GDP in 2004; the agreement with the WMF stipulates a level of 1.5% for 2005 intended to cut down the inflation level (another criterion also monitored for the EMU). Some important EU member states (France, Germany) argue against the validity of the criterion of the budgetary deficit lower than 3%. On the other hand, the governmental debt in Romania is lower than in many EU countries. In 2001 Romania had a governmental debt representing 22.8% of the GDP, close to the levels observed in Lithuania and the Czech Republic (23.6%) but much lower than in Poland (40.9%), Hungary (55.9%) and Cyprus (63%). The relevant figure for Bulgaria was 76.9% for 2001, while the EU average was 64%, peaking in Belgium (110% of the GDP).

A brief presentation of the system of social policies in Romania during the past 60 years shows the following (I. Mãrginean, 2004d).

- The social policy of the Romanian socialist state was characterized by the actual elimination of the private and voluntary sectors, establishing the economic dependence of the individual on the state and the so-called socialist model of the welfare state was tightly related to the occupational status of the individual, by the social insurance for pensions, generalized during the past 3 decades of existence of the socialist regime, and to a universal-type system of social services of education and health care supplied at the place of use (financed through the state budget). The services of social welfare were directed mainly towards forms of institutionalisation. The precarious financing stressed the adverse effects of the system of social welfare, which resulted in situations well below any standards of human dignity in the institutions for orphan and

abandoned children, for the handicapped, for the elderly or for the persons with chronic diseases; the news on this situation circled the world in the 90`s.

During the transition period corrective measures have been adopted, which to alleviate the extremely serious circumstances existing in the institutions of social welfare with foreign aid and with the support of international volunteer organizations. The process of de-institutionalisation of the social protection of children was started and enhanced in the process and laws were passed making sure that the rights of children are observed. Other regulations in the social domain implied by the transit to market economy were enforced and changes also occurred in other spheres of the social policy (a new law of the social insurance, the health social insurances, etc.). Despite this, as mentioned earlier, the actions done after 1989 did not result in getting decisively closer to the characteristics of the EU welfare state, neither as the range of benefits, nor as their level, which is influenced by several economic and political factors.

In judging the state of facts in the social area one must consider that the main characteristic of the capitalist welfare state is that the state is involved not just in helping the poor, but also in providing a set of social services to the whole population or just for certain disfavoured categories (groups) or individuals. A concept of social rights or of social citizenship is thus promoted (T.Marshall, 1952), following the juridical and political ones. Distinction is done, however, between the citizens, on the one hand, and the guests, temporary residents, refugees, on the other hand. Only the citizens have full social rights concomitantly with the rigorous control and conditioned grant of citizenship. Social programs are also used, however, for the persons not having citizenship. In the EU member states there is the community citizenship. In agreement with the provisions of the EU Social Chart, of free circulation of the persons, capitals, goods and services, a citizen of one member state enjoys the same social rights granted by any state to its citizens based on a permit of residence.

Against the image induced by the expression "welfare state", there is no egalitarianism though. In fact, there is a process of redistributing the incomes of the population. Within this process, the richest ones will be, of course, net contributors of income in cash and/or in kind and services. The welfare state is no charity work in its whole. Almost all citizens contribute, as much as they can, to the function of the system. Hence, not just the need of the simple support for the policy of the welfare state, but also the need of achieving a high consensus in the society by the more general interests of human solidarity, social integrity, securing the social peace, establishment of a system of citizens duties and rights, etc. One may say that the welfare state is a type of collective action promoting goods that are public or regarded as of public interest, even

though it may also include at a given moment the partial or total procurement of some goods that might be produced by the private sector.

Another aspect to be noticed is the *disputable* character of the social policy, as of any policy. One cannot say that there is just one good policy, rather there are policies preferred by different social sectors, bodies, parties, etc. There may be more or less adequate means of attaining some objectives of social policy. The social policy existing at a given moment is the result of the interaction between the political forces and the major groups of interest of the society. It reflects the relations of power, authority, competition, legitimacy, support, consensus, within a cultural framework of values, traditions and customs, but it is not immune to manipulation. What is presented as an aspect of general interest may be in fact a group interest that does not run contrary to the public interest, or that may affect it strongly.

All the countries display an interest in improving the system of social policies, in introducing new elements in agreement with the changes in society at the level of occupation, family life, etc. Beyond these quests, we observe that the welfare state survived time and criticisms, not few. It is now deeply rooted within the society, it fulfils important functions and those contesting its value cannot dislocate it. The concerns for the diversification of social services financing, production and distribution, the creation of pluralism by privatisation and mixed economy allowed slowing down the overall increase of the public social expenditure, while it decreased in given areas. At the same time there is a higher interest for introducing systems for the more accurate assessment of system's efficacy.

Of course, there will still be important differences in the manner in which some parties, states, regional or international organisms relate to the social policy. It is no surprise that the principle of subsidiary is applied in the EU for the social policies. They remain of the competence of the member states but solutions of improvement are sought jointly (open coordination), the process aims to establish general standards and to learn from the good practice (Vandenbroucke, 2001). At the same time, the conservatories, liberals or the social democrats will continue to promote different solutions of social policy. This targets mainly the level of expenditure and the diversity of programs. None of these directions has the status of "pattern of a society", but they prove to be viable alternative of governing, without any differences that might question the social policies and the welfare state between these political forces.

The three important political directions are now in competition within the same type of society; even though it is more difficult to define, it is certainly that this is a democratic society based on political and ideological pluralism, on liberty and tolerance, a developed society with market economy and with an important social component of welfare state. In fact, the three directions have

lost in time their status of "type of society", but the reciprocal rejection still is rather strong. The conservatories consider that the liberalism is more dangerous than other political directions because it is attractive but also deceiving, while they favour the traditional elements and a significant role granted to the state. The liberals consider that the social democrats did not give up the idea of reforming the capitalist society and the welfare state would be the preferred means of action to get to socialism. Yet, there is enough joint space within the "political game" that makes competition possible.

Therefore, the social policy and its modern product, the social welfare state must not be treated as ideal models, but as specific activities concerning the living conditions of the population both on the short term and opening to the perspective. The cure for the five huge social problems identified by Lord Beveridge in his 1942 Report – poverty, misery, disease, ignorance, unemployment – prove to be necessary even in the wealthy society, and it can not be imagined, for the time being, outside an ample social policy assumed by the state and materialized in this welfare state.

The changes required to be done in Romania must be directed mainly in connection with the situation existing in the country where there still are many children abandoned in institutions and in the street instead of being within a family of in family-type arrangements; Romanian citizens beg in European countries, where from they are sent home; the Europeans want to build a prison in Romania for the Romanian doing crimes in European countries; there are old persons whose pension, after a life-long employment, is below the poverty threshold, similar to the income of many families earning the minimal wage on economy or even the mean wage, if they have children, under the conditions in which some persons have higher education and are doing a highly useful work for the public; the income of most agricultural workers are modest; many Rroma ethnics do not have school education and the skills needed for a job; education is under financed, same as the health care.

Within this context we must consider that the EU accession also requires the achievement of the objectives of social inclusion by a proper coordination between the economic and social sectors. A first action showing the radical changes in the sphere of social policies and in promoting the individual and social welfare by economic and social instruments is to give this area priority in the distribution of the budgetary resources based on adequate programs run by performing management practices.

Although the expenditure is not the most adequate indicator of the social policy (anyhow, it does not mean that the higher the expenditure, the better it is, or that the lower the expenditure, the better it is), they express a financial effort that cannot be ignored. The older experience of western countries and the newer experience of the former socialist countries shows that the level of the social

expenditure increased considerably in order to meet the targets of the social rights of the citizens and to promote the social inclusion. The pledge for a moderate welfare state in Romania claims urgently social expenditures of minimum 25% of the GDP, which to increase to 28-30% in the near future (including the public expenditure for education). This is a dramatic financial effort but the social problems to be solved are overwhelming.

If the allocations from budget do not increase substantially, we can not expect a qualitative change of the Romanian social pattern allowing the access of population to better paid jobs, to social services, to the respect for human dignity, eliminating the flagrant lags in the conditions of living of the population. This is to be followed by future improvements of some components of the social life such as the trust in people, sharing common values and national objectives, by harmonized life styles based on the respect and tolerance between citizens. Otherwise said, without programs of social, community and human development there can be no radical improvement of the conditions of living and, on a more general scale, of the quality of life of the Romanian population (I.Mãrginean, 2004c).

The increase of the cash benefits (pensions, allocations, aids) is required both by the current precarious state of most beneficiaries of such cash transfers, and by foreseen increase of prices after EU accession. The most optimistic estimates presented by the World Bank Report for Romania (2002) show that about 30% of the population lives in poverty. I say these estimates are optimistic because they used a method that set the poverty line at 60% of the average value of consumption of the population, also using the structure achieved at a given moment; it was shown, however, (by normative-type of surveys) that this average value is below the decent standard needed to meet the requirements of consumption, more so as a fraction of it, while the structure is strongly misbalanced by basic components. (M.Stanciu, 2001; A.Mihãilescu, 2004).

The increased social expenditure is to be supported even by a reasonable level of governmental indebting. Another survey, conducted under the aegis of the European Commission, reported that Romania, like the Baltic states and Slovenia might increase the financing of the social policies at the expense of the budgetary deficit considering that the governmental indebting is low (other countries, though, such as Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, couldn't use this method because the level of governmental indebting is already high).

Romania needs to increase considerably the social expenditure from the public budget if it wants to reach the targets mentioned earlier. The effect of this additional allocation relates both to the share of the GDP assigned to public spending and to the fact that at least in the near future there will be less resources to collect due to the introduction of the single lower taxation level on

income and profit. Given the social context of Romania, the stagnation or decrease of social spending would be an aggravating factor for the conditions of living of the population. Increased allocations are required for all compartments of the system of social policy, be it the system of *social protection* (social security in European terms), of income support for the persons with limited material resources or without any means of living through systems of social insurance and social welfare (pensions, benefits, allocations, scholarships, aids, etc.), or the *general social services,* such as health care, dwelling, transportation, sportive and socio-cultural services, education, or the *individual social services*, institutionalised or at home, residential or in community.

The requirement of an increased allocation of funds for the social also flows from the recalculation and increase of pensions, from the higher financing of education and health care, etc. The increased allocation for these three domains should not affect adversely, however, other domains such as the occupation policies or the protection of vulnerable persons.

Within this changed context I revert on several directions of actions that I presented earlier, concerning the system of pensions, health care and education (I.Mãrginean, 2004d).

The *system of pensions*. At least for several decades the public system of social insurance organised in flow will be dominant in supplying replacing income in case pf retirement or of temporary incapacity of work. The level of pensions in the public system must be kept at a decent level as replacement income. I support this because the favourable effect of the system of universal pensions with private administration will be felt much later for the incomes of the retired people. There is no justification for current replacement levels of income by pension below 50%. The lower number of contributors to the system of social insurance must be completed adequately by transfers from the public budget to the fund of social insurances for pensions or by incomes obtained from privatisation. On the other hand, the indemnification of the parents for raising the child up to the age of 2 (a stipulation that is more generous in Romania than in many other countries) must be supported from the budget and not from the social insurance. It would become, as it is only natural, a non-contributory benefit. If this service is to be related to work, in this case the payments should be also made from budgets transfers. Concerning the occupational pensions, the second pillar of the insurance system, I consider that the public institutions should also be expected participate in this system. The current restriction eliminates the public officers, the employees in education and health care. In the developed countries the state and the large companies' support the occupational pensions as an important means of highly motivating the employees in their activity. In this year, the proportion of expenditure with

the pensions should increase from 7% of GDP to at least 9% and then, shortly, to about 11%.

The *occupational policies*. The level of expenditure for occupation are only poorly correlated with the requirement for the unemployed. Active occupation policies should be largely implemented for the creation of high quality and well paid jobs.

If we consider the unemployment only, it is unfair that in 2002 a very low level of the unemployment benefit (75% of the minimal wage) was decided with the declared purpose to motivate the unemployed to look for a job, especially since some sectors give compensation payments to which, however, many unemployed do not have access.

To reduce the cost of labour, a decrease in the level of the social contributions should be expected (possibly increasing the taxation level of income and profit from 16% to 19-20%).

Health care. The implementation of the health social insurance established two components of the public system of health care, financed from the budget and from the insurance fund. Beyond the arguments whether a system of health social insurance was necessary (ten years ago - I.Mărginean, 1994 I said, and I was not wrong, that it was not necessary for Romania, which already had a developed public system confronted, however, with great difficulties due to under financing and inadequate management) measures have to adopted now, which to correct the effects of de-universalisation and which to ensure the access of the population to health care. Otherwise said, either the insurance system receives from the budget the counter value of the activities provided to the persons assimilated with the status of insured person (children, retired people) and for the incomeless people that are not insured, or a distinct system of non-contributory services should be established for them. Irrespective of the adopted pattern, the level of public spending for health care should be at least 6%.

Education is highly promoting the economic development. The increase of the public spending for education up to 6% of the GDP is the first signal of the appreciation of its importance. The financing of the university education remains an open subject. The implementation of a general public-private formula of financing (by taxes) brings us closer to the older EU states and to other developed countries. At least part of the resources that remain at the population by reducing the taxation of income and profit should go to the taxes for attending the state or private higher education. A moderate level of taxation paid by the students is more equitable than the current system in which some pay taxes and other don't, although they are very close as performance (the average mark from the accession competition). At the same time, tax exemption or scholarships may be granted on combining social and performance criteria.

Sooner or later such an arrangement will eventually come into force. The current system of financing and scholarship, although is low on resources, wastes them for some persons that do not qualify to receive them, while other people receive insufficiently, or don't even get to the higher education due to multiple causes among which the poverty of their families. If the differentiated moderate taxation for all students (except those compensated based on social or performance criteria) is not to be generalised, than the public spending for education should exceed the level of 6% of the GDP. This is necessary much more that will be desirable to increase the number of the students at school level and in state university education and the value of budgetary allocation for the student too. Increased resource are necessary including the eventuality reduction of number of years of studies at basic university level, which is to be correlated with an substantial increasing of the number of students at master and doctoral levels.

Tightly connected to education is the scientific research, which is also under financed. If we are to fulfil the EU targets up to 2010, the research should receive 3% of the GDP (public and private expenditure) in order to respond to the requirements of the knowledge society. It is obvious that the public sector should also contribute to this financial effort by an adequate sizing of the spending, same as with the spending for the access to culture and sport.

Synthesizing the effect of the proposed changes for the level of social expenditure we reach the value of 25% proposed earlier for the first stage (9% pensions + 6% health care + 4% unemployment and social welfare, socio-cultural spending + 6% education). At the same time, it is more than obvious that the level of 30% of the GDP for social spending (education included) is more than founded and yet Romania still remains one of the European countries with the lowest social spending.

I finish by showing a trend that has started to act more or less vigorously in Romania too in different domains. This is the establishment of the public-private joint action. The more than welcomed private initiatives in the field of pensions, education and heath care doesn't mean a reduction of the state's intervention, at least as long as the requirements to meet are very large. This means the diversification of services and the improvement of their quality, an increased level of addressability and choice of the citizens in their pursuit to meet their interests.

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HENRI H. STAHL ET L'ÉCOLE SOCIOLOGIQUE DE BUCAREST

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The article analyzes the original scientific contribution of prof. H.H. Stahl in two main directions: building and consolidating the Bucharest Sociological School led by D. Gusti, on one hand, and founding his original framework for historic sociology which goes beyond the sociological monograph. The author highlights novel data from the intellectual biography of the historian and sociologist H. H. Stahl, and evaluations concerning the historical and contemporary significance of his contributions to the codification of the sociological monograph technique, his contributions to the ellaboration of the „exemplary sociological monograph" of the Nerej village (Vrancea), and to the construction of a new paradigm of historical analysis based on „social archaeology".

Paradoxalement, l'originalité scientifique de l'œuvre de Henri H. Stahl a été plus largement et mieux perçue à l'étranger que dans son propre pays. Tout phénomène est susceptible d'explications des plus diverses, et qui se veulent convaicantes. Peu d'entre ceux qui se sont occupés de l'œuvre du professeur Stahl ont saisi cette situation, et rares sont ceux qui ont essayé d'en trouver l'explication.

Témoin de presque tout le XXe siècle, Henri H. Stahl a vécu sous plusieurs régimes politiques et a subi les rigueurs de chacun d'entre eux. Avec son nom étranger, sa connaissance de plusieurs langues européennes, sa formation complexe de sociologue, historien et juriste, il éveilla plus de suspicions qu'il ne recueillit d'appreciations favorables. Pendant la jeunesse et le début de la maturité de Henri H. Stahl, la sociologie roumaine était dominée par la figure imposante du chef de l'École sociologique de Bucarest, Dimitrie Gusti. Henri H. Stahl avait un statut à part au sein de cette école; sa position sociale lui assurait une plus grande indépendance financière et, par là, une plus grande liberté dans son activité scientifique. Dimitrie Gusti cherchait des collaborateurs capables de mettre en œuvre son programme théorique et de jeter les bases de la sociologie d'une nation. Comme tout grand savant, Gusti était sensible aux préoccupations originales de ses élèves et collaborateurs, même lorsque celles-ci s'éloignaient de ses propres préoccupations théoriques et méthodologiques. Il s'y prit de la même façon avec Henri H. Stahl. Il était content de ce que celui-ci avait, à partir de sa propre théorie, élaboré un ouvrage de technique des monographies sociologiques et une monumentale monographie du village de Nerej (département de Vrancea) ; aussi accepta-t-il les travaux de Henri H. Stahl dans le domaine de la sociologie historique, même s'ils ne s'intégraient pas dans le paradigme de l'École sociologique de Bucarest.

L'ouvrage sur la technique des monographies sociologiques et la monographie du village de Nerej valurent à Henri H. Stahl un solide prestige

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scientifique en Roumanie et à l'étranger. *La Technique des monographies sociologiques*, publiée en 1934, garde en bonne mesure son actualité. D'habitude, l'actualité des ouvrages de sciences sociales dure relativement peu. La réalité sociale change rapidement, si bien que les aspects présentés dans les études sociales deviennent, en peu de temps, de l'histoire. Certaines études ne sont plus lues que par intérêt purement historique ou pour servir de fondement à l'analyse de processus de longue durée, étant donné que les sciences sociales, bien que concentrées principalement sur l'étude du présent, doivent également étudier le passé, ne fût-ce que parce que la situation présente est dominée, dans une mesure plus ou moins grande, par la situation passée.

Malgré les soixante-dix ans qui se sont écoulés depuis la parution de la *Technique des monographies sociologiques*, son actualité est presque intacte. Il existe, dans cet ouvrage, des sections qui ont perdu leur caractère de guide dans la recherche sociologique et n'appartiennent plus qu'au domaine de l'histoire de l'ethnographie. Mais la plupart des aspects méthodologiques et techniques de cet ouvrage peuvent encore être utilisés comme tels dans les recherches contemporaines sur les collectivités rurales. Ce qui ne veut nullement dire que, depuis soixante-dix ans, les villages de Roumanie n'ont pas changé. Il existe cependant des éléments de culture et de civilisation rurales particulièrement durables, voire permanents. Par conséquent, les techniques d'étude de ces éléments gardent plus longtemps leur validité. En plus, les changements qu'à connus la Roumanie après 1989 ont fait revenir dans l'actualité certains problèmes économiques et sociaux spécifiques de l'entre-deux-guerres: fort morcellement de la propriété dans le milieu rural, disputes sur les droits de propriété, faible dotation technique de l'agriculture, primauté de l'autoproduction et de l'autoconsommation, manque ou médiocrité du crédit agricole et rural, ambiguïtés législatives au sujet du droit collectif de propriété sur les terrains dans l'indivision, inégalité des échanges entre le milieu agricole et rural et le milieu industriel et urbain, précarité de l'enseignement et des services médicaux ruraux, taux élevé de l'abandon scolaire en milieu rural, infrastructure édilitaire médiocre ou absente, etc. Tous ces aspects peuvent être étudiés de façon très complète à partir des orientations méthodologiques publiées en 1934. Naturellement, les villages roumains ont vu apparaître des aspects tout à fait nouveaux, qu'on ne pouvait anticiper il y a soixante-dix ans. De nos jours, faire la monographie d'un village supposerait de compléter le guide de 1934 par des contributions nouvelles à l'étude d'aspects des communautés rurales.

La *Technique des monographies sociologiques* et la monographie *Nerej – un village d'une région archaïque* ne constituent pas un corpus tout à fait unitaire avec la théorie sociologique élaborée par Dimitrie Gusti. D'un certain point de vue, la technique des monographies sociologiques est une transposition méthodologique de la théorie de la volonté sociale. Le schéma théorique des

cadres et des manifestations est transposé comme tel et concrétisé dans le schéma méthodologique de la monographie sociologique. Sous cet aspect, Henri H. Stahl se montre respectueux de la conception théorique de son maître. La théorie de la volonté sociale, mise au point par Dimitrie Gusti, a toutefois été moins acceptée par rapport à sa technique des monographies. Le grand mérite de Dimitrie Gusti est d'avoir aceepté la diversité des perspectives proposées par son élève, lequel obtenait son propre prestige par une voie originale.

Des monographies communautaires ou régionales avaient déjà été faites en Roumanie bien avant l'apparition de l'École de Bucarest, à savoir dès la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle. Mais c'étaient des travaux isolés, qui n'avaient pas la portée de ceux entrepris par l'École de Bucarest et ne s'inscrivaient pas dans un programme théorique et social de l'ampleur du programme visant à jeter les bases d'une sociologie de la nation. Sur la base du schéma méthodologique des cadres et des manifestations, les chercheurs réalisèrent un nombre impressionnant de monographies de communautés rurales et, plus tard, de régions. Mais la qualité en est bien inégale. Certaines, d'une indiscutable valeur scientifique, furent réalisées directement par les élèves ou par les collaborateurs de Gusti; plusieurs d'entre elles sont le fruit de l'activité du Séminaire de sociologie, d'éthique et de politique, d'autres furent élaborées par l'Institut social roumain ou par l'Institut de sciences sociales de Roumanie. Bon nombre de monographies de villages furent réalisées par des personnes plus ou moins qualifiées, disposant de peu de ressources et travaillant, souvent, sur leur propre compte. Les principaux auteurs des monographies de cette catégorie étaient les instituteurs et les prêtres des villages. Ceux-ci n'avaient pas de formation spéciale théorique et méthodologique dans le domaine des études sociales, mais ils se montrèrent très sensibles au projet de Dimitrie Gusti, qui ambitionnait de faire la monographie complète des communautés locales.

La méthode monographique développée par Gusti et Henri H. Stahl ne constitue pas une nouveauté absolue dans le domaine des études sociales. Des monographies de communautés locales, de quartiers urbains ou de groupes sociaux avaient été déjà publiées, bien avant l'existence de l'École des monographies sociologiques de Roumanie. Des études monographiques substantielles avaient été faites en Allemagne, en France, en Espagne, en Italie, au Brésil, en Hongrie, au Danemark. Le nombre des monographies réalisées en Allemagne pendant l'entre-deux-guerre est impressionnant. Il y eut, en Allemagne aussi, un programme d'élaboration de monographies de toutes les communautés. Beaucoup de ces monographies furent entreprises en l'absence d'un plan théorique et méthodologique. C'est pourquoi elles sont difficiles à utiliser dans une analyse comparée et ne permettent guère de formuler des conclusions théoriques. La plupart des monographies réalisées en Allemagne pendant la période nazie eurent une évidente finalité idéologique qui fit que, pendant quelque temps, on les abandonnât. Ce n'est qu'à la fin des années 60

que l'on reprit les monographies de communautés. En d'autres pays européens, le mouvement monographique fut repris à la fin des années 50 et au début des années 60. Après cette date, plusieurs milliers de monographies de communautés locales d'Europe furent réalisées, certaines de simples études de cas, d'autres servant de base à des projets de génie civil et rural ou à des projets de politiques sociales.

L'École des monographies historiques de Bucarest est l'une des plus grandes contributions roumaines à la science universelle. Dès les premières années de son existence, l'activité de l'École este connue en France, en Grande-Bretagne, en Hongrie, en Pologne, au Brésil, aux États-Unis. L'activité et l'importance de l'École de Bucarest firent l'objet d'articles et de contributions de grandes ou de futures grandes personnalités des sciences sociales de l'époque: Roger Bastide, C. Bouglé, Paul Fauconnet, Helmut Haufe, Hans Hoske, Helmut Klocke, René Mounier, Philip E. Mosely, Gaëtan Pirou, Gaston Richard, Leopold von Wiese, Henri Mendras, Marcel Jollilvet, Claude Hervieu, Theodor Shanin, Daniel Chirot, Zbigniew Werbicki. Dans les années 30 furent publiées en Hongrie de nombreuses études sur l'École des monographiee sociologiques. La Hongrie est un exemple de pays où les chercheurs non seulement se sont informés sur la méthode monographique développée en Roumanie, mais l'ont même utilisée dans l'étude de nombreuses communautés rurales. Il en fut de même en France, en Pologne, au Brésil. Certains d'entre ceux que nous venons de mentionner, même s'ils provenaient de pays ayant une riche contribution au développement de la sociologie, sont venus en Roumanie pour apprendre directement le maniement de la méthode monographique. Henri Mendras, par exemple, vint en Roumanie accompagné de la plupart des chercheurs du centre d'études rurales de France et fit des études de terrain aux côtés des élèves de Henri H. Stahl et sous la direction de celui-ci.

Dans le contexte des mouvements monographiques nationaux, celui de Roumanie est reconnu comme le plus substantiel du point de vue méthodologique, de même que du point de vue de la complexité des techniques d'investigation utilisées et du nombre de monographies sociologiques réalisées. La monographie du village de Nerej, réalisée sous la direction de Henri H. Stahl (et publié en 1939), est, même aujourd'hui, considérée par toutes les grandes universités et par tous les instituts de recherche du monde comme un travail monographique exemplaire, aussi est-elle étudiée dans le cadre de beaucoup de programmes de sociologie. L'intention d'organiser le Congrès mondial de sociologie de 1939 à Bucarest était une reconnaissance internationale du prestige don't jouissait l'École des monographies sociologiques.

Dans les années 60 et 70, la *Technique des monographies sociologiques* et la monographie *Nerej – un village d'une région archaïque* ont orienté du point de vue méthodologique l'activité de centaines de spécialistes et d'amateurs qui firent des monographies de communautés locales.

Pendant l'entre-deux-guerres, l'image que donna de lui-même Henri H. Stahl se trouva influencée par ses réactions courageuses à l'égard des théories de grandes personnalités de l'époque. Bien qu'il fût parent et ami du grand historien Nicolae Iorga, Henri H. Stahl ne manqua pas d'engager une polémique avec celui-ci sur la question de la genèse des communautés rurales en Roumanie et de l'évolution historique de la propriété rurale. Ces questions, en apparence purement théoriques, avaient des implications politiques et juridiques directes sur les règlements de la propriété pendant l'entre-deux-guerres. Henri H. Stahl déclenchera également une fameuse polémique avec le philosophe Lucian Blaga; en tant que sociologue, il affirme avec passion que la théorie de l'espace *mioritique* élaborée par Blaga doit être considérée exclusivement comme une construction philosophique, et ne doit en aucun cas être utilisée en guise de sociologie du village roumain.

Auteur d'un nouveau paradigme dans l'analyse de l'histoire sociale de Roumanie, Henri H. Stahl engage des polémiques avec la quasi-totalité des historiens importants, tant pendant l'entre-deux-guerres que pendant la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. Cela ne pouvait lui attirer trop de sympathies. Beaucoup d'historiens roumains adoptèrent à son égard une attitude des plus nuisibles, en l'ignorant ou en le critiquant superficiellement. Alors que ses ouvrages étaient lus partout dans le monde et faisaient partie de la bibliographie obligatoire de grandes universités d'Amérique et de l'Europe de l'ouest, alors qu'on lui consacrait des livres et des études, Henri H. Stahl était, en Roumanie, considéré plutôt comme un dissident de l'historiographie officielle. Son ouvrage monumental, *Contributions à l'étude des villages roumains indivis*, suscita peu d'intérêt de la part des historiens roumains, tant au moment de sa publication qu'à sa réimpression après 1990, alors que des abrégés de cette étude étaient publiés en France, en Italie ou aux États-Unis. C'est que la démarche théorique et méthodologique de Henri H. Stahl est peu suivi par les historiens roumains, encore très attachés à l'histoire événementielle et aux documents écrits. Écrire l'histoire sur la base d'une « archéologie sociale » n'est pas une méthode à la portée de n'importe quel historien ; seule une formation complexe en sociologie, histoire, ethnographie, archéologie, droit permet de reconstituer les structures sociales et politiques à partir d'éléments matériels.

Avant tout, Henri H. Stahl soutient que la succession des modes de production dans les territoires roumains ne suit pas le schéma classique élaboré par les historiens français de la Restauration et développée par Marx. L'évolution historique des territoires roumains fut spécifique et ne saurait être comprise en appliquant de façon rigide le schéma marxiste de la succession des modes de production. A l'appui de sa théorie, Henri H. Stahl invoque plusieurs arguments empruntés à la théorie marxiste, mais qui ne parvinrent pas à convaincre les marxistes orthodoxes.

Dans le cadre de cette polémique théorique, Henri H. Stahl élabore sa contribution scientifique la plus notable – ou qui fut perçue comme telle par ses contemporains et successeurs : la théorie du mode de production tributal et des anciennes communautés rurales indivises. Le type de communauté rurale indivise, spécifique du mode de production tributal de Roumanie et d'autres pays à structures économiques et sociales archaïques semblables a été analysé par Henri H. Stahl dans ses ouvrages *Contributions à l'études des villages roumains indivis* (3 vol., Bucarest, 1958-1965) et *Théories et hypothèses sur la sociologie de l'organisation tributale* (Bucarest, 1980). Voici les traits qui définissent les communautés indivises:

- le territoire est possédé en commun;
- toute l'activité de la communauté est organisée et contrôlée par celle-ci. La communauté peut et doit intervenir dans l'organisation des processus de production, dans la vie publique et privée du village, dans la constitution et l'application du droit coutumier, dans le règlement des relations intercommunautaires; elle détient le monopole ou le contrôle des relations commerciales avec l'extérieur; elle a le droit de préemption sur les terrains; elle a des droits et des obligations dans ses rapports avec l'État; elle représente ses propres habitants;
- les communautés paysannes sont soumises à une exploitation de type tributal (mainmise sur la plus-value résultant des processus de production où les exploitants ne se mêlent pas);
- les liens de parenté ont une énorme importance;
- la division sociale du travail se fait en fonction de l'âge et du sexe;
- la communauté rurale constitue un isolat démographique;
- les communautés rurales ont une culture propre, de caractère folklorique;
- les communautés rurales entretiennent des relations entre elles, au sein d'une véritable société paysanne régionale.

Normalement, les théories de Henri H. Stahl sur le mode de production tributal et sur les villages indivis auraient dû produire des bouleversement importants dans la sociologie et l'histoire de n'importe quel pays. Cela n'arriva pas en Roumanie. Ses théories furent mises en valeur par un petit nombre de sociologues et par quelques historiens. Ce n'est qu'après sa mort que les jeunes historiens le découvrirent et remirent en honneur ses contributions théoriques et méthodologiques. La réaction de ses compatriotes est incompréhensible, d'autant que, des les années 60, les spécialistes de plusieurs pays occidentaux considéraient son ouvrage *Nerej – un village d'une région archaïque* comme la monographie rurale exemplaire, et l'utilisaient comme modèle pour leurs propres recherches monographiques.

J'ai pu constater directement de quel prestige scientifique jouissait le professeur Stahl à l'étranger. En 1975, j'avais obtenu une bourse pour me documenter à Paris en vue de terminer une étude. Une fois arrivé à Paris, on me

demanda des documents certifiant que j'étais licencié en sociologie et doctorant. Je sollicitai en Roumanie des preuves en ce sens, mais on refusa de me les délivrer. Je n'avais pas osé sortir mes diplômes du pays, car, selon les règlements du régime de l'époque, j'aurais commis un grave délit. Le salut me vint de la part du professeur Henri H. Stahl. Notre ami commun, le professeur Henri Mendras (bon connaisseur et grand admirateur des théories de Henri H. Stahl) m'accompagna à la discussion avec ceux dont dépendaient les avis favorables et qui était, heureusement pour moi, le grand historien Fernand Braudel. On lui expliqua que je n'étais pas en possession des documents qui me donnaient le droit à cette bourse. Henri Mendras eut un argument salutaire. Il dit à Fernand Braudel que j'étais l'élève de Henri H. Stahl. Désormais, on ne me demanda plus aucun papier, aucun diplôme. Le simple fait que j'étais l'élève du professeur Stahl suppléa à toute exigence bureaucratique.

Rares sont ceux qui jouissent, de leur vivant, du privilège de voir s'organiser en leur honneur des sessions spéciales aux congrès internationaux ou des conférences sur leurs théories. Henri H. Stahl en jouit à plusieurs reprises. Dans un pays à vie scientifique normale, de telles manifestations auraient été des événements importants, intensément médiatisés. Le régime communiste traita avec indifférence, voire avec hostilité les hommages rendus à Henri H. Stahl. Parfois, on lui interdisait de participer à des conférences qui lui étaient consacrées ; d'autres fois, on lui délivrait son passeport après que la conférence avait pris fin. Je me rappelle que, une fois, le traitement appliqué au prefesseur Stahl par les autorités roumaines suscita la réaction de sociologues prestigieux de l'Europe de l'ouest. Comme il s'agissait d'une conférence internationale consacrée à Henri H. Stahl, les organisateurs ont considéré qu'elle ne pouvait avoir lieu en l'absence du professeur. A la tête d'un groupe de sociologues, Henri Mendras s'adressa aux autorités roumaines sur un ton catégorique, en montrant que, si le professeur Stahl ne participait pas, l'échec de la conférence serait imputé aux seules autorités roumaines, que l'opinion publique mondiale serait informée de la façon dont les autorités roumaines traitaient leurs propres citoyens, et que les signataires de la lettre demanderaient à leurs gouvernements de rompre les relations scientifiques et culturelles avec la Roumanie. La lettre provoqua de grands remous, jusqu'au sommet de la hiérarchie de l'État et du parti communiste. Je ne connais, moi, que le résultats des discussions qui auront eu lieu : Henri H. Stahl put participer à la conférence.

Parfois, les compatriotes ne reconnaissent les mérites des savants qu'après la mort de ceux-ci. C'est ce qui se passa avec Henri H. Stahl. Les étudiants de l'an 2000 redécouvrent avec intérêt une œuvre d'une grande complexité. On a réédité certains de ses ouvrages, on a publié certaines études inédites. On a écrit plusieurs livres sur son œuvre. Lors d'une conférence à l'Institut de sciences politiques de l'Université de Bucarest, le président de la Roumanie, M. Ion Iliescu, a largement utilisé la théorie du mode de production tributal pour

expliquer l'évolution historique du pays et les spécificités du processus de transition. Le discours du président de la Roumanie m'a semblé aussi une façon d'honorer la mémoire de Henri H. Stahl.

La réception de l'œuvre scientifique de Henri H. Stahl par les spécialistes de Roumanie n'est pas sans rapport avec sa dimension idéologique. Henri H. Stahl avait affirmé sans retenue ses sympathies sociales-démocrates, qui lui valurent plus de dix ans de souffrances. Sous l'influence de la social-démocratie et de la conception de Dimitrie Gusti, il ne se borna pas à être un simple investigateur social, mais fut aussi un militant social. Selon sa conception, la sociologie a non seulement un but théorique, mais aussi un but pratique, celui d'offrir un fondement scientifique à l'action sociale. Évidemment, pendant la période communiste, une telle conception était mal vue, le socialisme scientifique étant le seul fondement « scientifique » des politiques sociales.

On a souvent, par commodité théorique, placé le professeur Stahl dans la catégorie des sociologues d'orientation marxiste. Il est vrai qu'il fut, dans sa formation théorique, influencé par des penseurs d'orientation marxiste, mais, même si des influences marxistes existent dans sa conception, elles n'ont rien à voir avec la version léniniste-stalinienne du marxisme. Henri H. Stahl a repris certaines idées de la sociologie marxiste, qui lui ont servi dans l'élaboration de la théorie de la succession des modes de production ; mais sa théorie est, finalement, en rupture avec la théorie marxiste classique. Il serait correct de préciser que, par leur originalité marquée, les théories de Henri H. Stahl ne se laissent pas enfermer dans une catégorie traditionnelle. L'œuvre de Henri H. Stahl doit être mise en valeur comme une contribution théorique originale dans les domaines de la sociologie et de l'histoire.

THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN A PARTIAL REFORM EQUILIBRIUM SOCIETY: THE ROMANIAN CASE

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Reforms in the social area have been less evaluated in regard to their completeness. Do social reforms in their initial state create winner or loser groups? And if so, are these groups opposing further steps of reforms, leading to partial reform equilibriums, as many analyses of economic reforms assess? A brief institutional analysis provides evidence of the fact that those who gain from a partial reform state are the winners of incomplete economic reforms, while loses are supported rather uniformly by the whole population.

Stating the problem

The paper aims at highlighting the articulation processes in the field of social security in regard to the degree of completeness of initiated reforms. As most analyses of social policy in CEE countries have until recently contained to assessing the design and distributive impact of policies and programs, issues regarding the variables influencing institutional developments of social reforms have remained rather untouched. The present endeavor is directed towards assessing the appropriateness of the explicative model of of economic reforms for the social sector.

Adam Przeworski (1991) has been among the first authors who talked about the pitfalls of transition in the CEE countries. Before the transition period can show its advantages for the whole society, or for at least a critical number of groups, a 'grievance valley' has to be traversed; thus, transition will 'proceed in spurts'. His belief was that early losers of transition will become a significant brake of the reform processes[1]. Yet Hellman (1998) shows that the main risk of partial reforms lies not in the constituency of short-term losers but of short-term winners, which – under some circumstances – will oppose the continuation of the reform process. "(...) the politics of postcommunist economic reforms has not been dominated by the traditional short-term losers of economic transition – striking workers, resentful former state bureaucrats, impoverished pensioners, or armies of the unemployed. Instead, the most common obstacles to the progress of economic reform in postcommunist transitions have come from very different sources: from enterprise insiders who have become new owners only to strip their firms' assets; from commercial bankers (...); from local officials (...); and from so-called Mafiosi who have undermined the creation of a stable legal

[1] For a similar position see also Joan Nelson, The Politics of Economic Transformation: Is Third World Experience Relevant in Eastern Europe?, *World Politics* 45, 1993. Haggard and Kaufman (*The Political Eocnomy of Democratic Transition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) support this argument, while identifying two further political barriers to economic reforms in early democracies: the problem of collective action and the short time horizon of political decisions, given the short electoral cycles (156-158).

foundation for the market economy" (Hellman, 1998, 204). These groups are expected to strengthen their position and oppose further reforms, in a partial equilibrium model, where benefits become increasingly concentrated while overall social costs are dispersed. Accumulation of privileges, thus a concentration of benefits accompanied by an increase of overall costs, is responsible for delayed or partial reforms. Hellman (1998) shows that the depth of reforms is neither positively associated with the costs of the reforms nor with political tenure security, respectively executive turnovers. On the contrary, exactly those governments which have been more insulated from electoral pressures and had to fear least about popular reactions to high cost reforms became the 'laggards in the postcommunist economic transitions' (217). Not the increasing costs of partial reforms lead to organized opposition, but short time winners.

Hellman et al. (2000) conclude that the main short time winners of transition are newly privatized firms, small de novo firms and state owned enterprises. Capture firms[2] do exhibit more advantages within a high capture economy (as compared to a low capture country), accruing benefits under high corruption circumstances. In addition, influential firms[3] do exhibit increased gains from corruption in both high and low capture economies. For these firms it pays off to lobby against reforms, as long as further reforms can decrease their comparative advantages on the market and affect direct gains. Therefore, the story of transition is about how a few groups increase the costs of the many.

This paper aims at questioning the opportunity of tracing similar conclusions for the reforms within the field of social security. Are delays and partial social security reforms supported by some specific 'winner groups' or not? And if so, are these groups accruing privileges due to changes in the field of social protection or outside this area, in a broader economic environment? If opposing groups are constituted 'within' the field of social security, then continuing social reforms will inevitably lead to their dissolution. But if these groups are better of within a state of partial economic and political reform, then they will continue to parasite the social security system, decreasing its effectiveness and efficiency even after the completion of social reforms. Thus, the importance of this issue lies in the fact that it aims at identfying the variables influencing institutional developments within the social sector – during and after completion of reforms.

The first part will survey the evolution of social security in the transition period. The second part aims at identifying the winners within a partial equilibrium state and their status within the field of social security and within a broader economic context.

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[2] Those "firms which make private payments to public officials to affect the rule of the game" (Hellman et al., 2000, 3). Mostly, these firms tend to be *de novo* private firms or newly privatized firms.

[3] i.e "firms that have influence on (...) rules without recourse to private payments to public officials" (Hellman et al., 2000, 3). These are rather state-owned firms or firms with high percentage of state capital

Overall trends of reforms in social security

Social reforms have been carried out later in the 1990s allover the CEE, as most of these have been dependent upon the economy (Hausner, 2001; Nelson, 2001). These reforms are considered "usually 'second (or third) generation' reforms in the broad structural adjustment agenda" (Nelson, 2001, 236).

While social services developed slower, as they required not only a high involvement of local actors but also the emergence of expert systems and complex financial and accountability mechanisms, categorical monetary benefit schemes have been less problematic to design and reforms in this area have been more easily and widely accepted allover CEE (Nelson, 2001, 237). This is, for example, the case of the pension system as compared with health or educational services.

While most delays in reforms have been encountered in those social areas where policies are highly dependent upon the economy and costs are significantly high, their acceptance is easier and the consensus upon their implementation higher – under the sometimes high pressure of international agencies. As it became visible from the experience of almost all CEE countries, reforms of monetary social policies followed, up to a certain degree, a neo-liberal logic (Deacon, 1997, 91-103). These programs aimed at offering a minimal protection to recipients while containing to an austerity budget and reducing fiscal burdens as much as possible[4]. This has been also the case of Romania.

Even if with higher delays than most of the CEE countries, Romanian income maintenance policies slightly moved towards such measures.

Unemployment policy. The first major revision of the framework for social protection of unemployed, set out in the beginning of the 1990s, has been carried out only in 2001. Beginning with this year the period for which unemployment benefits are granted has been drastically limited and has been made dependent upon the number of years of contribution: from an initial 27 month of unemployment benefit (9 months) and unemployment allowance (a flat rated benefit granted for 18 months), to a period between 6 and 12 months, depending upon the number of years of contribution. Benefits have been flat rated at 60% of the legal minimum salary, as compared to the previous generous benefit of up to 85% of the last salary.

The pension system. A first major reform of the pension system, a classical contributory system since 1933, was undertaken in 2000. The 2000 law did not introduce any alternative pillar to the existing PAYG system; it only adjusted it. In this sense, Romania is one of the last countries in the CEE in respect to the pension reform. The benefit calculation formula has been changed such as to increase the proportionality with the whole period of contribution and to make the level of pensions more dependent upon performances of the

[4] On what makes the initiation of such rather unpopular reforms possible, both in western and in post-communist countries, see Kitschelt (2001).

economy. This measure substantially lowered pensions, at least for those to enter the system. Indexation systems[5] have been designed such as to decrease benefit inequality, by indexing with a higher percentage lower pensions and a lower percentage (or at all) higher pensions. Parental benefits for raising children up to the age of 2 have been flat rated, for parents with incomes higher than the national average salary.

Family benefits. The same trend is witnessed at the level of child and family benefits. At the moment there are discussions about targeting the universal child allowance (adopted in 1993 as a universalistic benefit). Another family benefit, for families with two and more children, adopted in the late '90's, has been already transformed in 2003 in an income-tested benefit. At the same time, a second family benefit has been adopted for single parent families, which has been as well designed – from the very beginning – as an income-tested benefit[6].

Thus, for most social benefits the average level decreased while either eligibility has been limited to, or benefits have been targeted on lower income deciles. There has been opposition to some of these developments, especially on behalf of trade-unions when it comes up to unemployment benefits. A series of voices rose against the flat rate benefit system, as contributions are related to income. Yet changes have been accepted and adopted[7], rather as a concession to the economy than due to their legitimacy. This reform direction leads to a peculiar form of redistributive social policy: *categorial benefits, double-checked by an income criteria, on the one hand, and insurance systems with social assistance traits, on the other hand.* While coverage has been restricted and benefits flat rated the social contributions and taxes maintained their high level[8] and continued to be proportional with the income level. On the other hand, pressure on social expenditure increased even more, as employment rate decreased and the number of pensioners and unemployed increased (see annex, graphic no. 5), while social expenditure did rather maintained its previous level (see annex, graphic no. 1, 2 and 3).

Overall low to moderate public social expenditure, a tendency towards means-tested benefit systems and a reduction in the average level of benefits are combined with high social contribution and taxes and a predominance of social insurance systems. This rather unpopular combination – of high net costs as compared to benefits – has been made possible – in the Romanian case – besides strong external influences also by the power hold by the government, as compared with the parliament or any other elected body. The number of

[5] Aimed at adjusting benefits to inflation

[6] Eligibility is limited to all those families which have per capita incomes lower than approximately half of the minim salary. This represents a higher threshold as that used for the means-tested social assistance benefit in Romania since 1995.

[7] sometimes under pressure of external actors

[8] In 2000, social contributions represented, on average, about 58% of the earned income (included are gross salaries and salary funds), as compared to OECD countries, for which in 2003 the highest social security contributions – paid jointly by employee and employer – did not exceed 39% (in the case of France, see OECD taxation database).

emergency ordinances has increased beginning with 1997 and outnumbered by far in 1999 – 2000 the number of laws adopted by the parliament in the field of social protection (see annex, graphic no. 8). Despite an apparently normalization in 2001 – 2002, the tendency towards governing trough emergency ordinances revived. On the other hand, the proportion of laws which sanction, respectively reject governmental ordinances is very high compared to the proportion of primary laws or adjustments to previous laws in all social sector areas (see annex, graphic no. 9). The power hold by central actors has been straightened as well by the low trust invested by the population in the parliament compared to any other institution.

But whatever the opportunities for undertaking unpopular reforms – be they external pressures or internal power balance – most of these reforms have been not yet completed. Pension reforms have not yet touched the delicate issue of a multi-pillar system; unemployment policies are not complete as the legislation in the field of work relations is still fluid and changing. Family benefits are not yet correlated with other form of benefits and tax exemptions or with major anti-poverty policies. Yet completion of reforms seems even harder than their initiation, as this second stage is more vulnerable to pressures and interests groups. Who are those winning within a partial social reform equilibrium state?

Accumulation of privileges and increasing benefits for certain groups: effects on the dynamic efficiency

Another particularity of the developments in the field of social cash-benefit systems – this time referring less to their distributive impact but to the articulation process itself – is the concentration of additional rights and privileges in some specific groups. Two categories of groups, which benefited of special treatment, have been identified[9]: one category attaining special rights and social benefits within the social protection system and a second category which, on the ground of a privileged position derived from partial economic and administrative reforms, benefited of massive arrears exempts and indirect subsidies (see Fig.1 below and table no.1 and 2 in the annex). The first category is composed of two types of groups: (potentially) influential political actors (e.g. military, employees in the industry supporting the national defense sector, miners, employees in monopolistic industries, police) and 'deserving' groups, which claimed restorative and compensatory policies (as war veterans, politically persecuted groups by the previously regime, 'new' revolutionaries

[9] The identification of the first category of groups has been made by an analysis of legislation. For example, during the period 1991-2003, almost half of the laws (i.e. 21 out of 46) passed in the field of social protection of unemployed has been dedicated to the groups identified in the diagram below. 18 laws regulating social security pensions have been dedicated to military pensioners and war veterans. While the second category of groups are the economic agents, who have been described by Hellman (1998) as winners from economic partial reforms (de novo firms and those with a majority of state capital) and who match the picture of arrears accumulation of firms by capital type (see annexes, table 1 and 2).

etc.). Both types of groups benefited of special treatment before and after the first major social policy revision in the beginning of 2000s'.The second category of 'winners' are those economic agents, identified by Hellman (1998) as those who usually win from a partial economic reform: either private firms or those with a majority state capital. Corruption permits to both these groups – private and state owned firms – to take advantage by either exercising their previously gained influence or buying off the 'rules of the game'.

Analyses of economic reforms show that accumulation of privileges is associated with delayed or partial reforms (for a detailed discussion see J. Hellman, 1998). These groups are expected to strengthen their position and oppose further reforms, in a partial equilibrium model, where benefits become increasingly concentrated while overall social costs become higher.



Figure 1. Groups which concentrated special privileges in the field of social protection during the '90s

A brief analysis of the legislation dedicated to the first category of groups, which gained special privileges in the field of social protection, does not confirm such a development. Despite the fact that an impressive part of the legislation during the last 14 years has been dedicated to these groups (see annex fig. 1, 2 and 3), the privileges and rights which they won are not significantly affected by the continuation of the reform. A good indicator is that benefit types for privileged pensioner groups have not significantly been changed by the first step of the pension reform in 2000. Maybe the most affected are future unemployed and the actual under-employed groups (see fig. 2 subcategory A) from the mining sector and those yet unreformed public utilities, for which the preservation of some privileges can become hard to negotiate (an exception are employees of public utility monopolies). Thus, the incentives to oppose reforms are rather low, as their 'privileged' position is less threatened by social reforms than by political and administrative ones. On the other hand, benefits granted to groups of the second sub-category – 'deserving groups' – transcend a specific field of social protection, while being extended from fiscal and entrepreneurial facilities to special insurance, categorical and social assistance benefits and services. Therefore, their interests are not related to a specific area or social policy. This fact decreases further the probability of opposing social reforms while rather opposing political ones, which could lower their overall influence power.

Interests in social security and unemployment legislation are mainly structured at the level of trade-unions and economic actors, some of the latter taking full advantage of an environment characterized by low law enforcement and doubtful procedural justice. Finally, the echoes of partial economic reforms, amplified by delays in administrative and social reforms, are those which 'count'. Economic agents, who benefit from partial economic reforms, are those who benefit as well from delayed reforms in the social sectors and administration. The major winners of partial reforms are state owned enterprises (or where the state is the principal stakeholder, with the majority capital), newly privatized enterprises, which negotiated privileges during the privatization stage (see IMF report on Romania, 2004), and, to some extent *de novo* private firms, which benefit from state capturing, in a high capture economy (see Hellman et al., 2000).

About half of the arrears in the Romanian economy, during the period 1995-2002, took the form of debts to the state budget and social insurance funds, whereas the highest debts can be observed in the private sector, followed by the mixed sector, where the state holds more than half of the capital (see annex, table no. 1 and 2). Most disciplined enterprises, from this point of view, are those with mixed capital, where the state holds less than 50%.

At the end of 2002, the debts of economic actors to the state budget reached 13,3 % of the GDP[10] while the debts to special social funds reached 5,8% of GDP (total debts, including debts to suppliers and banks, amounted 37,7% of the GDP). The mixed sector, with less than 50% state capital, had a very low contribution to this figures, the main debtors being the private and the majority state-hold enterprises. For example, the debts of economic agents to the National Health Social Insurance Fund at the end of 2002 represented 48% of the total expenditure made during the whole year by the Fund and 1,6% of the GDP (see table no. 3 in the annex).

Private and state firms are also those who engage in state capturing and influencing strategies, as these behaviors yield private benefits to firms in high capture economies (Hellman et al., 2000). Thus, opposition to any economic and administrative reform is more probable to come from these actors.

But what is the impact of these groups upon the developments in the field of social security? A first conclusion is that there is no strong evidence to support the statement that those who gain in terms of social protection[11] have the highest interests to oppose social reforms (as in the case of the economic reforms). Second, while delays of reforms of cash benefit programs are mostly due to incomplete economic reforms and they merely over-amplify the advantages of the winners of economic partial reforms, they increase overall costs for social protection therefore significantly affecting their prospects for sustainability. This is especially true as these developments are accompanied by the neo-liberal logic, to which most cash benefit programs submit. Low social benefits come to be bought more expensive by the majority of the population, as some very small groups preserve their privileges, disregarding the course of the reforms. Because contributions to social funds continue to remain high, alternative voluntary provision is practically excluded.

Thus, one of the most important consequences of the ongoing increase of overall net costs, in terms of sustainability of future institutional developments, is the lack of dynamic efficiency. The concept of dynamic efficiency is frequently used by economists to define sustainability. Dynamic efficiency is understood as a characteristic of an unfolding process of Pareto-improvements (Stavin et al., 2002), i.e. a sequence of decisions which allow for any type of welfare maximization as long as no one is affected on the spot, or in the long run. In the context of social policy dynamic efficiency requires social welfare maximization strategies which do not adversely affect effective 'social functioning' of individuals and communities. Therefore, an increase of costs accompanied by a decrease in coverage and/ or level of benefits leads to long

[10] In 2002 some of the existing social funds have been transferred under the administration of the Ministry of Finance and absorbed by the state budget. This is reflected also by the data on debts.

[11] In the form of direct benefits, special arrangements or tax exemptions

term monetary deprivation and diminishing chances of gaining basic capabilities for important segments of population.

Conclusion

The history of social sector reforms in transition seems more close to the initial position formulated in the early 1990s by Adam Przeworski. While there is no strong support for the opposite position – that winning groups of partial reforms are those which have the highest incentives to oppose further reforms (a position which seems to describe very well the politics of economic reforms)-, there is also too little evidence for supporting the statement that losers of partial social reforms are those who will oppose further reforms. A first conclusion is that the 'winner status' within the field of social protection is preserved by means of incomplete economic, political and administrative reforms. A second conclusion is that these winning groups, more than to oppose further social reforms, do increase the overall costs of anyway neo-liberal shaped social policies. Increased costs are not concentrated into certain 'losers' groups, therefore the chance to oppose reforms by certain groups is low. Low income groups do lose especially due to increased contributions while middle and high income groups from low protection (benefits) accompanied by decreasing opportunity of private provision of social protection. Rather, the main impact on the social sector developments can be described in terms of un-sustainability, as such evolutions affect negatively the dynamic efficiency of the policy articulation process. The long term consequences of delayed reforms in the social sector seem more important than in the case of economic reforms. While economic recovery is dependent upon 'now and here' policies, social welfare is rather dependent upon long term, sustainable policies.

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Annex



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 1. Romania - Social public expenditure as a % of GDP, 1990-2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 2



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 3. Romania Social security and social assistance expenditure as a % of GDP, 1991-2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics
Note: beginning with 1999, the average monthly social insurance pension for non-farmers includes as well the supplementary pension

Graphic 4. The real dynamics of the monthly average social insurance pension, as compared to 1990 (1990 – 2002)



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 5. Romania - social insurance dependency rates (in %), 1990-2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics

Graphic 6. Romania - the real dynamics of minimum salary, as compared to 1995, 1995-2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics
Note: in 1997, the benefit included also some compensation of increase in bread prices

Graphic7a. Romania - Monthly average unemployment benefit, as a % of the minimum salary, 1991 -2002



Data source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2003, National Institute for Statistics
Note: in 1997, the benefit included also some compensation of increase in bread prices, and in the 2002 other form of unemployment support is included in this figure

Graphic 7b. Romania, real dynamic of the unemployment benefit, as a % of its 1991 value



Data source: Deputy Chamber, Romanian Parliament, www.cdep.ro (legislative database)

Graphic 8. Romania - The dynamics of governmental (emergency) ordinances and laws in the field of social policy, 1990-2003



Data source: Deputy Chamber, Romanian Parliament, www.cdep.ro, (legislative database)

Graphic 9. Romania - Number of laws in the social field by type, 1990-2003



Figure 1. Romanian Legislation in the field of social protection of unemployed, 1990-2003



Figure 2. Romanian legislation in the field of social security, 1990 -2003

Table 1. Arrears of Romanian Enterprises to state social funds, as a % of GDP, 2000-2003

	Dec. 2000	Dec. 2001	Dec. 2002	June 2003
National economy	3.9	5.2	5.8	5.3
Private sector	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.8
State sector (50% - 100% state ownership)	2.4	3.4	3.8	3.3
Mixed, with state share < 50%	0.2	0,3	0.3	0.3

Data source: Romania: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF, European Department, 2004

Table 2. Arrears of Romanian enterprises 1995-2002, as a % of GDP

	Private sector							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	8.14	14.28	13.24	15.60	19.52	17.71	19.28	20.98
Suppliers	4.51	7.60	7.62	8.50	9.65	8.88	10.27	10.18
Other creditors	2.28	2.40	2.16	2.53	3.67	4.14	4.60	3.69
Banks	0.83	2.12	2.29	3.00	4.21	2.24	1.67	1.55
State budget	0.52	1.32	1.18	1.57	1.99	2.45	2.75	5.57
	Mixed with state ownership under 50%							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	0.81	1.37	2.47	2.80	4.38	4.73	3.83	3.77
Suppliers	0.63	0.83	1.46	1.67	2.61	3.22	2.57	0.78
Other creditors	0.07	0.15	0.49	0.34	0.87	0.82	0.70	0.38
Banks	0.03	0.18	0.16	0.34	0.44	0.34	0.27	0.33
State budget	0.07	0.22	0.37	0.45	0.46	0.35	0.29	2.27
	State ownership: over 50% but under 100%							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	1.29	5.99	7.66	7.82	9.66	*8.06*	*4.40*	*3.30*
Suppliers	0.54	2.31	2.47	2.34	2.35	1.64	0.92	1.88
Other creditors	0.22	1.10	2.02	1.70	2.34	2.88	1.66	0.37
Banks	0.26	1.14	1.76	1.50	1.27	0.88	0.53	0.22
State budget	0.34	1.45	1.81	2.28	3.70	2.67	1.30	0.82
	Integral state ownership							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	14.71	14.30	10.28	9.83	8.57	9.91	8.17	9.52
Suppliers	7.61	2.57	3.53	2.68	3.40	3.95	2.79	3.82
Other creditors	0.97	3.22	1.92	2.18	2.55	2.44	2.88	0.83
Banks	1.99	1.94	1.59	1.22	0.52	0.43	1.10	0.30
State budget	4.13	3.87	3.24	3.75	2.11	3.09	1.40	4.57
	National economy							
	1995	*1996*	*1997*	*1998*	*1999*	*2000*	*2001*	*2002*
	25.15	36.07	33.74	36.15	42.22	40.48	35.76	37.70
Suppliers	13.35	16.05	11.92	15.22	18.02	17.71	16.55	16.67
Other creditors	3.57	6.90	6.21	6.78	9.46	10.31	9.88	5.34
Banks	3.12	6.22	5.81	6.06	6.44	3.89	3.57	2.41
State budget	5.11	6.89	6.62	8.08	8.29	8.57	5.75	13.27

Data source: www.fmi.ro; statistical annex, table 10, Romania: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF, European Department, 2004

Note:
1) Other creditors include debts with salaries and contribution to various social insurance funds
2) Data for 1995 are under evaluated due to the cancelling of some arrears through the FESAL program
In 2002 some of the social funds have been absorbed by the state budget and this shift is reflected by the sudden increase of debts to the state budget

Table 3. Romania - Expenditure and debts of and to the Health Social Insurance Fund, 2002

Total expenditure from the Health Social Insurance Fund, as a % of the GDP	**3.20%**
Hospital debts	
total debts of hospitals, as a % of the total expenditure from the Health Social Insurance Fund	**19.02%**
total debts of hospitals, as a % of GDP	**0.61%**
Total debt of hospitals which can not be covered from the Health Social Insurance Fund, as a % of the total debts	**53.42%**
Debts to the Health Social Insurance Fund	
Debts of economic agents to the Health Social Insurance Fund, as a % of the total expenditure form the Health Social Insurance Fund	**48.85%**
Debts of economic agents to the Health Social Insurance Fund, as a % of GDP	**1.56%**

Data source: Annex 3,6,10 Annual Report of the National Health Social Insurance House, www.cnas.ro

CHILD CENTRED APPROACH DEVELOPED FOR THE PROMOTION OF CHILDREN'S WELL BEING IN ROMANIA - THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW 272/2004 -

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Ana Radulescu – University of Bucharest

As a candidate country for accession to the European Union, European Commission is closely monitoring the respect of Childs rights in Romania. The European Union acknowledged that significant reforms had taken place since 2000 on Human Rights and the Rights of the child but also urged continued progress on child protection. The National Authority for the Protection of Childs Rights (NAPCR) is currently engaged in implementing the New Legislation (Law no.272/2004) regarding the protection and promotion of the rights of the child. In this respect, NAPCR is carrying on the Educational Campaign on Child's Rights, component of the 2002 PHARE programme. In this article we will focus on the progress Romania has made to fulfil its obligations towards the children in Romania.

Introduction

In this article we will focus on the subject of the 'United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child' and the progress Romania has made to fulfil its obligations towards the children in Romania. This would prove to be valuable, since the social workers have a crucial role to play in protecting and promoting the Rights of the children.
The time is particularly right, because the social workers from all over the country, working at the county and local levels are currently working towards making progress in the work of Childs rights. It is hoped that the this article will be of interest and will provide thought for debate and suggest future development in qualification and training of social in this area of work.
We address here to all social work staff involved in working with all aspects of child or children and their families in any setting or environment. It is to serve as a refresher or a reminder of the responsibilities that social workers have towards promoting, maintaining and ensuring every individual child's rights and supporting their parents in order for them to fulfil their obligations to care for their children. Social workers will be able to achieve this objective by assuming the role as advocates for the child and working in close collaboration and partnership with other agencies.

Romanian Journal of Sociology, XVI, 1-2, Bucharest, 2005

What is the Convention on the Rights of the Child?

The international instruments related to the Rights of the Child[1] have been developed in the wider context of Human Rights.

The main Humane Rights instrument we refer to is the Charter of the United Nations signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco. The charter of the United Nations is based on the following principles:

- The recognition that the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world
- The dignity and worth of human person, and the determination to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom
- An universal declaration and agreement that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
- Childhood is entitled to special care and assistance
- The family is the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community.
- The child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding
- The child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the charter of the United Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity.

Given below is a list of the important international declarations focused on the children's rights, developed following the need to extend particular care to the child, which has been stated especially from the early 90's. They are as follows:

- Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924;
- The Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the United Nations on 20 November 1959. The Declaration indicated that, 'the child by reason of his physical and mental immaturity needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth'.
- In the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of United Nations (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession

[1] Convention on the Rights of the child - Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989

by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.) particularly in article ten and in the status and relevant instruments of specialised agencies and international organisations concerned with the welfare of children

- The United Nations Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with special reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/85 of 3 December 1986) It is important to emphasise that the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, brings Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally; the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Administration of Juvenile Justice ('The Beijing Rules'); and the Declaration includes also the items such as, the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict.

The UN Convention, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989 also acknowledges specific needs of the particular country context and therefore, makes the following points:

- Recognizing that, in all countries in the world, there are children living in exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such children need special consideration,
- Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child, and
- Recognizing the importance of international cooperation for improving the living conditions of children in every country, in particular in the developing countries.

In spite of the above, a recent report by UNICEF, called 'The State of the World's children': "Childhood Under Threat" (2004), shows that more than half the world's children are suffering extreme deprivations from poverty, war and HIV/AIDS – conditions that effectively deny children a childhood and hinder the development of nations. The following figures indicate this sentiment:

- 640 million children do not have adequate shelter
- 500 million children have no access to sanitation
- 400 million children have no access to safe water
- 300 million children have lack of access to information
- 270 million children have no access to health care services
- 140 million children have never been to school
- 90 million children are severely food deprived

Context in Romania

Given this bleak picture, how is Romania dealing with improving the lives of children in the year 2005?

Romania ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child by Law no. 18/1990 and according to the provisions of Article 44 in the Convention, Romania submitted an initial report on the implementation of the CRC to the UN Committee in 1993. Subsequently, a periodical report was submitted in 1999 and was discussed by the committee in 2003. The next report is in the process of preparation for submission in 2007.

As a candidate country for accession to the European Union, European Commission is closely monitoring the respect of Childs rights in Romania. The European Union acknowledged that significant reforms had taken place since 2000 on Human Rights and the Rights of the child but also urged continued progress on child protection. In a recent press release from the Delegation of the European Commission in Romania, it states that "the European Commission would like to reiterate that, as mentioned in its Monitoring Report on Romania published in October, 2005, is fully in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights and completes the reform of child protection[2]"

The National Authority for the Protection of Childs Rights (NAPCR) is currently engaged in implementing the New Legislation (Law no.272/2004), regarding the protection and promotion of the rights of the child. In this respect, NAPCR is carrying on the Educational Campaign on Child's Rights, component of the 2002 PHARE programme, currently focusing on training the social workers who are in post at the present moment and other professionals involved, in order to develop their knowledge and skills required for the new law to be applied.

Contribution of the International Community

However, before discussing the specific law it is important to outline the benefits that Romania has received from the consistent support granted by the International Community.

- The European Union has been involved in the field by means of the PHARE assistance programmes since the early '90s, both by providing a significant cumulated volume of grants, as well as by means of multiple and sustained technical expertise
- The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) has also had an active presence in the country since 1990, developing multiple projects whose

[2] Press Release, Delegation of the European Commission in Romania, Bucharest, November 2005

purpose has been to improve the situation of children in Romania, from a social, medical and educational perspective.

- The World Bank and the Bank for Development of the Council of Europe are partners of the Romanian Government in an important reform programme of the system for the protection of the child
- The Governments of the US, the UK, France, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland support the Romanian system of child protection, either on a bilateral basis, or in the framework of more international programmes.

Law 272/2004 on the protection and promotion of the rights of the child

The Law is based on the UN Convention of the Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. The convention guarantees all children: the right to education; medical care; privacy; freedom of opinion; social care and protection from abuse and exploitation. These are also based on the following fundamental principles mentioned in Article 6 of Law 272/2004:

a) Observing and primarily promoting the best interests of the child
b) Equal opportunities and non-discrimination
c) Raising the awareness of the parents on the exercise of their rights and on the fulfilment of parental duties
d) The primordial responsibility of the parents to observe and guarantee the rights of the child
e) The decentralisation of the child protection services, the multi-sectorial intervention and the partnership between the public institutions and the authorized private institutions
f) Providing individualized and personalised care for each child
g) Observing the dignity of the child
h) Listening to the child's opinion and giving it due weight, in accordance with the age and maturity of the child
i) Providing stability and continuity in caring, raising and educating the child, taking into account the child's ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background, in cases where protection measures are to be undertaken
j) Providing protection for children being abused and neglected
k) Celerity in making all decisions concerning the child
l) Interpreting each legal act concerning the rights of the child in correlation with the entire collection of regulations in this field

The main features of the law 272/2004

The Law 272/2004 on the protection and promotion of the rights of the child is very comprehensive and child centred but also complex. The following are the key elements in the law:

1. **All children should be protected** - According to the law, every child has the right to receive protection and support without any discrimination or of any distinction related to the gender, language, social origin, type of disability, etc.

2. **The importance of parental responsibilities - The** law states that parents should be responsible for child care and the protection of their rights. Also, those parents should provide appropriate opportunities and proper conditions so that they can develop to their full potential.
3. **Support of the community -** The parents have the right and duty to care for the children in the spirit of the law, as stated in the above point but the law emphasises the need for providing a positive and responsive support from the community members and services to enhance the competency and ability of the parents to take proper care of their children.
4. **State involvement -** The State will only intervene to support families in order to fulfil their responsibilities and to ensure the protection of the children whenever the parents failed or are not able to fulfil the parental duties.
5. **Prevention -** The emphasis is to prevent children being separated from their parents and wider family. In instances, where this is not possible, the child /children should be placed with substitute families.
6. **Inter-institutional cooperation** – the law also stipulates clearly that all agencies should co-operate in protecting and promoting the well being of the child/children. It is in fact the responsibility of everyone concerned. Such as the community and all other agencies involved in child care activities at the community level. The local administration authority has the duty to develop and provide diversified, accessible and high quality services that responds to children's needs.
7. **Social workers responsibilities -** receive referrals and depending on the nature of the concern and subsequent home visits they take action. They have to produce service plans (in the Social Assistance Public Service) and individual protection plans (in the General Direction for Social Assistance and Child Protection), based on their assessment of the situation and professional judgement. Above all, the action and measures taken should be weighted against the best interests of the child

Implementation of the Law & social work practice

Some of the immediate measures that are being undertaken have already been mentioned in the above sections. A working methodology for the social workers at the county and local level' has also been produced by the PHARE project 2002. In addition to the training, it is noted that pockets of good social work practice already exist in some areas as was demonstrated in the discussions during the training sessions. However, in order for social workers to comply with the legislation and work according to the spirit of the law, there has to be a radical change in the hearts and minds of people. In other words, the attitude has to change. The approach to working with children and their families requires

new skills in: engagement; negotiation; communication, both with children and adults; acquiring information; assessment; making sound professional judgements without delay; writing service plans; individual protection plans and the skill to work in partnership with other professionals.

Where are we at present?

In order to examine where we are at present with regard to the implementation of the new law, it is appropriate to review the strengths which already exist in the system.

What do we have at present?

- An important progress was made in the development of child protection services and there is at present, a General Direction of Social Assistance and Child Protection in each county;
- Another very important development is that social workers are involved in the delivery of child protection services;
- There is a legal framework in place, which explains the scope and also gives the opportunity to bring about uniformity, standardization and also, evaluation of the outcomes.
- Also, there are now a number of courses with specifically designed curricula in child and family issues in the university education in social work.

Having examined the positive factors that are in place, we need to build on these strengths and endeavour to develop further, the necessary and prerequisite conditions required for improvement in the area of child care.

Responsibilities of social workers working in the field of child care

Due to the de-centralisation in the child protection services, some of the responsibilities which were previously at the county level are now transferred to the community level. Therefore, the responsibilities for prevention of child abandonment, assessment of the risk situation and intervention are now the responsibility of the community.

Social workers in the Social Assistance Public Service (community administration) have the responsibility in assessing the needs of the children and the family, identify risk situation and developing the service plan for the family.

However, in reality gaps exist with the changes that have been brought about and therefore, need to be addressed. These include:

- Inadequate numbers or lack of trained social workers and community workers on local level especially in rural areas. This is a very urgent and crucial issue, since, social workers play a key role at the local level in prevention and intervention.

- The public and the decision makers from the social services are aware about a limited range and functions of the social work profession but the public image of social workers is not an accurate one. This point needs urgent consideration particularly, since they are instrumental in influencing the lives of children and families and making real changes.

In an attempt to fill in these gaps, , the Educational Campaign on Child Rights within the 2002 PHARE project, focused mainly on two directions towards the implementation of the new law:
1. Developing the awareness of social workers from the Public Social Assistance Service of their responsibilities and providing them with the skills and the knowledge base required in the preparation of the service plan for the family, in order to respond to the immediate needs in the community.
2. Developing inter disciplinary teams. This involved, bringing together social workers and the representatives of local services involved in the field: municipality policy office; health; justice; education and the church.

Responsibility of other agencies

Here we have the responsibilities for all the community members and specialists in the community's services which should be involved according to the law, in the identification of all the risk factors, where there is a danger of failing to comply with the convention of the child's rights. The specialist in the community services are: social workers; the teachers; the priests; the family doctors and community police officers.

The responsibility of implementing the measures for family support is also now directed to the local level. In addition, all the resources should be developed in the community and all its members should take the responsibility for the children's well-being.

As mentioned above, the specialists in the services in the community should inform the social workers in the Public Social Assistance Service whenever they identify that child's rights are being violated and also they have to support the actions set by the social workers in the service plans.

Like in the above case, there are gaps at the present moment. To mention one of them, is that:

- The community members and specialist in the community services are not ready at the moment to work together because, the skills required to work together, need to be further developed. In addition, it is a real shift in culture and attitude and therefore, needs constant encouragement, citing examples of the benefits derived from it.

Similarly, in order to begin to minimise the difficulties, the Educational Campaign on Child Rights attempted to put together representatives from services responsible, according to the law, in order to understand the implication, expectations and roles of other services as well the obstacle that affect the fulfilment of child's rights.

Emphasis on working together

The law requires that all the community services should work together. Without which the children will not be protected and their welfare will not be sustained. Good cooperation between services is an absolute/essential ingredient for the promotion and protection of the rights of the child

In this case, as the others mentioned above, there is also some ground to cover before it can become fully functional. For instance, the interdisciplinary team work is not yet functioning because, among other reasons for this failure, is the fact that it is a new concept and thus, will take some time to develop. The progress will be faster or more rapid progress will be made if some support is provided, including the skills in communication

To fill in this gap, the Educational Campaign on Child Rights did the following:

- Encouraged the development of the roles for each individual services through the training courses
- Focused also on the development of the ability of working together
- Disseminated information and promoted good practice

Given the above gaps mentioned there are other particular issues from the social work perspective which need to be tackled. They include:

Key messages for social workers and social work services in Romania:
Through the process of the identification of the gaps; firstly, we saw that many more social workers are required in the services area to ensure that effective measures are been under taken to promote the welfare of the children. In addition, we also conclude that strategies in social work at the community level should be developed in order to assess the needs of the community and to match the services to be provided.

Where do we go from here and where do we want to go?
In addition to the continuation of the methods applied so far (education, training and raising further awareness, dissemination of updated information-articles by social work professionals, sharing of experiences), further initiatives need to be taken on board.

Suggested future initiatives

- So far with the help of the project, the main emphasis has only included the specialists directly involved at the intervention level. We suggest that in the future awareness raising should also involve and include the decision makers at both the county and the local level
- Developing the role of each of the services and the protocol between services including a clear role on the field of child protection
- The approach should be more proactive; they need to be encouraged in taking a innovative stance instead of waiting for things to happen. .
- Improved effectiveness of team working
- Developing some instruments for measurements of the outcomes of the intervention, and more importantly,
- Increasing the number of social workers is an issue which was mentioned before, but more so, is allowing social workers to devote more time to children cases in order to provide quality services

With regard to the question as to where we would ideally want to go, we would want to make the following suggestions, which we consider to be realistic and achievable and follows on from where we are at the moment.

To make some progress in the very near future, we will need to increase the number of social workers in place and have developed more appropriate services provision according to the needs of the community. Added to this we will like to see an atmosphere where the whole community is actively engaged and involved to raise the quality of care for all children. These would require an environment of innovation and commitment. Further, it would be beneficial if the local administration could create a method to monitor and evaluate the progress that is being made.

Summary and conclusions

The article has attempted to convey the high level of interest that exists at the International level in promoting and protecting Childs rights and that Romania through the PHARE projects has had support from the international community towards the development of its own approach in Childs Rights in accordance with the principle of the convention.

It is also perfectly fair to say that Romania has made good progress in the field. However, it has to be acknowledged that it is only the beginning and that more work needs to done in changing peoples' attitude and work culture. Further, capacity building activities need to continue in the area of development of skills and bringing about a common approach for all professionals and services involved in working with children and families. Also, it cannot be

emphasised enough that the public image of social work needs to be considered. Accurately. This work also needs further development.

In addition to the above, The Public Social Work Service who are now expected to take on a major role in prevention and intervention and support to the families, which is, undoubtedly an enormous responsibility and a vast area of work. Thus, an important focus should be increasing the number of the social workers in the Public Social Work Service. They should be recruited with the certain job specifications in mind or competencies, besides social work skills. These should include: their ability to make appropriate interventions; their capacity to work together in a team with other professionals; their ability to initiate and activate resources. Without more social workers who fit the particular needs of the job in place, it will be increasingly difficult to sustain the momentum of the work.

In Conclusion the following issues should be given due consideration:

Also, in order for social workers to pursue quality work, support should be provided in terms of realistic case loads, allocation of work, supervision and support from other community services playing a role in the filed

The local administration should recognise the potential of social workers and therefore, there is need for recruitment of more social workers with the appropriate and suitable skills mentioned above.

For all the decision makers of social services provision, the professional status of social workers involved in services provision should be perceived correctly according to their role

It is good practice for all key players to work in partnership with social workers. This is of utmost importance and is fundamental to the promotion of the welfare of children. The involvement of community members and services in working and supporting vulnerable children and their families is a key message in the new Law and therefore, should be observed at all times.

The improvement of the inter-institutional and intra-institutional communication is vital because it will help the efficiency and effectiveness of the work.

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ENLARGEMENT OF NATO.
THE NEW YORK TIMES' REACTION TO ENLARGEMENT AND TO ROMANIA'S CANDIDACY

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Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) witnessed a profound process of adaptation and change. In conjunction with the pursuit of new missions, one of the key elements of the alliance's transformation has been the enlargement to the East. This paper examines the issue of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement in the broader context of its adaptation to the new particularities of the international security environment. The paper suggests that changes in the alliance's mission and in the U.S. interests influenced the politics of enlargement and, consequently, the policy toward candidate countries. Romania's unexpected admission into NATO in the second round illustrates this aspect. A content analysis performed on The New York Times reveals that this newspaper's attitude toward enlargement has changed from negative in the first round to positive in the second round and that it portrayed Romania negatively in both rounds. In addition, the NYT coverage of the candidate countries was not always objective but reflected the U.S. official policy.

Since the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has undergone a major process of adaptation and change. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the communist governments in Central Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact obliged the allies, led by the United States, to redefine NATO's purpose and mission in order to justify its relevance in a radically different strategic context. In addition, with the new changes in the security environment brought by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO is once again in a process of substantive transformation. The alliance is moving now in new directions: from "promoting democracy and stability in Europe" to "coalitions of the willing" to fighting against terrorism and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

In conjunction with the pursuit of new missions (i.e. crisis management, peacekeeping operations, combating terrorism), one of the key elements of the alliance's transformation has been the enlargement to the East. Despite the widespread pessimism of those who, in the 1990's, pointed out the weakening of NATO once the Soviet threat disappeared, the alliance has survived the end of the Cold War and enlarged twice in the last decade: first, at the Madrid summit, in 1997; and second, at the 2002 Prague summit.

Although a number of key political factors proved crucial in shaping the enlargement process, the decision to expand the alliance membership was seen

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as an American project. Each round of the post-Cold War enlargement reflected the U.S. vision of the alliance's future mission and the U.S. assessment of risks and threats. American leadership also proved crucial in choosing the countries that were invited to join in each round, based on a completely different set of criteria. Each round of enlargement had its own particularities which were influenced by the U.S. security needs, its desire to demonstrate global leadership, relations with Russia, the developments of the EU, and by the national interests of allies.

The decision to enlarge NATO did not lack controversy and witnessed intense intra-alliance divergences. In the first round, the disagreements were over the name and number of the candidate countries. Romania's candidacy was one of the most debated and represents an example of the lack of consensus among the U.S. and its European allies. Despite France's (and other European members') support, the U.S. opposed Romania's admission to NATO in 1997. However, as the essence of the second round of enlargement changed from political and economical criteria toward aspirants' strategic qualifications and how they might contribute to the U.S. war on terrorism, America supported Romania's candidacy and a "robust enlargement" of the alliance.

In the process of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement, however, far less attention was paid to the Eastern European side, by both American scholars and media. Although in the first round the alliance tried to portray the process of enlargement as fair and impartial, one in which the credentials of each candidate state were properly examined, countries that were rejected in the first round questioned the impartiality of the U.S. decision to exclude them from the admission list. Yet, their arguments and concerns were rarely taken into account on the Atlantic side. In addition, countries from Central and Eastern Europe wanted to join NATO and did not question NATO's relevance. However, their rationale for joining the alliance was in many instances different from the way the debate was framed in the U.S. and presented by the American media.

It is widely recognized that, in the realm of foreign policy and international relations, media plays an important role as a vehicle for carrying out political messages. In addition, media coverage of an event can put an issue, a region or a country on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, can stimulate action or inspire inaction. When an important issue is at stake, the media might carry the message of powerful actors and marginalize the real concerns of the less powerful or less important ones. In the enlargement debate, depending of how much support the U.S. government manifested and signaled to each candidate, that country's candidacy and image were presented by the American media accordingly.

This paper examines the issue of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement in the broader context of its "metamorphosis" and adaptation to the new particularities of the international security environment. The paper suggests that

changes in the alliance's missions and in the U.S. interests influenced the politics of enlargement and, consequently, the policy toward candidate countries. Romania's candidacy is an illustrative example. The media reverberated many times derogatory comments about some candidates and their suitability for inclusion in Western institutions. The media also mostly reflected the U.S. official policy regarding the desirability or undesirability of a candidate to join the alliance. How much such evaluations and coverage affected politics of enlargement and the fate of countries from Eastern Europe represents an important issue. Therefore, to illustrate media attitudes toward the alliance's enlargement to the East, we will present how one of the most prestigious U.S. newspapers- *The New York Times*- addressed Romania's candidacy and NATO's post-Cold War enlargement.

The first part of this paper underlines the role of U.S. leadership in preserving the alliance and in building a "*new NATO for a new era*." It is revealed that the U.S. official attitude toward Romania dramatically changed after 9/11 terrorist attacks, which helped catapult Romania to the forefront of the aspirant candidates for the second round.

The paper presents the case of Romania; its rationale and efforts to join NATO and its possible contribution to the alliance. Using content analysis, we analyze how one particular segment of the U.S. media, *The New York Times,* covered the debate related to the post-Cold War enlargement and to Romania's candidacy.

The Evolution of the New York Times Attitudes toward NATO Enlargement in the Post-Cold War era and toward Romania's Candidacy. Among many aspects of the alliance and its transformation, an important topic for research relates to the evolution of mass-media attitudes toward NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War era. This study uses content analysis to research the following questions: (1) How did the New York Times - as one of the top U.S. newspapers with a worldwide circulation - present the NATO enlargement issue in the years following the end of the Cold War? The study will compare the New York Times coverage of the first round with the coverage of the second round and will try to identify changes in attitudes toward NATO enlargement, as well as in the focus of attention in each round. Because one of the main sources of intra-alliance disputes in the first round--and an unexpected decision in the second round— relates to Romania's admission, a subsequent question of this research relates to the New York Times' attitude towards Romania's candidacy. Specifically, this study asks the following second question: (2) Did the New York Times support, oppose or have a neutral attitude toward Romania's admission into NATO? In other words, was Romania's candidacy an important issue for the New York Times? What kind of message about this candidate did the New York Times promote?

Analytical Framework. Scholars (Domhoff, 2002; Dye, 2002) have argued that mass-media, as the opinion-shaping network, achieve the greatest success in the

area of foreign policy, where most people have little information or interest and are predisposed to agree with their leaders. At the same time, media studies argue that what appears in the media is often shaped by specialists on subject matter, including government officials and policy experts, among others. Media have a pervasive influence in the foreign policy process, shaping the tone, style and emphasis of U.S. foreign policy in various ways and to varying degrees. Press coverage of an event can put a region or an issue on the U.S. foreign-policy agenda, can call out for action or inspire inaction. Moreover, although they claim to be objective, when an important issue is at stake the media often promote or even amplify the message of a particular group of policy-making elite. In the realms of foreign policy and international relations, the media also might carry the message of powerful actors and marginalize the real concerns of the less powerful or less important ones.

One method used to identify the main issues reported by the *New York Times* during both rounds of NATO enlargement and measure the tone of coverage is content analysis. Holsti (1969) points out that contend analysis is a data-making procedure that might be performed on any communication, including the newspapers. Most frequently, content analysis (manifest and latent) is used "*to describe the attributes of messages*." (Chelcea,) Hence, one application of content analysis is the comparison of messages over time, from which "the analyst might draw inferences about trends in communication content"(Holsti, 1969, 28).

In conducting the content analysis presented in this study, we selected one prestigious U.S. newspaper - *The New York Times*, which will be referred to as "*NYT*". The fact that a single newspaper has been analyzed represents an important self-imposed limitation: no generalizations and comparisons with other sources can be made. The nature of this research and the scope of the paper does not allow a cross-national comparison or a comparison among two major U.S. newspapers or other media. Such a comparison would have been more revealing and it may be a topic for future research. The purpose of the present study is rather limited. It aims to show how the *NYT* covered the debate leading to one of the most important aspect of the alliance's transformation and, perhaps, of the U.S.' foreign policy during the post-Cold War period - enlargement to the Eastern Europe. Attitudes toward Romania are also evaluated in order to determine the extent to which Romania, as a future U.S. ally, received objective coverage.

Data Collection. The data for this study has been collected by accessing the *NYT* archives through Lexis-Nexis Academic database available on-line at Florida Atlantic University Libraries. The analysis covers the period January, 1994 - the year when President Clinton decided to support the proposal for NATO enlargement and launched the *Partnership for Peace Program*, PfP [i], as the "*stage on the road toward membership*"- to February, 2004. The year 1994

represented an important starting-point for consequent debates about NATO enlargement and, thus, for our analysis. In addition, 2004 is the year when the seven newly admitted countries formally joined the alliance.

For the purpose of this study, the time-line for the two rounds of admission have been delimitated as follows: (1) the first round refers to articles published from January, 1994 to June, 1999; (2) the second round refers to articles published from October, 2000 until February, 2004. From March, 1999, when the first three countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) formally joined NATO, until October, 2000 only three articles were published. They discuss mainly the "Kosovo issue" and therefore we decided to include them in the "first round debate" rather than in the second.

The articles have been collected by making two searches in the full-text Lexis-Nexis database. The first search was made by typing in the search bar the key-words "NATO" and "Romania." The search resulted in 302 articles. Within these articles, we performed a second more focused search. We typed in the search bar the terms "enlargement and/or expansion." Because at the beginning of the first round the term "expansion" has been more often used (even in the official statements) than "enlargement" and because since 1997, they tended to be used interchangeable in journalistic reports, searching only for "enlargement" would have skewed the database. The second search resulted in 108 articles. After reading each article, 31 articles proved to be irrelevant to the topic. In these cases, only the word "expansion" appeared and it referred to the expansion of European Union or to the U.S. alone (e.g. "expansion of the U.S. sphere of influence, or interests"). The remaining 77 articles represent the database for this research.

Data Coding. While enormous improvements have been made recently in computer software for content analysis, many scholars continue to rely on "manual" coding for more nuanced and reliable readings of the text. Because we applied content analysis to a relatively narrow case study (one newspaper, 77 articles), this allowed us to examine all articles relevant to the topic, a fact that increased the reliability and validity of coding.

Familiarity with one's data is an important step for developing reliable and valid categories. In this study each article has been read and pre-coded. The Annex 2 provides the database pre-coding sheet. The information registered for each article includes (see Annex 1 for codes)[ii]: date when the article was published, type of news (report or opinion/editorial), period (first round or second round), source (refers to people who are quoted either directly or indirectly or it may be the journalist's voice), the presence or the absence of references to Romania, the tone (positive, negative, neutral) of comments related to Romania, and all issues covered by each article.

A central problem in any research design is selection and definition of categories into which content units are to be classified. Having prepared the pre-

coding sheet which includes all relevant issues discussed by each article, we then recorded every statement related to NATO enlargement and to Romania (i.e. "NATO enlargement is a mistake", "U.S. has/ or has no interest in expanding NATO"; "Russia has nothing to fear from a bigger NATO"; "expansion increase stability and decrease the chances to war"; "expansion needs Senate's approval"; "alliance's sharp disputes over how many countries to join"; "France supports Romania" etc). Statements presented in the same article more than once, were recorded only once.

Next, for reasons of convenience and precision, we counted the relative frequency of these statements to determine how many times references to Romania and to enlargement appeared in each round of debate. After this relatively easy step, we established more general and relevant categories of themes (issues) in order to be able to make comparisons between the two rounds. Establishing these categories was the most challenging part of the research design, mainly because each round had its own particularities and, thus, quite different attention. However, we noticed that the *NYT* discussion of the pro or con enlargement arguments tended to focus on some specific issues. These issues were identical with the U.S. government's rationale for enlargement published in the 1995 "Study on NATO enlargement." Specifically, the methodology developed as follows:

1) For the *NYT* attitude toward NATO enlargement, we analyzed first the journalistic reports and identified general themes of attention, separately, for both rounds. We placed all relevant sub-topics (items) in 10 themes and counted the frequency of each theme. Table 1 and table 2 (and the corresponding graphs) which will be discussed in detail, present the codes, the frequency and percentages for the themes (issues) covered by the *NYT* during the first round and, respectively, the second round of NATO enlargement. In order to maintain the reliability and relevance of coding, identical themes were assigned identical codes for each round. For example, the theme "*intra-alliance divergences*" received the same code in both rounds. For the first round, it includes all references to the U.S.-France (or any other European ally) disputes regarding France's initial opposition to enlargement and its consequently opposition to the number of invitees, or over France's requirements to name a European commander to NATO's southern flank. For the second round, this theme (issue) also refers to the U.S.-European allied disputes, with the notation that the object of divergence was different (i.e. U.S. intervention in Iraq). For further clarification, it should be mentioned that theme (issue) 3 "*U.S. - Russia relationships*" includes all references to the following sub-topics: (a) fear of Russia's reaction; (b) Russia's attitude toward enlargement; (c) the signing of NATO-Russia Act; and (d) the U.S. efforts to "reassure Russia that enlargement posed no threat to its security." "Other issues" includes all references to the following: "U.S. efforts to reassure countries left out in the first round"; "the

Baltic"; "attitudes toward NATO future enlargements"; "new threats"; "reasserting U.S. leadership in NATO"; "EU enlargement".

Particular attention was paid to opinion/editorial pieces, as they were the main determinant of the *NYT* attitude toward the dependant variables of this study (enlargement and Romania's candidacy). The first step was to count how many op/editorials were published in each round. Second, we determined the attitude (positive, neutral, negative) toward enlargement and toward Romania of each editorial for both rounds (Table 3 and Table 4). This analysis was based on linguistic evaluation of editorialists' main assertions (i.e. "*enlarging NATO is a big mistake*", was coded -1). The vast majority of articles used unambiguous language to express their approval/disapproval for enlargement and to explain the reasons why they adopted the respective position. For example, a statement that claims "enlargement is in the U.S. interest" and then enumerates the reasons why, was coded 1. Two editorials, written by Thomas Friedman, departed from the "norm" because the journalistic tone was rather ironical. In these cases, the articles' evaluation was made by inferring conclusions from author's statements and by "*reading between the lines*." In addition, every report that just presented the facts was coded as neutral. These include official statements, without adding journalist's own opinion. If a report presented two negative and two positive comments/statements related to the same issue, it was registered as neutral. If the report presented an official position then made one or more opposed comment, it was coded accordingly (positive or negative).

Third, in order to see whether there was a relationship between support/opposition to a particular issue and the attitude toward enlargement, we recorded from each op/ed, if applied: a) the arguments pro NATO enlargement; b) the arguments against NATO enlargement we established a list with main issues (arguments) based upon which the journalists supported or opposed enlargement. Then, I determined for each op/ed, whether the journalist argued that enlarging NATO would have a positive or negative impact on a specific issue and assigned numerical codes (1 for positive impact; -1 for negative). For example, every negative comment (i.e. enlargement "*will create new divisions in Europe*", "*will alienate Russia*", etc) was assigned the code -1; every positive statement (such as "*enlargement will promote stability*", "*will deter future Russia threats*"; "*will make Europe more stable and secure*") was assigned the code 1. The results are presented in tables 5 and 6 (see also figure 5).

(2) The same methodology has been applied in analyzing the *NYT* attitude toward Romania's candidacy. First, we counted how many times the articles referred to Romania in each round of enlargement. Second, we determined the general tone (positive, neutral, negative) of editorials toward Romania, in the same way as it has been explained earlier for "enlargement." Tables 4 and 5 include the results regarding *NYT* attitudes toward Romania in the first and second round of enlargement. Figure 6 presents the evolution of the *NYT*

attitudes toward Romania from 1994 to 2004. Third, we recorded all statements about Romania, categorized them in general issues, and established the attitude toward every issue in both rounds (as shown in tables 7 and 8).

We also recorded separately (for op/ed and reports, when appropriate) the exact wording of comments (both positive and negative) about the three countries admitted in the first round. I counted their simple frequencies and compared not only the numbers with those related to Romania but also the language used to describe Romania and these three countries

Findings. During the period from January, 1994 to February, 2004, the *NYT* published 77 articles relating to the NATO enlargement debate. Twenty-eight (36.3%) of them were opinion or editorial pieces (8 opinion and 20 editorials). The remaining 49 (63.5%) were journalistic reports. Of the 77 articles, 54 (70.1%) were published in the first round (14 editorials, 5 opinions, 35 reports) and 23 (29.8%) articles were published in the second round (6 editorials, 3 opinion pieces, 14 reports).

In the first round, Romania was mentioned 44 (81.4%) times. Out of this total, 12 (27.2%) were negative comments (10 expressed in op/ed and 2 inferred from reports), 1 was coded as a positive comment and 30 (68.1%) were neutral (simply mentioning the country's name). In the second round, Romania was mentioned 17 times: 5 (29.4%) were negative comments, 2 were positive and 11 (64.7%) were neutral. As for NATO enlargement, in the first round there were 14 negative comments, 3 positive and the rest were either neutral or the issue itself was not discussed. In the second round, there were 8 positive comments about enlargement, 0 negative, the rest were neutral. The journalists cited different sources: 78 times in the first round and 33 times in the second round.

As a result of the journalistic nature of the 49 staff-written articles coded in this study, it was difficult to judge whether an article was overtly in favor or against NATO enlargement. Most of the articles were written in an "objective" tone and tended to cover the debate as it unfolded. However, an observation should be made. The most cited sources were U.S. government officials, mainly the president and other high-level officials. In the first round, the U.S. president and other members of his closest staff were cited 29 (37.2%) times; NATO officials 6 (7.6%) times; U.S. foreign policy experts 5 (6.4%) times. In contrast, Western European leaders (presidents, prime-ministers, diplomats, EU representatives) were cited 8 (10.2%) times while Central European leaders only twice (2.5%). Romanian leaders (president, prime-minister, military officials) were cited 5 (6.45%) times. In the second round, the same tendency was maintained: U.S. president and other American officials were cited 14 (42.5%) times, Western European leaders 4 (12.1%) times, Central European leaders-once. Romanians were cited 5 (15.1%) times. Yet the most cited Romanian sources were military personnel and military leaders, not Romanian government officials (president, prime-minister). The unbalanced usage of sources cited

raises the question of objectivity. Although at first sight the *NYT* reports look quite objective, in fact, they presented mainly the American government point of view and arguments.

The New York Times Coverage of NATO Enlargement. The findings of this study show that the *NYT* coverage of the first round of NATO enlargement focused on the following four issues: costs of enlargement - appeared as the main issue of journalistic reports (19.5%); intra-alliance divergences (15.6%); U.S.-Russia relationship (14.1%); U.S. domestic politics (10.9%). The rest of the issues and their frequencies and percentages are presented below in table 1 and figure 1.

Table 1. Themes (issues) covered by the NYT in the first round of NATO enlargement

Code	Issue	%	(N)
1	Costs	19.5%	(25)
2	Intra-alliance divergences	15.6%	(20)
3	U.S. - Russia relationship	14.1%	(18)
4	U.S. domestic politics	10.9%	(14)
5	Senate approval	10.2%	(13)
6	U.S. commitment to "open door" policy	7.8%	(10)
7	NATO's future/transformation	7.0%	(9)
8	Gap in military capabilities	2.3%	(3)
9	Impact of terrorist attack	-	
10	Other issues	12.5%	(16)
		100.0%	(128)



Figure 1. The percentages of themes (issues) covered by the NYT in the first round of NATO enlargement

These were among the main issues that framed the debate between different policy-experts within the U.S. government. For example, the issues of costs and costs estimates made the subject of many congressional hearings, debates among U.S. senators and policy experts. Therefore, *NYT* reports gave plenty of attention to this topic. A particular observation should be made, however, in regard to the issue that ranks second in this analysis (the intra-alliance divergences). In the first round it referred overwhelmingly to France's opposition to the number and the names of candidates proposed by the U.S. The *NYT* tried to "deconstruct" France's stubborn support for Romania and Slovenia and to suggest, as soon as 1995, that these two countries were far less qualified and, thus, impossible to get the U.S. Senate's approval. More than 60 percent of the time, Romania's name was simply mentioned without any comment about its qualifications. Every such mention was followed by statements about U.S.' intention to support only three countries, about France's opposition to this policy and, or about U.S. commitment to endorse future enlargements. The *NYT* referenced Romania mostly for the purpose of signaling clear messages from the Clinton administration to its European allies and to the rest of the candidates, not because the newspaper was concerned with Romania's fate in particular or wanted to pay a special attention to it. The Clinton administration and, accordingly, the *NYT* perceived Romania's admission as less important and less relevant for the U.S. strategic interest. Perhaps surprisingly, concerns and support were expressed for the Baltic's admissions on the grounds that they needed protection against Russia's threat more than any other country in Eastern Europe. The fact that (besides U.S.-Russia relations) the most discussed themes were U.S. domestic politics (articles paid attention to Clinton's campaign speeches and to the "Polish vote" issue), and the Senate's approval suggests that the *NYT* coverage reflected the main concerns of the U.S. administration.

In contrast to the first round, in the second round of NATO enlargement the attention shifted toward very different issues (table 2). As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on American soil, U.S. priorities have changed and, consequently, criteria for NATO admission have changed. The U.S. officials argue since 9/11 that in order to confront the new security threats (terrorism, WMD) NATO should change its role and mission and should be able to perform out-of area operations. Therefore, NATO needs new and improved military capabilities. Not surprisingly, these arguments represented the most covered themes by the *NYT*. As table 2 shows, almost half (41.3%) of the main themes presented during the second round refer to NATO's need to transform and to improve military capabilities.

Table 2. Themes (issues) covered by the NYT in the second round of NATO enlargement

Code	Issue	(%)	N
7	NATO's future/transformation	41.3%	(26)
8	Gap in military capabilities	15.9%	(10)
3	U.S. - Russia relationship	14.3%	(9)
2	Intra-alliance divergences	7.9%	(5)
9	Impact of terrorist attack	7.9%	(5)
1	Costs	1.6%	(1)
5	Senate approval	1.6%	(1)
4	U.S. domestic politics	1.6%	(1)
6	U.S. commitment to "open door policy"	-	(0)
10	Other issues	7.9%	(5)
		100.0%	(63)



Figure 2. The percentages of themes (issues) covered by the NYT in the second round of NATO enlargement

Because the European allies have a different perception of threat and are more concerned with the prospects of European Union and, therefore, less willing to increase their defense spending, the *NYT* repeatedly (15.9%) mentioned the huge gap in military capabilities and suggested (by citing U.S. high-level officials) that increasing defense spending is a necessary measure for ensuring both U.S. and European security. It can be noticed that the weight of "U.S. domestic politics"; "Senate's approval", "Costs of enlargement" issues in the total number of topics covered in the second round decreased considerably (1.6%). Instead, a new issue started to receive more attention (7.9%) - the impact of terrorist attacks on U.S. security and on NATO's future role and

missions. Figure 3 shows the weight of themes covered by the *NYT* in both rounds of enlargement.



Figure 3. The weight of themes (issues) covered by the NYT in both rounds of NATO post-Cold War enlargement

As table 3 shows, 46.7% percent of opinion/ editorials published by the *NYT* in the first round had a negative attitude toward NATO enlargement (compared to 20% positive view of enlargement). Table 3 (and table 4) also presents the *NYT* views about Romania, which will be discussed later.

Table 3. NYT attitude toward NATO enlargement and Romania's candidacy in the first round of NATO enlargement

#	Date	Type	Attitude towards:	
			Enlargement	Romania
1	3/12/1995	Editorial	*	-1
2	5/9/1995	Editorial	-1	-1
3	5/21/1995	Opinion	*	-1
4	12/16/1996	Editorial	1	0
5	3/28/1997	Opinion	*	-1
6	5/15/1997	Editorial	-1	-1
7	5/30/1997	Opinion	0	-1
8	6/2/1997	Editorial	-1	0
9	6/26/1997	Editorial	-1	*
10	6/30/1997	Editorial	1	0
11	7/6/1997	Editorial	-1	0
12	7/9/1997	Editorial	1	0
13	7/9/1997	Editorial	-1	0
14	7/10/1997	Opinion	0	-1
15	7/13/1997	Opinion	0	1
16	7/17/1997	Editorial	*	-1
17	2/9/1998	Editorial	0	-1

#	Date	Type	Attitude towards:	
			Enlargement	Romania
18	3/5/1998	Editorial	-1	*
19	4/7/1998	Editorial	0	-1
Negative			46.7% (7)	58.8% (10)
Neutral			33.3% (5)	35.3% (6)
Positive			20.0% (3)	5.9% (1)

* Not discussed. 1 = positive. 0 = neutral. -1 = negative

In the second round of enlargement, as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and of improving the relationships with Russia, the opinions about NATO enlargement have completely changed (table 4). Underlying NATO's transformation, more than half of the articles expressed a positive view about enlargement while none of the editorialists opposed it. An editorial published on December 1, 2001 cited Kissinger who recognized that he "changed his mind about Russia's reaction." The journalists declared that "all previous skepticism about NATO enlargement promoted by the *NYT* was wrong" and that "the impact of September 11 has made NATO enlargement more right than ever".

Table 4. NYT attitude toward NATO enlargement and Romania's candidacy in the second round

#	Date	Type	Attitude towards:	
			Enlargement	Romania
1	10/6/2000	Editorial	1	-1
2	2/25/2001	Opinion	0	-1
3	12/1/2001	Editorial	1	0
4	10/23/2002	Opinion	0	-1
5	11/10/2002	Editorial	0	-1
6	11/17/2002	Editorial	1	0
7	11/20/2002	Editorial	1	0
8	11/24/2002	Opinion	0	1
9	11/24/2002	Editorial	1	*
Negative			0.0% (0)	50.0% (4)
Neutral			44.4% (4)	37.5% (3)
Positive			55.6% (5)	12.5% (1)

Figure 4 shows the evolution of the NYT attitudes toward NATO's post-Cold War enlargement.



Figure 4. The evolution of the NYT attitude toward NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War era

In regards to the specific themes, the *NYT* gave special attention to Russia issue. As a general theme, U.S.-Russia relationship appeared in 14.1% of the reports in the first round and in 14.3% in the second round. The "Russia issue" represented the greatest concern of most of the *NYT* editorials. Overall, the newspaper attempted to give a balanced coverage of both arguments endorsing and opposing enlargement. A closer examination shows that, in the first round, each pro enlargement argument was sidestepped and immediately replaced with or followed by an argument opposing enlargement. Among the most cited pro-enlargement arguments (table 5) were: maintaining security and promoting stability, democracy, and market economy in Eastern Europe (12.5%); enhance U.S. security (7.8%); maintaining U.S. security umbrella and commitment in Europe (6.3%); deter/prevent future Russia aggressions (6.3%); prevent ethnic conflicts in Balkans (4.7%).

Table 5. Issues (arguments) related to NATO enlargement covered by the NYT and the attitude toward each issue in the first round

Code	Issue (Argument)	Attitude				
		Negative % (N)		Neutral % (N)	Positive % (N)	
1	Relationship with Russia	26.6%	(17)	-	6.3%	(4)
2	Dividing lines in Europe	12.5%	(8)	-	3.1%	(2)
3	U.S. interest	14.1%	(9)	-	7.8%	(5)
4	Democracy and stability in Europe		-	-	12.5%	(8)
5	U.S. commitment in Europe		-	-	6.3%	(4)
6	Ethnic conflicts in Balkans		-	-	4.7%	(3)
7	Strengthen NATO	1.6%	(1)	-	3.1%	(2)
8	EU enlargement		-	-	1.6%	(1)
TOTAL		54.7%	(35)	-	45.3%	(29)

In fact, the *NYT* expressed mainly the ideas of those policy experts (George Kennan, for example) and U.S. officials from the Clinton administration who opposed enlargement on the grounds that it would deteriorate U.S. relations with Russia and would provoke Russia unnecessarily (26.6% of the total arguments). The authors of these editorials feared that Russia would refuse to ratify the Start 2 Treaty and the Chemical Weapon Convention, or simply feared that enlargement would increase the rise of ultra-nationalist sentiments in Russia and thus, would have a negative impact on Russia's transition to democracy. It have also been argued by the *NYT* editorialists that enlargement would maintain and create new dividing lines in Europe (12.5%), and that committing American troops to Central Europe could not be in the U.S. interest (14.1%). Although the newspaper published in June 1997 - one month after the signing of NATO-Russia Act - Brzesinski's and Lake's editorial that strongly encouraged NATO enlargement, the general negative tone of the coverage continued until 2001. The arguments continued to express concerns toward Russia and referred to the possible intentions of U.S. and NATO to place troops or nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members, ignoring the NATO-Russia agreement.

In the second round, the U.S. officials and the *NYT* articles (table 6), framed enlargement as having an important role in consolidating the gains of market democracies (38.5%), in drawing Russia closer to Europe (23.1%), and in rejuvenating/strengthening NATO (23.1%).

Table 6. Issues (arguments) related to NATO enlargement covered by the NYT and the attitude toward each issue in the second round

Code	Issue (Argument)	Attitude			
		Negative % (N)	Neutral % (N)	Positive % (N)	
1	Relationship with Russia	-	-	23.1%	(3)
2	Dividing lines in Europe	-	-		-
3	U.S. interest	-	-	7.7%	(1)
4	Democracy and stability in Europe	-	-	38.5%	(5)
5	U.S. commitment in Europe	-	-		-
6	Ethnic conflicts in Balkans	-	-		-
7	Strengthen NATO	-	-	23.1%	(3)
8	EU enlargement	-	-	7.7%	(1)
		-	-	100%	(13)

Figure 5 presents the weight of issues related to NATO enlargement covered by the *NYT* in both rounds.



Figure 5. The weight of issues related to NATO enlargement covered by the NYT in both rounds

In addition to expressing a positive view of enlargement in the second round, the editorialists' attention was centered on NATO's transformation. The editorials seem to focus less on enlargement *per se* and more on the necessity - as suggested by the Bush administration - to transform NATO's missions and to improve its military capacity. A closer analysis shows that the *NYT* promoted the Bush administration's policy regarding the future of the alliance. Almost half of the sources cited (42.5%) came from President Bush and other U.S. high-level officials who argued that it is necessary to "build a new NATO, more adaptable, and more flexible." The newspaper reflected President Bush's call for the creation of NATO Rapid Reaction Force and to reduce the gap in military capabilities, suggesting that European allies must increase their defense spending. The gap in military capabilities and the changing missions of NATO made the well-known columnist Thomas Friedman — who opposed enlargement in the first round — to admit that he do not oppose enlargement anymore. The ironical tone of his editorial (i.e."what the hack, let's invite everybody in!") made clear that he does not see enlargement as an absolute necessity for the "old NATO"– which has been transformed meanwhile--but as a

way to help the "new NATO" to accomplish its missions. In this context, the fact that each of the newly admitted countries (which he called "Autocrats Anonymous") has or is in the process of developing certain "niche capabilities" (Friedman called them "boutique skills") might help the U.S. and its English-speaking allies in the fight against terrorism. In other words, the military capacity gain for NATO/U.S. is minimal but the political gain for the U.S. is important, as the Bush administration seems to favor the new concept of "coalitions of the willing."

The New York Times Coverage of Romania's Candidacy. The first observation to be made refers to the nature of the message about Romania promoted by the *NYT*. In the first round, this message was very much "in line" with the Clinton administration's policy regarding the name and number of preferred candidates to be admitted. For example, since 1994 the comments about Romania were predominantly negative. Moreover, because the semantic distinction between "Eastern Europe" and "Central Europe" (favored by all former communist countries and encouraged by the Clinton's administration) influenced positions toward enlargement, a *NYT* article published in March, 1995 made it clear that the term "Central Europe" refers only to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The journalist stated that "Central Europe" does not refer to Romania and Bulgaria. By their geographical location, history and cultural heritage, these countries belong to the Balkans and, thus, to Eastern Europe. This was an important statement because it framed, from the beginning of the debate regarding NATO enlargement, what countries were officially favored by the U.S. to join, what countries would most probably be excluded, and, obviously, which position the newspaper was going to promote.

The *NYT* favored the "*small is beautiful*" policy of the Clinton administration. Other than presenting short statements or brief journalistic comments about the existence of U.S.-French divergences over this matter, the *NYT* almost completely ignored the European points of view. Tables 3 and 4 presented earlier show that 58.8% of the *NYT* views about Romania's candidacy in the first and 50% of the views expressed in the second were negative. Figure 6 presents more clear the evolution of the *NYT'* s attitudes toward Romania.



Figure 6. The evolution of NYT attitude toward Romania's candidacy to NATO in both rounds of enlargement

The coverage clearly disadvantaged Romania. Not only was there an abundance of negative comments about this country but also almost every negative statement was followed by or preceded by a positive comment about Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. I counted as many as 17 positive comments (51% of the total comments about candidates of the first round) about the three countries and zero negative comments, compared to only 2 (0.6%) positive comments and 14 (42.4%) negative comments about Romania. The positive comments about Romania where, in fact, inferred from the paragraphs in which the journalist talked in more favorable terms--as the Madrid Summit approached - about Romania's military contribution to peacekeeping missions, about "*some*" progress toward democratization, and about relationships with its neighbors (signing the border treaties with Hungary and Ukraine, in particular).

Despite all the official claims to the contrary, the list of the potential member states in the first round was known by everybody: it consisted of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The *NYT* discourse used to describe these countries is relevant for the message it wanted to transmit. The three countries: had "*strong support from the U.S.*;" were "*governed by anti-communist regimes*," "*most probably to join*," "*the most qualified to join*;" "*front-runners in solidifying democracy;*" they had "*the most advanced economies,*" etc. In contrast, Romania was depicted as "*a politically fragile country;*" "*far from the point of establishing democracy and market economy;*" "*still governed by former communist;*" "*still struggling to establish a democratic government;*" belonging "*to the Balkans*"; it needed "*a more long term commitment to reform.*" Therefore, "U.S. did not support Romania's candidacy;" Romania was "*more-likely to be told to wait*;" was "*on no one's*

short list" because "*politically, economically, and militarily - the country is not in shape to join*." Thus, it has been suggested that not only did Romania not meet political and economical criteria of U.S./NATO standards but also that, in fact, the U.S. did not encourage Romania's candidacy.

The *NYT* reinforced the policy promoted by the U.S. government and signaled to the other European allies - France, in particular- (and eventually to Romania), the intentions of the Clinton administration. This characterization, made by an influential newspaper, probably had an extremely negative impact on the U.S. and international business elites' perception of Romania, and, consequently, on Romania's image abroad and on its national interests. As table 7 shows, the lack of "U.S. support for Romania's candidacy" received the most attention (24.5%) from the *NYT*, followed by the "lack of progress toward democracy" (20.4%) and the lack of economic reforms (16.3%). Political stability (10.2%) and moral traits (8.2%) are the next most discussed negative characteristics of this country.

Table 7. Issues related to Romania's candidacy and the NYT attitude toward each issue in the first round of NATO enlargement

Code	Issues	Attitude			
		Negative % (N)		Positive % (N)	
1	U.S. support for Romania's candidacy	24.5%	(12)		-
2	Progress toward democracy	20.4%	(10)	10.2%	(5)
3	Economic reforms	16.3%	(8)		-
4	Political stability	10.2%	(5)		-
5	Moral traits/geographical place in Europe	8.2%	(4)		-
6	Military modernization/contribution		-	4.1%	(2)
7	Relationship with neighboring countries		-	6.1%	(3)
8	Strategic importance		-		-
9	Support for U.S. leadership		-		-
		79.6%	(39)	20.4%	(10)

Although in the second round (tables 3 and 4) there was a small increase in positive attitudes toward Romania (12.5% compare to 5.9%) and decrease in the negative one (from 58.8% to 50%), the editorials, overall, promoted the same unfavorable image of Romania. In the second round, the *NYT* continued to focus on the lack of economic reforms (25.8%) and other issues related to economic situation (table 8). For example, an article published in November, 2002, stated: "Romania has the lowest GDP of the 12 candidates for EU, the least foreign investment, the highest inflation, and the most corruption."

Table 8. Issues related to Romania's candidacy and the NYT attitude toward each issue in the second round of NATO enlargement

Code	Argument	Attitude			
		Negative % (N)		Positive % (N)	
1	U.S. support for Romania's candidacy	-		-	
2	Progress toward democracy	-		-	
3	Economic reforms	25.8%	(8)	-	
4	Political stability	6.5%	(2)	-	
5	Moral traits/geographical place in Europe	25.8%	(8)	-	
6	Military progress/modernization	-		16.1%	(5)
7	Relationship with neighboring countries	-		-	
8	Strategic importance	-		16.1%	(5)
9	Support for U.S. leadership	-		9.7%	(3)
		58.1%	(18)	41.9%	(13)

The *NYT* coverage decreased its criticism related to country's political stability (6.5% compared to 10.2%) but increased the focus of attention on Romania's moral traits (25.8%). Figure 7 presents the weight of issues related to Romania's candidacy to NATO covered by the NYT in both rounds of enlargement.



Figure 7. The weight of issues related to Romania's candidacy covered by the NYT in both rounds of NATO enlargement

The *NYT* editorials - some of them written by well-respected, influential scholars and policy experts, like Robert Kaplan - continued to draw attention, besides the economic backwardness, to the moral traits of Romanian leaders. Without any other clarifications about particular circumstances of Romania's history, Kaplan mentioned in the first round that Romania "was a Nazi ally" and that "invoking Yalta betrayal makes no sense for Romania." The editorial suggested that this is an opportunistic country, one that "switched sides in the WWII" and, therefore, an ally that, besides not being able to pay the costs for its Western integration, no one can trust. This idea was promoted in the second round, almost until the end of 2003. For example, the editorialists mentioned often, in a negative manner, that Romania was the only country to sign an agreement with the U.S. to exempt American soldiers from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. In addition, it has been suggested that the "U.S. tragedy of September 11 marked an opportunity Romania carefully cultivates" and that, by supporting U.S. leadership in Iraq, Romania "broke the European solidarity on this issue."

In striking contrast to the first round, during the second round the linguistic characteristics of discourse regarding Romania's candidacy and the content of the message have changed considerable. First, U.S. officials - constantly cited by the *NYT*- began to state that "*every European nation that seeks NATO membership and is ready to share NATO's responsibilities should be welcomed in our alliance*" (President Bush's speech, published by the *NYT*, November, 2002). Second, it has been signaled that "*Romania is stable now*;" "it is, in particular, of strategic importance," "*will add to the strength of NATO*," and "represents a bridge to new Russia."

All these official signals about Romania's increased chances to join NATO in the second round (signals that started after September 11, 2001) were reflected by the *NYT* reports. From being on "no one's list" in the first round, Romania became, in the second round of *NYT* coverage, a "closer ally" to the U.S. Then, the reports' language was incrementally moving from: "*closer* ally" to "U.S. is *considering* Romania" to "*strong backing* from the U.S." to "Romania is *expected* to join" to "*in addition* to Romania, another six candidates will join." For the second time, the *NYT* reflected the evolution of the U.S. government's policy on this matter. However, while the comments about the country's weak economy and high levels of corruption were still present in the *NYT* columns at the end of 2003, the positive statements about Romania's qualifications were quite rare. When present, most of them referred to the progress in military modernization and participation in peace keeping operations (16.1%). In addition, as table 8 shows, it began to print favorable comments about the country's strategic importance for the southern flank of NATO -- that is, for the U.S. war on terrorism (16.1%) and, from 2003 on, some positive comments about Romania's support for the U.S. leadership (9.7%).

To sum up, the findings of this study show that the *NYT* coverage of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement reflected, in both rounds, the policy of the U.S. government. In the first round, the coverage replicated the main concerns of the Clinton administration and thus, focused on the costs of enlargement, relations with Russia, domestic issues, and divergences with France and other Western European allies over the names and number of candidate countries. However, the *NYT* editorials generally presented the arguments of those who opposed enlargement and who saw the end of the Cold War as a chance to cooperate with Russia and to reduce the danger of nuclear conflict. The ideas expressed by the *NYT* reinforced the arguments of those U.S. policy experts who considered that, in the absence of Russia's threat, enlargement was not in the U.S. interests, would not increase European security, and would create new dividing lines in Europe. Fear of Russia's reaction motivated George Kennan to oppose NATO's first round enlargement to Eastern Europe and so did many of the *NYT* editorialists.

In the second round, the war on terrorism profoundly changed U.S. relations with Russia. Russia has now a common cause with the West and this reduced its opposition to NATO enlargement, even for the Baltic countries. One hurdle (fear of Russia's reaction) being solved at least to some extent, those *NYT* editorialists who opposed NATO's first post-Cold War enlargement on the grounds that it would damage U.S. relations with Russia, declared in the second round that they did not oppose enlargement any longer. The war on terrorism and the Bush administration's calls for a fundamental transformation of NATO made the debate for the second round of enlargement lose almost any significance. As a result, all editorials published by the *NYT* favored NATO enlargement, or, at least, did not oppose it.

While the *NYT* attitude toward enlargement has changed from negative, in the first round, to positive in the second round, the coverage of Romania remained predominantly negative in both rounds. Although the news reports presented the U.S. administration's preferences and changing priorities, and, thus depicted in completely different language the chances of Romania to join NATO in the second round, the *NYT* editorials constantly manifested a negative attitude, focusing on Romania's economic situation and moral traits of its leadership.

Citing overwhelmingly American sources, the *NYT* reports did not pay significant attention to European points of view relating to NATO enlargement. The newspaper did not discuss until late 2003 the credentials of Romania in terms other than economics. It may be, therefore, revealing for future research, to compare the *NYT* coverage of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement with the coverage made by major Western and Eastern European newspapers. One step further in developing the topic of this paper would be the realization of a cross-

national media study which would also allow determining how American and European media present NATO's future evolution.

Conclusions

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO, the principal instrument of U.S. foreign policy in Europe during the Cold War, witnessed a profound process of transformation. Reflecting this change, new roles and missions gradually began to dominate the discussion about the alliance's future. In the early 1990's, NATO allies acknowledged that security threats were less likely to come from calculated aggressions against their territory than from the breakdown of the communists regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, including economic and social disturbances, ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes. As a result, in place of preparing to carry out military operations only in response to an armed attack against the territory of its members, the alliance would undertake crisis management and peacekeeping operations (out-of area missions), beyond Europe's border. Although collective defense remained the core purpose of NATO, new dimensions were added to the initial security concept: the commitment to build a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies and, after September 11, 2001, the fight against terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

As NATO started to redefine its security mandate more broadly, it also redefined its military strategy and force structure consistent with the new security environment. In this context, multinational rapid reaction forces increased in importance, as did the requirement for light, mobile, flexible, technologically advanced formations. NATO has also been engaged in a complex process of internal adaptation. This process includes a closer political control over military operations; the establishment of a new institutions intended to promote cooperation and to enhance political dialogue with partners; increased support for European Security and Defense Identity; the development of a special political and military consultation mechanism with Russia and Ukraine; and a great flexibility for the ad-hoc "coalition of the willing"(composed of states volunteering to participate in specific non-Article 5 operations) throughout Combined Joint Task Forces.

Another important aspect of NATO's transformation was the eastward enlargement to incorporate the Soviet Union's former satellites. Contrary to the predictions that in the absence of the Soviet threat the alliance would wither away, NATO enlarged twice in the last decade: in 1999, three former Warsaw Pact members – Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic - joined the alliance; in 2004, a larger group of seven countries received NATO membership: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia.

As the alliance's leader, the U.S. was the key actor in NATO's post-Cold War enlargement process. Each round of enlargement reflected the U.S. vision of NATO's future mission and was influenced by the U.S. security needs, its desire to demonstrate global leadership, relations with Russia, the development of the EU, and by the national interests of the allies. The U.S. also influenced and changed criteria for membership. Although the U.S. eventually managed to create consensus among allies on the choice and number of invitees, the decision to enlarge NATO was highly controversial and witnessed intense intra-alliance divergences. Romania's candidacy illustrates the intra-alliance disputes that characterized the first round of enlargement. Romania's unexpected admission to NATO in the second round is also an example of how changes in the U.S. interests and in the alliance's mission influenced the politics of enlargement and, consequently, the policy toward candidate countries. While in 1997 the U.S. opposed membership for Romania on the grounds that it did not meet the alliance's economic and political criteria, after 9/11 the American official attitude toward Romania significantly changed. In the context of the U.S. war on terrorism, the strategic importance of Romania – which is closer to many likely crisis areas and proved willing to support the U.S.- increased and so did its chances of being admitted into NATO in 2002. For many commentators, it seemed obviously that if the September 11 terrorist attack had not occurred, the Prague invitation list would have been smaller, most probably without Romania among the invitees.

As with the other former Warsaw Pact members, Romania viewed membership in NATO as essential to securing its reintegration into the "West" and as a way to reinvigorate its shattered economy and to facilitate its accession to the EU. Therefore, in addition to illustrating the changing politics of enlargement, Romania's case also shows the differences between Romania's view of NATO and its rationale for joining the alliance on the one hand, and the manner in which the debate was framed by U.S. officials and presented by the American media, on the other hand.

Because in the realm of international relations media is an important vehicle for carrying out the political messages of powerful actors, and it has the ability to marginalize the concerns of less powerful ones, this paper analyzed how one particular segment of the American media - *The New York Times* - reflected Romania's candidacy in the general context of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement. The results of the content analysis performed on articles published over a 10-year period show that, while the *NYT* attitude toward enlargement has changed from negative in the first round to positive in the second round, this newspaper portrayed Romania extremely negatively in both rounds. The news reports presented the U.S. administration's changing priorities and, as a result, depicted in completely different language the chances of Romania to join NATO in the second round. However, the editorials published by the *NYT* constantly

manifested a negative attitude, focusing on Romania's economic situation and on the moral threats of the country's leadership. The *NYT* did not discuss until late 2003 the credentials of Romania (e.g. its participation in NATO and UN peacekeeping operations, military reform, or strategic importance) in terms other than economic. The *NYT* mostly reflected the U.S. official policy regarding the desirability or undesirability of a candidate to join the alliance and rarely paid attention to the Western or Eastern European concerns or points of view.

This paper reveals the fact that NATO's post-Cold War enlargement process was driven by the U.S. and that one of the most prestigious American newspaper reflected this situation. This research also underlines the fact that enlargement had some deficiencies, that there were differences in perceptions of the membership issue among the U.S. and Central Eastern Europeans candidates and that American media coverage of the candidate countries was not always objective. In addition, in the context of NATO's transformation after September 11, 2001, and of its future mission, public opinion and media from Central and Eastern Europe – so far supportive of NATO - might react in a less positive manner to the outcomes (e.g. possible casualties, high defense spending while reducing the funds for health care, education or for other social benefits) of these countries' membership in a such a "metamorphosed" alliance. Therefore, extensive research on Central and Eastern Europe is necessary in order to better understand the behavior of the newly admitted members and the reactions of their population, to facilitate communication among all NATO allies and the integration of these former communist countries. This region could be an evolving field of study not only for European scholars but also for the Americans scholars.

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Notes

[i] Partnership for Peace Program. Partnership for Peace was another framework of NATO cooperation with non-NATO countries. First proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Germany in October, 1993, the PfP was formally approved three months later, at NATO's January, 1994 Brussels summit. At that summit, NATO went well beyond declaring the addition of "cooperation" as a basic purpose. The alliance announced its intention "to launch an immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states." (North Atlantic Council Declaration, January 11, 1994). PfP purposes were defined as follows: "At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, will we work in concrete ways toward transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercise, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fiel ds as peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations, and other as may be agreed."(Ibid., p.14)
The twenty-seven PfP participants (Romania was the first PfP country) include all twenty-two non-NATO NACC participants except Tajikistan, plus Austria, Finland, Macedonia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 1996, Malta withdrew from the PfP (Yost, 1998). Each partner country has concluded an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) approved on a "16+1 base" -- that is an agreement between NATO and each state.

[ii] **ANNEX 1 CODES**

A) SOURCE:
1 = Report
2 = Op/Editorial

B) PERIOD:
1 = First round
2 = Second round

C) COUNTRY MENTIONED:
1 = Yes
0 = No

D) COMMENTS ABOUT ROMANIA:
1 = Positive
0 = Neutral
-1 = Negative

E) SOURCES CITED:
1 = U.S. President
2 = U.S. officials (Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Security Advisor, military officials, U.S. representatives to NATO)
3 = NATO officials (ex. Secretary General)
4 = Western European leaders (presidents, prime-ministers, diplomats, EU representatives)
5 = Central European leaders (presidents, prime-ministers, other officials/diplomats –including former president Vaclav Havel)
6 = Russian leaders (president, prime-minister, military officials)
7 = U.S. foreign policy experts/scholars
8 = Romanian representatives (president, prime-minister, military officials/military expert, foreign policy experts; also included here regular people cited as interviewed)
9 = U.S. Senators
0 = Journalist/author's voice

PRAXIS AND LIFE-WORLDS IN THE POST-COMMUNIST CLUJ-NAPOCA

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This paper emphasizes the outcomes of two socio-anthropological researches done in 1999 and 2004 in the Cluj-Napoca city from Transylvania, Romania. We have investigated inhabitants from different areas of the city and also "local experts" from urban field (e.g., local administration representatives, architects, public notaries, lawyers, estate agents etc.). The fieldwork was focused on the housing quality in the post-communist urban environment and on the developmental paths followed by the city in the latest years. The main conclusion is that the Romanian urban environment is passing an aggressive process of counter-urbanization, visible at the macro-level as deregulation, at the mezo-level as the diktat of spatial organization and also at the micro-level (i.e., the household space), where, is manifest/obvious in the aesthetics of the post-communist houses and latent/obscure in the habitudes of the socio-spatial consumers of this period.

Introduction

The socio-economic and political transformations that took place in the Romanian society since the 1989 Revolution are covering institutions, groups, markets (e.g., the capital market, the housing market, the land market etc.), locations (urban, rural, rurban or periurban) etc. The social change has brought us transformations of the attitudes, behaviors, and socio-economic-politico-cultural praxis. Here, I will emphasize some of the processes which, in the past years, have been affecting the urban environment: the *built environment* of the city and the *daily life* of its inhabitants. I should mention here that due to the research restrictions (i.e., I have investigated only the Cluj-Napoca city at two different moments in time: 1999 and 2004), the conclusions of this paper cannot be directly applied to other Romanian cities, although the common knowledge rises the idea of similar development (or regress!) for the urban environment.

The *first research* – "The transformations of the housing market, mobility, and social segregation in the Romanian cities: case study of Cluj-Napoca, Romania" – financed by The German Society for Research (DFG) was done between February and July 1999, as a joint research project between the Sociology Department of "Babeş-Bolyai" University from Cluj-Napoca and the Institute of Geography from University of Göttingen (coordinator Prof. Dr. Hans-Joachim Bürkner). *The second one* – "Housing inequalities in post-socialist cities. Villas' Neighborhoods in Cluj-Napoca" – a grant financed by the Romanian Minister of Education and Research (CNCSIS code 392, topic no. 39,

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contract no. 33374/29.06.2004, coordinator: Senior lecturer Dr. Rudolf Poledna) was carried out between August and September 2004. Both projects had a *quantitative dimension* – approached through sociological surveys based on questionnaires on households, livelihood, sources of income etc. of the city's inhabitants and a *qualitative* one – approached through semi-structured interviews with *respondents* living in different areas of the city (i.e., neighborhoods such as: *Centrum – RC, Gheorgheni – RG1, Grigorescu – RG2, Mănăştur – RM1, Mărăşti – RM2, Zorilor - RZ* etc.) and with *local experts* working in administration, public and private companies, a total of 60 interviews[1].

My focus in this paper will be on the *qualitative dimension* of these research projects.

a) On the general problems with which the city of Cluj-Napoca as a "whole" is confronting today – data resulting from the investigation of *two types* of "experts" that are in a *process of permanent negotiation of the urban development principles*[2]. In the *first category* are placed those who, as a consequence of the positions occupied in the local administration, *could and must elaborate and implement developmental strategies of the municipality*: local councilors, urban service representatives etc. I am referring to all those *plans and policies* regarding the urban local community, which are supposed to establish an integrated development of the city, to ensure a medium and a long-term perspective within which the individual interests of the inhabitants (persons and companies) – divergent for most of them – can be reconciled. As a counterbalance, in the *second category* of experts are located those specialists who, by their profession, must *serve the beneficiaries' interest and facilitate individual strategies*: public notaries, advocates, architects etc. This later category often has an uncomfortable position, as they often need to *work against the public interest* when following their private agendas.
b) On the information provided by the respondents relating to *facts* about their daily life in the city (e.g., socio-cultural identity of the inhabitants, available types of capital, socio-spatial life trajectories, problems and solutions that appear within and without the domestic space etc.), and *perceptions* of it (e.g., views regarding the socio-economic status of the neighbors, the quality of living and of the houses, the motivations of the preferences for certain areas of the city etc.). They are reflections of the inhabitants, differentiated by residential areas where they live, with reference to the physical and social

[1] Please noticed that I will use "« »" as quotation marks for the respondents and the experts accounts.
[2] Our analysis starts from the argument of Mike Savage and Alan Warde (1993, 122): "One approach is to think of the city as a text, in the same way that a novel or a film might be a text. This text has certain authors, is constructed in a particular way by various procedures and techniques, has a series of meanings embedded within it and is subject to forms of reading. Conceiving the urban as text in this way may help in understanding how cities gain their specific meanings".

space of Cluj-Napoca city, and also about the *emergent socio-spatial dynamics*[3].

For "capturing" the grassroots level *shades/overtones* resulting from the in-depth interviews, I have implied Glaser & Strauss' *Grounded Theory* (1967) as *data structuring device* and *objective hermeneutics* ("Methoden der objektiven Hermeneutik", developed by Ulrich Oevermann[4] and his colleagues, *Institut für Sozialisationsforschung und Sozialpsychologie*, Johann Wolfgan Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany) as tool for *comprehending and interpreting the text-materials*. It must be said that social scientists are working with *double-represented social reality sequences* (i.e., with facts, believes, jokes and stereotypes on the one hand and with cultural stories, worldviews etc. on the other; with *manifest and latent structures of the meaning*, Dürrschmidt 2002): generated by the *respondents* but also the *researchers* (due to their theoretical/methodological frameworks "entrapment"), which are *not ended* after the interviews transcription. They are continually retelling stories about the world and knowing that became evident that *theorizing* and not necessarily *making a theory* (Mucchielli – ed., 2002) has to be their goal.

In the objective hermeneutics frame, the meanings are embedded in "structures" and the individuals are only *vehicles* of those meanings. Therefore, "counts less" who and how is saying and very much what the *structure/entity requires* for him/her to say. The objective hermeneutics holds the existence of a social reality beyond the *context created by interview* and this social reality can be brought to light by approaching the "primary-documents" as narrative-texts. A proper knowledge of the social reality, of the possible meanings offered by the life-world, could not be reached without that *go-forth-and-back movement* from facts/narratives to ideas, meant to assure the development of interpretations which go beyond the limits of our given framework. This *motion* is assured by the *ten steps grounded theory process* (*Collect Data, Transcribe Data, Saturate Categories, Abstract Definitions, Theoretical Sampling, Axial Coding, Grounding the Theory, Filling in gaps*, Mckenzie, Powell, & Usher – eds. 1997) which assumes a permanent *construction and reconstruction* of the object of investigation by *swinging between concepts and empirical data*.

From Communism to Post-Communism

The experienciation of the physical and social space is having a time of strong reconfiguration. Its beginning appears to coincide with the start of the transition

[3] One of the first scholars who have used the concept of *emergence* was the philosopher George Henry Lewes in 1875. He, as R. Keith Sawyer (2001, 553-554) has noticed, thought that a distinction between two types of effects, *resultant* and *emergent*, is needed: "An emergent effect is not additive, not predictable from knowledge of its components, and not decomposable into those components. Lewes's classic example was of the formation of molecules from their component atoms; hydrogen and oxygen are the cause, and water is the effect – the properties of water are emergent from the combination of hydrogen and oxygen".

[4] For an overview of Oevermann's work see *http://user.uni-frankfurt.de/~hermeneu/bib_oev.htm*.

period in Romania[5] when the individual expectations related to the social changes that had occurred, have dramatically decreased (Totelecan 2005b). Under the pressure of *inflation* («in each year less and less things I am able to buy… last year more than this year, and with two years ago even more» – *RM2*), *unemployment* («has greatly affected me, at all the levels, it even ruins my health» – *RG2*), but within a *context overwhelmed by freedom* – which, unfortunately, *just a few can afford*, no wonder that *the before time* (i.e., the Communism), when «working less, debating less, even thinking less… but surviving» – *RM1*, become *appealing* for an increasing number of people. Some respondents have motivated "the looking to the past attitude" as follows:

> «In the 90s the level of the life conditions was very high and it was very easy to live… we ate at the restaurant nearly daily and we did not have too many expenses. It wasn't always ok, but everyone had the chance to make business because everything was profitable. Nowadays [in 1999] everything is problematic, *you cannot eat anymore in fancy places or buy clothes as much as you want*» *(RM1)*. «Now, when my daughter asks me if I allow her to go in an excursion with her school… I must think twice before I give her an answer… we have a lot of expenses regarding the costs of the school for the kids (e.g., for writing materials, clothes, books etc.), *often our budget is running out*» *(RM1)*.

The past *daily livelihood security* («I had a secure working place… I knew that I go there, I work and I get paid.» – *RM1*), although within *the lack of purchasing opportunities of desired and needed goods,* is now replaced by *the feeling of insecurity related to tomorrow's means of existence.*

> «I do not say that the former regime was good. Before 1989 was also not ok. At that time everything we brought, we did it in a hidden way[6]. I can not say that we ate worse than now… but I want to emphasize that everything was out of our reach then» *(RM1)*. «The youth, the young people, my daughter, my son, what kind of advantage have they today since they do not know if tomorrow they will go to work or not, if they will have a job or not, if they will be paid or not? For sure, these are not advantages» *(RM1)*.

Paradoxically, in the Romania of the new millennium, every desire can be satisfied, but the necessary resources implied by it have made its *denial the main option* for the majority of Romanian people. In the former time (i.e., the so-called "golden epoch" of Communism), as *RM1* told me, with an average income people had the chance to go out every day for a coffee or a beer and to have a family lunch on weekends. Today he said, after 1989, we have moved from "heaven" to "hell".

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[5] Dorel Abraham and Marilena Gânju (2000, 22-23) have noticed that after 1989, Romania "underwent some significant changes in the political, economic, and social field. During transition, the key-words that describe these changes best appear to be «market economy», «privatization», «democratization». These economic and political processes act on individuals through them, so that it becomes natural to bring about a large range of social effects. […] It becomes more and more obvious that the phenomenon of transition concerns not only the changes in the economic field, but also in the field of institutions and the relationships between them, of behaviors and individual and group attitudes".

[6] The respondent has referred to the fact that the stores had just a few products and the people had to know every store sellers in order to obtain, from behind the desk, the required products.

Post-Communism brought us moral advantages, the hope of a better life, the freedom of thought and action etc.; counterbalanced by an impressive number of *disadvantages* or as some subjects called them: *chaos and disappointing, fear and despair*, which, the ordinary citizen can not face it easily. Although incomplete, I am drawing here a work-in-progress version of these:

1. Job insecurity (jobs themselves are hard to get!) and the failure of private initiatives;
2. Impossibility of financial accumulation of capital;
3. Fall of living standards and of purchasing power;
4. Deterioration of cultural capital (when the monthly income is low and not enough for the regular housing costs, things such as: the acquisition of books, journals and even newspapers or seeing a theater play, an opera and even a movie are issues regularly left out of the family schedule);
5. Dissolution of the primary social relations (after 1989, the increasing feeling of property, has created a lot of disputes between the descendents – brothers and sisters but also within other kin types – of the older generations in their contests for land and houses);
6. Fragmentation of the public interest in correlation with a very weak administration capacity of the local resources (e.g., the former local authorities of Cluj-Napoca city – replaced in 2004 – have considered investing in local symbols as a higher priority than building houses);
7. Lack of prospects and consequently traumas and anxieties.

Macro-structural transformations launched by the Romanian Revolution have influenced urban social life and facilitated *social atomization*. Despite the *emergent opportunity* resulting from the change of the system (e.g., high chances for social and territorial mobility, for capital growth – economic, social, politic and so on –, for the access to resources and information etc.) or to a certain extent because it, have generated many *counter effects*[7], the multiple possibilities of the man to "unwrap himself" into the world were doubled by countless "closing ups" to the other. As an interviewee (architect) remarked: «the man has locked himself in his apartment and outside of it has had no interest in cleaning, reshaping, improving the environment or in establishing way of communications with his neighbors and the enlarged community». The individual home become the absolute expression of the hanging back from a "worthless community", which rather prejudices than improves the individual being. The comfortable perimeter of the dwelling, a domestic space desired to be placed, if is possible, in an environment close to the nature and designed

[7] "The post-communist transition brought with it an increase in urban unemployment, an increase in general poverty, a land restitution process and the need for new adaptive strategies from the part of the transition losers. In this new context urban unemployment acted as a force pushing for former immigrants coming from villages, into the cities. The need to survive was met with lower costs in rural areas, with taxes remaining low and the help of small plots of restituted land. Targeting cities for residence and returning from them to former village residences was the new dominant pattern of survival strategy for large segments of the population.", Dumitru Sandu *et al.*, 2004, 1-2.

according to the owner's personality, makes promising the avoidance of contradictory discussions with the block's (i.e., buildings made in the communist period, with large number of quite small-sized flats) neighbors, reduces the lack of intimacy, keeps the individual away from *intermingling* with the others.

The shift from the block type of residence to the family house has not so much to do with the *never-ending interference* with the others, *less priceless* also in the Post-Communist Romania's rural areas, where it used to be the "backbone" of social bounding[8], but rather with the huge need to escape from the *swarming communist space*. The fact that the socialist system and later the communist one wanted to *homogenize* the housing conditions (which in the end became a quest for uniformity and not for improvement; in the name of the communist egalitarianism so-called "barrack room" type of apartments became present everywhere) has created high distaste for everything that is nearby of the built environment and daily life *standardization*. That was practiced with good will, being related with the *strict control* of the citizens and having nothing to do with the social requirements of housing diversity. The *positive* aspect (if there was such a thing), compared with the up-to-day situation is that there was at the time a normative framework that could *impose* (in the name of the centralist system) minimum living standards – which of course often were not respected: «Today we cannot talk about a coherent urban strategy. Via National Agency for Housing are built flats for young families, which is a good thing, but those are made without taking in consideration a specific urban area where the infrastructure and the facilities are available. The main concern is the needs fulfillment and not having a housing policy which should be implement adequately» (architect).

The need of people to *escape from the restricted spaces* built under Communism, has reached the *boiling level* in the first years of transition (unfinished process yet). Then (and also now), due to the rapid growth of the capital and of the strong desire for *maximum visibility achievement*, the urban and rural environment was *assaulted by ostentatious constructions*. Their style is very much questionable, with doubtful esthetic taste of the beneficiaries and not in the last instance with the lower innovative capacity of the architects – who have spent long time of their carriers as public servants within a system that designed centralist project which were obligatory implemented.

The built environment

In the most expensive real-estate market in the country, namely the Cluj market, where the prices are competing with those in the West, to buy a house is not an option for an average income family. On the other hand, the aspiration for "my

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[8] For an extensive discussion on *social-spatiality*, and *physical-territoriality* (the double dimension of the space), and also on the differences between the household, the neighborhood and the community space see: Silviu G. Totelecan, 2003.

own roof" forced people to search for optimal strategies through which they will achieve this goal. If we take a look at the rhythm of constructions we can conclude that many of them have found such ways. Unfortunately, the house building process is running within a context where urban strategies and regulations are missing. Local urban development has less consideration for *sustainable development*[9] or at least for *coherence*, furthermore, due to the personal economic interests, the specialists who need to stand over its accomplishment, create *development projects adapted to beneficiaries' interests* (often people with high socio-economic and political capital), which shadowed social optimum and promoted the individual one.

It must be mentioned here that the large majority of the local experts, though there are many disputes between them, are well aware of the fact that the urban environment means a certain degree of needs fulfillment regarding its functionality. It became extremely important to leave behind *the anti-urban socio-communist logic* and move further to a comprehensive level of urbanity. The fact that is still functioning a distorted understanding of what urban development means has much to do with macro-structural concerns of Romania's development as a whole. The *lack of internal cohesiveness of the state* and the existence of a *bureaucratic system* far-off the Weberian meaning of the concept, seem to play a central role. Political elites cannot act as *developmental promoters* (Chibber 2002: 951-952) if they will not become independent and autonomous from the local elites and if they will not support the state institutions. The sate, if it wants to promote development, is obliged to have strong internal cohesiveness and follow well-defined collective goals.

Along with the collapse of the communist system and the *apparent retreat* of the state from the social life, its *authority institutions have also collapsed*. The individuals' needs of being their "own masters" make practically inoperable any forms of the former guidance. After the '89 revolution, the enormous pressure generated by the population over the state has restricted those spheres of activities in which it has emitted and actively implemented rules (e.g., *the deregulation* at the beginning of 90s, existing in urbanism and housing policies which have allowed *chaotic development* of the built environment). One of the main outcomes was *the substitution of the state institutions* with the persons that took authority positions within them. This "replacement" has corroded the institutional responsibility itself.

Housing privatization, land restitution[10] etc., events which in the 90s where received with great enthusiasm by almost all social categories, have

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[9] "Sustainable development is defined as the kind that does not compromise the foundations for future development and should be achieved through economic activity that does not impede the regeneration of natural resources as well as through the development of social equity, since inequity is argued to be detrimental for the sound management of natural and human resources by corroding social cohesion and solidarity (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; Houghton and Hunter, 1994, 17–18; Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000, 16–18).", Thomas Maloutas, 2003, 168.

[10] The 61/1990 Law and then the Law 85/92 has regulated the *transfer of the apartments* from the state to the population. By buying those flats, the majority of the population turned from renters into owners. The Law 112/1995 and the Law 10/2001 (also in the real estate regulations) reassigning the house ownership from the

signified not only a *transfer of propriety rights* but also the *discharge of the duties and obligations* of the former owner – the state as a representative of the collective propriety. By reason of *lack of authority coercive forms*, or more accurately due to the lowest implications of them in the public space, the man has practically remained *indifferent to others*, at the issues which are outside of its private space, indifference which, by accumulation, has provoked harmful effects at the societal levels, which now are *claiming a new type of state intervention* – in the post-communist fashion.

Today, after one and a half decade of the "let them do as they want" policy, which has affected the built environment and the life of the people who live within, the resulting consequences are uncountable. The *lobbyists' pressure* (i.e., creators & beneficiaries of the city environment, often without urban visions, which do not have and are not interested of the holistic approaches of the local territory) over the environmental dimension of the city life, in combination with the *lack of determination for law enforcement* from the urban institutions (e.g., Urbanists Association, The Architects Union, of the local administration structures in general) have created many *counter-development effects*. Lately they were perceived even by those who until yesterday where only aware of the personal interests and strategies. They have started now to claim *local authority intervention and a coherent development of the city*, although, no longer than a decade ago, they were completely against such kind of "state-behavior".

The truth is that the above issue is, in fact, targeting *local authority over-implication* in designing and redesigning the city features and not at all its *presumably vague contributions – under-implication*.

> «Political interests define when and if an urban plan is to be accomplished, and of course, the size of the constructible perimeter of the city [...] in 1995 was 4069 ha, in 1996 6470 ha and in 2000 was 8815 ha. Neither the members of the Local Council nor other officials of the local administration did think that such enlargement will create a lot of problems for the municipality (i.e., the urgent need of infrastructure development, problem which even for 1995 situation is not solved). The main concern was to provide the legal framework for all those (with money!) which have started to construct in areas where was not allowed» *(Engineer from the City Hall Urbanism Department).*

Recognizing that could mean implicitly the lobbyists' recognition of the fact that *what was done was done because they wanted to be done*. Such a stance is not at all convenient for them, and this is the reason they are playing a double-faced game: claims for "rule-free situation" – but only for them, and requests for "authoritarian interventionism" – only for the others. The authorities' over-implications have two forms, both extremely dangerous for the Cluj-Napoca's health: *the passive type* or "closing the eye procedure", namely the conversion of the penalties of those who did not respect the urbanism regulations in

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state to the people. The Law 18/1991 has made the reform of the land; by the restitution of the land, an important percentage of the population became land owners. Nowadays the state has 10-15% from its former ownership.

briberies for those who should enforce the laws; *the active type*, i.e., changes of the local urban norms in a way that certain beneficiaries/the local patrons will benefit and the rest of the inhabitants (at least from the neighboring area) will probably have to suffer.

This kind of *local public management – based on interests and not on strategies or projects*, though is responsive at the today dynamics and facilitates the urbanization process of the city, in the end it remains emblematic for what can be called *counter-urbanization*.

> «There is one phenomenon which neither us – County Council nor them – City Council are able to control: those chaotic constructions inside and outside the city. We have our culpability in that, but also responsible is the Law's permission, which gave the chances to build in unacceptable areas..., knowing that if two bricks are already one above the other, nobody will intervene or try to pull down the construction. Consequently, houses are randomly placed in the territory, there are no alignments, systematizations or minimum respected urban conditions. Those who will live in such neighborhoods will have high discomforts... because everybody builds on its place everywhere it wants without taking into consideration the environment outside their propriety» *(county councilor)*.

It is interesting to note, as I have already mentioned, that the former *counter-urbanization promoters and/or beneficiaries* are *lobbying now for the application of the rules*. The increasing number of the buildings nearby their surroundings, done in a "norm-free" context, which is threatening the proximity in a double way: socially and physically, has made them aware of *whom, what and how* to build. Building against the norms, environmentally questionable, has surprisingly achieved a positive effect at the level of social space. There seems to develop a *new form of community reconstruction*, i.e., a process of *rebuilding the community around the members' interests*.

In a double *post-context*: post-communist and post-modern – or to a certain extent *pseudo-modern* (Voicu 2001), the community as *face-to-face interaction type* became challenging, especially in the urban environment more atomized than the rural counterpart. Concepts such as *online/offline community* which suggest the *affiliation/non-affiliation* at the *network society* (Castells 2000) gain more meanings. In a variety of socio-politic and cultural context, *the amplification of the multiple identities and the permanent roles' negotiation* (Wilson & Peterson, 2002, 456) has replaced the face-to-face communities with the *communities of practice*. Though, the community is defining less and less in geographical terms, or according to the spoken languages, or else as belonging to certain social categories (e.g., race, gender, ethnicity etc.) and more and more as *the outcome of social reciprocity and interactive engagement* (Garrett & Baquedano-López, 2002, 347-348) regarding well-defined goals.

Unfortunately, in the area investigated here, the seeds of such community are new and its *intervention* in the urban life came a bit too late. *The mental picture* of Cluj-Napoca city has not so much to do with the urban complex as a whole. There is no consistent or coherent view to actively seek to understand

how various elements contribute to a complex whole. To a certain extent, it is a range of perspectives that coexist and are likely to see cities in quite different and *potentially conflicting ways* (Marvin & May, 2003, 213). Those are the products of the *urban spatial organization diktat* (Ward, 2003, 203-204), the end result of the "space privatization" after the 1989 when the inner city has passage a process of *retailization*.

The city life

The peasants' delocalization in the 70s and the stimulation/pressure put on rural inhabitants to relocate to cities – in the name of socialist industrialization – has brought along practices, habits, belief and various kinds of behaviors rooted in the village culture. This "anti-urban culture" has coexisted with the city's socio-cultural climate – deficient and unclearly hard-set. The *in-betweeness style of life of the inhabitants* (Totelecan 2005a) has affected the generations of children who developed a *hybrid type* of urban dweller. For a large number of them, the daily life is still *imbued with rural practices and enslaved by urban needs*. Here are some examples, synthesized from the interviews:

> «We keep cattle, pigs, sheep, we have milk, cheese, wool... we work the land and we get our foodstuffs from there» *(respondent from Dâmbul Rotund neighborhood)*. «I have a garden in Andrei Mureşanu which provides me with vegetables and fruits; maybe 10-15% of my expenditures are covered in this way» *(RM2)*. I have planted potatoes, carrots, parsley, peas and bean... nearby Sânnicoară» *(RM1)*.
>
> «With clothing is extremely hard, because prices are high. For example, if you want to buy shoes you cannot buy a suit with a month's salary. For that, you need to make savings from one salary to the other and maybe then you will have a chance» *(respondent from Dâmbul Rotund neighborhood)*. «I hope that my daughters will find some boys who already have their own houses... will see that maybe in the next years» *(RM1)*. «Our income is low, my wife is unemployed, and we have small kids... I cannot think of having a seaside or mountain holiday because the costs are too high for us» *(RM1)*.

The city life of those mentioned here is usually spent in an *alienating space* – «each of us are living in our blocks of concrete», *claustrophobic and without personality*. Supplementary, the *mixture of social classes* that are living in the same proximity is deepening the communication gap; it ruins the inter-personal relations and increases the frictions within the neighborhood: «all the time problems exist because it supposes that we are living jointly/communally but in fact everybody is for itself» *(RM2)*. Variations of those issues are present in each neighborhood of Cluj-Napoca. Although the inhabitants speak well about their areas, they often mention other neighborhoods – fragments of the same city – when they want to illustrate negative aspects of the city. Mărăşti was labeled by our respondents as «laborers' neighborhood, congested, polluted, without green space or playgrounds for children, a high agglomeration of apartments surrounded by concrete and noisy streets». In Grigorescu they say,

«it was nice until they (i.e., the communists) started to build blocks around. Now it is a cold neighborhood – heating system being all the time an issue here. Gheorgheni is an ugly area, is darker and its gives a felling of insecurity. Zorilor is placed too high and they always have access problems there».

From the point of view of housing quality, the *gray* appear to be the color which "covers" the city. Day by day, a growing number of people make tremendous efforts to escape the *block type living conditions* and *insulate themselves* within the cozy environment of individual houses. Inheriting a land or buying a land on the long-term family income is the first of the two-step procedure that will make that dream come true. This is at hand for a larger number of persons than the second one, which implies the construction of the house. Selling the flat or acquiring a loan is the usual option, but frequently that it is not enough. Regrettably, the inexistence of a solid financial capital obliged the man to build with low costs, often without specialized building contractors and with daily-workers teams. Minimizing the costs will have an effect on the quality of construction and, on the long run, will in fact increase the total costs (i.e., the beneficiary will need to hire extra-teams for fixing the damages of the former). Noticeable at *macro-level* as deregulation and at *mezo-level* as the diktat of spatial organization, the counter-urbanization is also visible at the *micro-level* (i.e., the household space), where, is *manifest/obvious* in the aesthetics of the post-communist houses *and latent/obscure* in the habitudes of the socio-spatial consumers of this period.

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SOURCES OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN ROMANIA

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This article represents the second part of a complex article of which first part was published in RJS No1-2/ 2004. The whole article is the result of a study undertaken by Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of University of Bucharest (Nov. 2003- Feb. 2004) and it was commissioned by Ministry of Labor, Social Solidarity and Family as a result of the agreement between MoLSSF and European Commission within the common action "Programul Comunitar de Acțiune pentru Combaterea Excluziunii Sociale" approved by European Parliament and European Commission (decision no.50/2002/EG).

In the first part of article, published in RJS No.1-2/ 2004, we reviewed a) the relevant literature, theories and explanations in the field of social exclusion, b) identified and analyzed major sources of social exclusion in Romania and c) analyzed the main types/ forms of social exclusion (from education, health, labor market, social services, housing etc.).

The second part of the article has also three sections analyzing in depth a) the main social groups excluded (children, elderly, homeless, unemployed, delinquents etc.), b) social policies on social inclusion, and finally we have an important section of c) conclusions and recommendations for action.

Since the study was done in the early 2004, Romania has made significant progress in fighting against social exclusion and promoting social inclusion. Such progress was recorded especially in the field of child protection (new legislation and institutional capacity building), but also regarding financial benefits and development of social services for vulnerable groups (elderly, domestic violence, children in institution at age of 18 etc.; child allowance, maternity leave etc.) social and economic measures for unemployed people and so on. The authors intend in the near future to update this study, putting more accents this time on the policies for social inclusion in the light of Romania's accession to EU structures.

Excluded Groups/ Social Segments

Currently, there exist in Romania a series of specific social groups that are at an accentuated risk from becoming excluded from various spheres of social, economic and political life, such as: children, the elderly, the unemployed, single parent families, the homeless, youngsters leaving institutions at the age of 18, children's institutions, the victims of delinquency, persons with disabilities etc. Such groups benefit from no comprehensive programmes that could protect them adequately against social exclusion. If in developed Western nations, unemployment – because of its consequences – is considered to be the gravest form of social exclusion – that pre-disposes, by association, to other types of

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exclusion – in Romania, there are even more specific forms of exclusion that presuppose concrete answers given by specialised services. The absence of ID papers for a significant number of citizens (especially from the Roma ethnic group) constitutes a severe form of social exclusion in as it excluded these people from the formal statute of citizenship and its associated rights and benefits they cannot therefore exercise, such as: Child Benefit, the Guaranteed Minimum Wage, free education, free health services for children and other disadvantaged groups, voting rights etc.

Children in foster families and institutions

Children represent one of the population segments most affected by poverty and social exclusion during the transition period. According to statistical data (CASPIS, 2002), by 2001, the percentage of impoverished children whose ages vary between 0-15 was 34,4%, whereas of the total number of poverty stricken people, they represented 22,6%. Hence, children are but one of the categories most affected by poverty. Moreover, approximately 8,3% (362.000) of the total number of children whose age varies between 0-15 live in absolute poverty.

Despite the significant successes registered lately, during these past years, *abandoned children had continued to represent the transition's problem that simply will not go away as support procedures were found wanting.*

After 1989, the large number of abandoned children who ended up in institutions followed a high birth rate pattern characteristic of extreme poverty-stricken families despite the overall trend of falling numbers of newly born babies.

- in public placement centres
- in private placement centres

Table 19. The situation of children who were outside their natural families, in placement or foster care

		30.11.2003		*31.12.2001*	
The total number of children in foster families or institutions		**83.811**	**100,0%**	**87.518**	**100,0%**
of which,	**children protected in foster families**	**45,965**	**54,8%**	**37.553**	**57,1%**
	- with maternal assistants hired by specialised public services	12,657	15,1%		
	- -with maternal assistants hired by authorised private organisations	544	0,7%		
	- with up to and including 4th degree relatives	25,817	30,8%		
	- with other families/persons	5,669	6,8%		
	- entrusted with a view to adoption*)	1,278	1,5%		

	Children protected in institutions	**37,846**	**45,2%**	**49.965**	**42,9%**
	- in public placement centres	32,171	38,4%		
	- in private placement centres	5,675	6,8%		

Source: ANPCA

Despite efforts made via various programmes to prevent children being abandoned in maternity or, subsequent to mothers' leaving the maternity, in the family, the number of children abandoned by their parents and entrusted to the social protection system presented until not so long ago a slight tendency to rise – both in absolute terms (i.e. as a total number of abandoned children) as well as in relative terms (i.e. as a percentage of newly born babies).

The reformation of the child protection system, initiated in 2001, led to a promising decrease in the number of children entrusted to foster families and/or institutions and, most importantly, to a significant drop (of over 12.000) in the number of children being protected in institutions (Table 19).

Social support for socially disorganised, impoverished families – the greatest producers of social abandonment – must be continuously and significantly improved especially as regards the unwanted pregnancy component.

An important social inclusion and integration component concerns the increase in the population's capacity – in particular, those disadvantaged sections of the population – vis-à-vis family planning so to avoid unwanted pregnancies as much as create a specific support system that would increase the degree of responsibility when deciding to have children. One of the factors leading to the abandonment of children is the absence of family planning and the failure to use contraceptives – not simply because of a lack of information but also due to the faulty distribution of free contraceptives.

The high-risk (of unwanted pregnancy) segments are still relatively small though the lack of policies designed to prevent unwanted pregnancies does nothing but feed the institutional/alternative services system with abandoned children. Moreover, increasing access to family planning is vital for the development of family planning counselling services so that there is a higher degree of parents' responsibility towards the act of procreation.

During the last year, financial social protection measures that will have positive effects for easing the plight of impoverished families with children have been assumed. For instance, the introduction of special allowances for single parent families and families with many children are but two of a number of telling examples. There are already situations when consensual couples with children – from the Roma community – requested the issuing of birth certificates for their children in order that their children could benefit from the latest legal provisions.

In the past, as much as during the initial phase of the transition, until about 1997-8, the vast majority of abandoned children were placed in institutions. The principal causes for institutionalisation[1] relate to:

- the family's precarious material situation: living conditions (precarious if not absent), insufficient earnings to cover the family needs;
- parent's reduced level of education (that limits their access on the labour market, well paid job positions as much as the perception of the future) constitute factors that have led to children being institutionalised;
- a numerous family;
- a disorganised family;
- the parents' state of health;
- the child's state of health;
- a combination of the above i.e. disorganised family, lack of resources etc.

A relative lack of qualified professionals in the child protection area added to this situation. Though the number of public institutions' employees that deal with children's problems is significant, *the vast majority of them have no proper qualifications for this type of job*. In 2003, in the National Authority for the Child Protection and its Regional Centres, the human resource component was as follows:

Table 20. The personnel hired in child protection services (SPSPC)

		31 March 2002		30 Sept 2003	
Total		35.138	**100,0%**	**36,843.2 5**	**100,0%**
of which,	SPSPC's own staff	3.372	9,6%	4.944	13,4%
	placement centres	22.954	65,3%	17.870	48,5%
	Professional maternal assistants	7.436	21,2%	10.311	28,0%
	other services	1.378	3,9%	3.7120	10,1%

Source: ANPCA

In 2002, of these numbers, only a small proportion were *professional social assistants* (2%), sociologists (0,2%), psychologists and/or pedagogues (1,4%) yet, there were *40% high school graduates and 33% general school – primary and secondary cycle – graduates*.

The entire social assistance system is confronted by a severe shortage of qualified personnel. In rural areas, of the 1355 communes that have staff dealing exclusively with social assistance duties, 124 communes (4,61%) have social assistants with specialist higher education background of which, more than half are in just two counties: Valcea (25) and Vrancea (39). In 882 communes (32,83%) the local council's secretary general fulfils social assistance duties

[1] Identified as a result of research undertaken by UNICEF and the Social Assistance Faculty, in the autumn of 2002.

whereas in another 444 communes (16,53%) it is the marriage ceremony official, the librarian, the agronomist engineer or, the cashier that plays the role of social assistant.

Despite the fact that social assistance specialist education has been made available to students after 1989 and, since 1995, the first generations of professional social assistance have graduated from University, these graduates remain insufficiently absorbed by the labour market (because of the institutional system's inertia that is still employing the kind of people mentioned above). Few of them work in specialist public institutions as some eventually found jobs in the non-governmental sector whereas others remain unable to practice their profession because of a lack of job opportunities which makes them abandon their chosen profession shortly after graduation.

Supporting the normal development of children has been neglected for long period of time. In this area, social support is efficient only in certain components whereas in others it is found wanting. Children's inclusion in pre-school education remains far from being satisfactory. Though official statistics show that the school incorporates the quasi-majority of children, there are yet an unacceptably high number of non-enrolments in education, primary cycle abandonment occasionally as well as secondary school abandonment more often that just occasionally.

In the social support for children there is still a degree of imbalance. If children from institutions or family placements were offered an important degree of care and resources, the same thing cannot be said about children in high risk situations i.e. families who are in extreme poverty and going through an acute state of disintegration despite an increase in the current financial support offered. There are still high-risk segments of the children's population for which there are not enough developed mechanisms of support and protection:

- Children affected by the extreme poverty of their families; this is the case, for example, of families that are without any shelter or of those who, despite having a shelter, their living conditions are particularly harsh; for families such as these, the financial help offered is insufficient.
- Children gravely and systematically neglected by their parents (including street children, of whom some do have a family).
- Children exploited economically – especially via their being made to beg or perform physically exhausting work; though the number of cases such as these remains limited, the category becomes important due to the gravity of their plight and the likelihood of their being excluded from a normal life in the future.

The financial support for families with children has had an uneven, contradictory and incoherent course during the transition period. During the first ten years of transition, with few exceptions, there was very little focus on

families with many children. It was only after the year 2000 that a series of laws were drafted and a number of programmes focusing on offering children complex support were developed though this was not enough either. Although, at this particular moment in time, single parent family support and support for families with many children witness a different type of approach, what is needed is a continuous evaluation of these families and a massive development of services that are targeting these social segments in order that one of the most important exclusion sources is eradicated.

Kindergartens have short programme and fail to meet the parent's current needs. The problem of a child with "the house keys round his neck" is inherited from the time of the socialist regime and has yet to be resolved. What is most needed concerns the development and the implementation of a programme that is accessible to the vast majority of families and meets their needs. Such a programme that could include homework preparation at school, outside the normal class hours, could be extended to the primary cycle (especially in rural areas, where parent's involvement in their children's education is marginal).

The protection, care and the education of the child from birth until the age of seven. The National Strategy for the Development of Human Resources

The Strategy was outlined in 2002, following co-operation from a number of relevant ministries, international organisation's representatives in Romania, higher education institutions and research institutes. A diagnosis of the resource system involved in caring and educating a child from birth until the age of seven and stating its objectives is done by components: psycho-pedagogical, social, sanitary and community components. The objectives are projected in different frames of time some being considered to have permanent relevance while others being conceived for a ten-year duration period – mostly pertaining to the perceivable horizon of governance for the current Government.

The vocational education segment had its severest downturn as most youths fail to obtain a viable profession upon completing their school studies. In order that social inclusion is aptly promoted there is a need to embark on a programme: *"A profession/qualification upon completing schooling"*. As regards the professional formation process' content, it is essential to prevail over Ceausescu's megalomaniac vision of industrial schooling, much as we ought to learn from the mistakes of the first post-Revolutionary years, and turn it into a school for economic prosperity and social cohesion, according to the current economic and social changes undergone.

Community activities for children/adolescents/youngsters have been chronically neglected. There is an urgent need for activities/programmes that include active life skills, the formation of youth for normal integration in the community as well as given an option to opt for fundamental values relating to the issue of social inclusion thus, preventing noxious forms of association for youngsters that may lead to their social exclusion.

Stimulating initiatives such as rehabilitating community centres in rural areas or, building sports halls in urban ones represents but a promising start.

Demographic processes and social inclusion

Romania is confronted with a sharp decline in its population's birth rate that is having negative effects on its current and its long-term development. Two major aspects though must be taken into consideration:

a) Though fertility has decreased, because of an inadequately developed children and family support system, an irrecoverably high loss of children through insufficient schooling and personal development – that draws them into social exclusion mechanisms such as delinquency, drug abuse etc. – is taking place.
b) It is becoming clearer by the day that Romania needs to accentuate its policies on socially supporting families with children while being demographically friendly also.

The "Street Children"

The "Street Children" group, though restricted in terms of actual numbers is at the highest risk of social exclusion on manifold aspects. For many of these children who have, for years, been living on streets, total social recovery chances are slight. In fact, we could go as far as to say that for the vast majority of them there is not a glimmer of hope of their recovery for society despite programmes destined to their removal from the streets on which they live.

The factors that have generated this situation have been pointed out in numerous reports and various strategies. The main sources generating this occurrence remain poverty, the weak protection of families with (many) children and social disorder. As it is mentioned in the PNAinc, *despite various programmes undertaken by various non-governmental organisations, on the basis of an inhibited reaction of response on the part of the public authorities, the numbers of "Street Children" shows no sign of abating*. This fact can lead us to the conclusion that the approach on the matter is incorrect and that a series of programmes are mostly conceived rather haphazardly, they consume plenty of resources (especially external financing) and fail to produce the efficiency that was hoped for. In 1998, in a catalogue of the Romanian NGOs, approximately

1000 NGOs declared that their sphere/object of activity/assistance includes the Street Children. Yet, according to various estimates, the number of such children in Romania does not excede 3500 whereas the number of those effectively living on the street is approximately 1000.

The sustained efforts made to absorb the "Street Children" phenomenon proved to have little efficiency due to the fractional approach to the problem: each one of these programmes addressed only one of the many problems children were facing much as the limited number of individual cases was. Thus, it is *an urgent task to promote a global and decisive approach to the matter that will eradicate once and for all the "Street Children" phenomenon* rather than alleviate the situation of children living on streets by solving a limited number of individual cases only to be replaced by others, shortly afterwards.

The current data available leads us to the conclusion that the *"Street Children" phenomenon has not reached proportions that have spun out of control. The problems that have led to its perpetuation* refer to:

- The lack of a coherent and efficient strategy (not that there was a lack of them yet, they were mostly unrealistic, utopian, naïve and demagogical.
- The lack of an identification and monitoring system for all the "street children" cases.
- The lack of infrastructure, of friendly institutions and of specialised services that are adequate to different situations (picking "street children" up from the street, putting a diagnostic to the case and "transiting" it to a family or institutional environment).
- The lack of a specialised institution and that of accrediting NGOs and the rest of the institutions involved in the protection of "street children" as well as co-ordinating projects and resources in the area. Thus, the multiplicity of interventions could be avoided, overlaying programmes for the same case (usually, the "easiest" ones) and a complete absence of intervention in others (the most "difficult" ones)

What is the Street Children's Profile?

In a research done in 2000 on a sample of 84 Bucharest Street Children the following features were noticed:

1. They have problems concerning their natural family:
   - Unknown mother –6%, unknown father –19%
   - They have no mother (unknown to them or deceased) –23%
   - Parents are not legally married (parents unknown, divorced or live in a consensual relationship) - 49%
2. Their ethnic background:
   - Romanians - 79,8%
   - Roma 20,2% (compared to a percentage of 4% -6%of the entire population)
3. They have problems concerning their ID papers:
   - No birth certificate – 15,5%

- No ID papers– 41% from those over the age of 14

4. They have behavioural problems:
   - They smoke – 60%
   - Take drugs –19%
   - Consume alcohol– 17%
   - Have a (judicial) record – 15,5%
5. They are in care of 2 or more foundations – 49%

Data from the UNICEF report (2000) mentioned earlier reveals that 32% of Street Children have no ID papers, almost 80% of them beg, 16% wash cars and 14% steal.

Youngsters leaving institutions by the age of 18

One the severest problems encountered is that of *18 year olds who must leave such institutions designed for protection*. Their number is estimated to be approximately 5000 per year. For the vast majority of them, there is no institutional alternative as many of them any family or relatives to speak of that could give them shelter. Many institutions are therefore reluctant to enforce this legal provision and continue to give them shelter even after they turn 18, as they cannot throw them in the street once that happens. Often, they cannot practice any profession as they have never had one and, worse still, they have a severe socialisation deficit in that they do not know how to relate to people, take decisions and lead a normal, independent life as they never had a chance to learn that in the encampment style institutions where they spent their childhood. Consequently, vis-à-vis social inclusion, this sector needs special efforts in that there is the simultaneous problem of finding accommodation, a work place as well as learning to build various social and inter-personal relationships that are oh so different from their earlier experience.

The National Authority for the Protection of the Child considered the only solution for youngsters leaving such institutions to be one that decentralises the problem hence, responsibilities. The involvement of the local community, however positive it may be, cannot resolve this whole issue. An institutional framework is needed to enhance the local solution's success rate and encourage more local initiatives in this area. Young Persons community placement centres are also needed for temporary shelter for those who turned 18 and do not yet have an independent solution as regards the way their life is going to go.

Starting from the number of youngsters that have no immediate housing solutions i.e. survive after coming of age and having to exit the institution that was the only home they have ever known, and after another average period of 3-5 years of a "stay of execution" – in which they are granted support (mainly in the shape of housing) – the end result is a need for approximately 10.000 housing places in support centres, nation-wide i.e. between one hundred and

four hundred places in each county according to the population number and the severity of this phenomenon.

It is essential that an adequate legal framework is created so that it prepares the social and economic mechanisms background enabling – in a 'natural' way, and via specific labour market mechanism – institution-exiting 18-year old youngsters to integrate socially. The process of preparing youngsters to enter the labour market must be started well before the cut off date for their departure is nearing i.e. from about their reaching an age of 14-16 and not upon their coming of age when turning 18.

It is recommendable that legislative initiatives easing such a category's employment (after turning 16) in jobs with a reduced number of hours based on an obligation to go to school, too (as employers could benefit from tax allowances or even have their wages partly paid by the state). Research data demonstrated how beneficial such pilot projects were – as employment from the tender age of 14 helps not only to learn the tricks of a trade but also, to create a bond of trust between employer and employee before he comes of age, when turning 18.

The elderly

Though the transition managed to ensure a high degree of pensioner inclusion through the system of pensions, it is nonetheless a fact that pensions degraded faster than wages, notwithstanding the fact that the social services for the elderly were severely neglected (please refer to Tables 5 and 6). Poverty and the isolation of many, notwithstanding the lengthy absence of community services, led to the diffuse process of social exclusion and segregation becoming considerably more focused as time went on.

As regards support for the elderly who face difficulties (i.e. beyond natural ones), there are an extremely limited number of institutions attempting to ensure a decent standard of living for them. Moreover, the system of domiciled support services is in its infancy.

Despite the Law number 17/2000 concerning the development of community services for the elderly being promoted, the services for this category of people are yet under-developed. For instance, in the Sibiu County, in the year 2000, only 1443 persons (2% of a total number of 73198 persons) benefited from community care services. By the year 2002, the number of beneficiaries rose very little bringing the total number of beneficiaries to 1927 persons (2,7% of the elderly population) against a background of a reduction in the elderly population total, to 70933 persons.

Data at 2001 level (CASPIS, 2002) show that 25,4% (approximately 244.000) of the total number of persons over the age of 65 that live alone, live in poverty. Many of the poor from this category are, in fact, the state's social

insurance system pensioners. The poverty of some of them owes to some extent to the inequities inherent in the pensions' system in establishing the pension's quantum (in the same conditions of contributions paid and respective length of service) and the exact time when they retired into pension. Thus, the generations of pensioners that retired before 1998 have been grossly disadvantaged by comparison to those that have retired after.

There is a vicious effect in that, too. Pensioners' earnings erosion led to an increase in their inability to cover basic food and medical care expenses, which, in turn, led to their health deteriorating and, to close the loop, a situation which led to their increasing dependency on the medical care services. There have yet to be developed programmes that prepare people for retirement as well as identify the option available for maintaining an active life-style that would enable the elderly to have a significant degree of social participation.

A large proportion of the elderly population does not have at its disposal sufficient means to lead to decent life, to participate actively in the society's cultural and social life, to benefit from the social services care available to them and, ultimately, to afford the freedom to decide on matters concerning their very own life. Yet, housing, health and food expenditures is what governs the life of the urban, elderly population while other types of expenses, such as cultural expenses for instance, are nothing but residual.

Persons with disabilities

In spite of the recent measures promoted nation-wide to inspire social inclusion, handicapped persons continue to be a group that is liable to be socially excluded. The types of services developed for this category of people – both residential and community ones – are yet in a phase of developmental as well as financial infancy. Partly, the problems confronting this group of people – also identified by PNAinc – still persist:

- Systematic community services that could come to the aid of non-institutionalised, handicapped persons are limited both in number and type. In every county, the number of day-care centres offering handicapped persons therapy and social integration programmes is very small and they are in most cases located in the County Capital cities unlike residential institutions that are placed mostly in rural areas.
- The services concerning pay and contracting of nurses/personal assistants for handicapped persons are inadequate.
- The lack of generalist social services' capacity concurs to an inability to adapt to handicapped person's specific needs.
- The lack of job opportunities for handicapped persons makes them, irrespective of their degree of handicap, dependant on passive support and encouragement strategies the result of which is but rapid impoverishment.

- The inequity of access to essential social services compared to the rest of individuals impoverishes handicapped persons hence it makes them disadvantaged financially too, which does nothing but increase the poverty risk they face.
- The inequity of accessing services/social protection benefits due to the physical distance separating their residence from the County Capital City.

The problems facing residential institutions for handicapped persons concern, primarily, their recuperating capacity, at least partially i.e. increase the capacity of those assisted to integrate naturally in a social and family environment via assuring professional services that are at least of an acceptable quality.

Table 21. The number of persons with handicap that are institutionalised in terms of population percentage, 1996-2000

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2003
Children	3955	3909	3493	3186	1204	--
Adults	16622	17178	17608	18478	18343	--
Total	20577	21087	21101	21664	19547	**19965**
% of the total population	0,09	0,09	0,09	0,10	0,09	0,09
% of the total handicapped persons	4,44	5,16	5,12	5,28	4,86	4,81

Source: SSPH
Note: Since 2000, children with handicap are included în the child protection

La sfârşitul anului 2003 se înregistra un număr de 414.620 persoane cu dizabilități (1,91% din totalul populației), din care 19.965 (4,81%) trăiau în mediu rezidențial.
At the end of 2003 the total number of people with various disabilities was 414620 (1,91% in total population), from which 19.965 (4,81%) were in residential care.

One of the positive measures relating to stimulating the social inclusion of handicapped persons' is addressed by the Law number 76/2002 concerning the unemployment insurance system, which motivates workforce occupation. The provision stipulated at paragraph 2 of articles 80 and 85 is in fact an incentive for employers to hire handicapped persons in that it:
- Offers to employers hiring handicapped persons a monthly sum representing 1,5 times the national gross minimum monthly wage, for a period of 12 months;
- Offers employers with fewer than 100 employees that hire a handicapped person for an unlimited period of time, a monthly sum representing a yearly

national gross minimum wage on condition that the contract with the handicapped person is not terminated earlier than a period of two years.

This last measure adds to a regulation stipulated at article 42 of the Emergency Ordinance number 102/1999 which sets the economic agents' (with fewer than 100 employees) obligation to hire a percentage of at least 4% of its workforce from among people with handicap. In case this obligation is not met by the employer, he/she has to pay towards the Social Solidarity Fund a sum equal to a gross minimum wage for each position that ought to have been filled by a handicapped person (article 43).

2003-2006". Acest plan vizează:

- reintegrarea în comunitate a persoanelor cu handicap care trăiesc acum în instituții rezidențiale coordonate de ANPH sau care trăiesc în familie fără un suport corespunzător;
- promovarea unei participări active a persoanelor cu handicap în societate la toate nivelurile şi în toate sferele vieții cotidiene;
- crearea unui sistem de servicii comunitare care să permită persoanelor cu handicap să îşi trăiască propria viață cât mai independent posibil, asistate de o rețea de suport formată din oameni calificați şi de o legislație adecvată.

Other positive measures adopted in this area:

- Facile access in public buildings, buses, public cabin-phones, side-walks and parkings (L. 519/ 2002) – measures already started (from 77% open access in public buildings, to 4,3% access in public parking places).
- Implementation of quality standards in the field of handicapped people according with the Order No. 22/2003 of State Secretary of National Agency for People with Handicap.

Another important step in improvement of situation of people with handicap is represented by the new "National Strategy regarding special protection and social integration of people with handicap" (GD 1215/2002) – as a start point for "National Action Plan for the 2003-2006 interval". This plan is concerned with:

- reintegration into community of people with disabilities which live in present in residential care centres or in their families but without adequate support
- encouragement of handicapped people to take part actively in the normal life of society at all levels and in al areas of daily life;
- set up a system of community social services which shall offer to handicapped people the opportunity of living as independent as possible, and assisted by a support network of professionals and adequate legislative framework.

Delinquents

The increase in delinquency after 1989 has yet to be countered by the existence of certain fundamental institutions, such as: juvenile tribunals, a framework for juvenile offenders' social recuperation and re-insertion, a framework for all delinquents that have served time to be re-inserted into society as well as offering social support to the victims of crime.

Juvenile delinquency is on the rise. For instance, the number of youths (18-29) that have committed crimes (and have been under investigation) rose between 1993 and 2000 by approximately 70% (from a total number of 55625 case in 1993 to 93634 in 2000).[2]

The classical solution of punishments that deprive people of their freedom is most often one that far from recuperating the individual for society it actually serves to lose him/her for good. The recent introduction of the probation system and of alternative types of punishment is an important step towards a quicker social re-integration of delinquents who have committed only minor offences in order that their social segregation and exclusion is avoided thus, helping to ease the normalisation of relationships between the ex-delinquent and the community.

The Roma minority

The social exclusion of the Roma population's specificity resides in the very existence of certain exclusion sources that do not exist as an underlying trend in the Romanian society. Whelan B.J. and Whelan C.T. (1995) argue that people's segregation occur in the labour market primarily, as a "causal, pre-disposing factor" for social exclusion as it triggers a chain reaction of exclusion.

What can be noted about the Roma population in Romania is that *there is no single factor generating exclusion but several of them*. If we analyse their nature we notice that, with the *exception of their presence on the labour market* – that could well be determined by certain conditions present in the local community or nation-wide – *the causal factors have a determination that is preponderantly individual* and, to a certain extent cultural ("communautaire" in the sense of a cultural "acqui") hence, self-exclusion to a certain degree. Here are some worrying statistics:

[2] The Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs, the General Police Inspectorate

Table 22. Causal/pre-disposing factors for social exclusion at the Roma population

Causal/pre-disposing factors		the proportion of people excluded
Do not have any ID papers		3,1% of the total Roma population
Have no ID though they are over 14 (and have Birth Certificate)		5,7% of the total number of 14 year olds
Have never gone to school		24,4% of those over the age of 10 (that never go to school)
Not legally married		39,4% of those married
Do not have a job	Have not worked (even occasionally in 1997 and 1998	52% of over 14 yo, do not go to school any more and have answered the question (28% of those who have not given an answer to the question)
	Have not worked with worker's passport in 1997 or 1998	84% of over 14 yo, do not go to school any more and have answered the question (28% of those who have not given an answer to the question)

Source: the IRQL(ICCV) database

Thus, it can be noticed what huge proportions such primary, fundamental exclusion forms take. In practical terms, to speak of poverty/reduced standard of living for people who, officially, do not even exist (because they have no ID papers as such) is pointless; they are completely excluded from the rights invested upon all individuals by the quality of being a citizen: social assistance, social insurance, the right to political participation, employment in a legally occupied job position etc.

The social exclusion of the Roma minority

Types of exclusion	Forms of exclusion	Sources/causes for exclusion	Exclusion consequences (derived exclusion/of a consequential type)
A. from the democratic and legal system	- excluded from the formal statute of citizens (do not have any ID papers)	- self-exclusion (disinterest as to the formal norms) - lack of specific measures dealing with this social problem.	- cannot vote, cannot profit from any of the social benefits available in the social protection system (please refer to type C)
	- have no property deeds for the house/land	- self-exclusion	- cannot sell or leave inheritance the house/land respectively
	- do not work legally (with contracts/workers' passport)	- is mainly a type of structural exclusion, a model encouraged by the system.	- do not benefit from social insurance: health, unemployment, pension work accidents etc.
B. from the labour market	- do not have a job	- is a type of exclusion pertaining to both the system as well as the individual and the local community	Practically, they follow from a series of other exclusions generated by a scarcity of earnings.

	- cannot practice/do not have a modern profession that is sought after on the labour market	- self-exclusion	Small chances of finding a job
C. from the welfare state (i.e. in terms of social protection)	- do not benefit from free education, child benefit, social insurance	- largely, a consequence of the first two types of social exclusion (A & B) yet, often a personal option too.	- strong material deprivation
	- do not benefit from social support though they fulfil the criteria)	- no resources in the community - discriminatory attitudes	- material deprivation
	- do not benefit from dinners at the social support canteen	- no such institution in the community - have not applied	- material deprivation
D. from the family and community system	- have no partner support: not married (even without Marriage Certificate) are divorced, widowed or, abandoned	- individual option for the unmarried / divorced; widowers/ abandoned not supported enough by the system	- interpersonal integration deficit - material deprivation
	-get no support/help from neighbours, relatives, friends when they need it	- is a consequence of relationships established by the individual (requires certain reciprocity) yet, the lack of community resources may also be the cause	- interpersonal integration deficit - material deprivation

The financial exclusion of the Roma population. The Roma are by far the most impoverished social category in Romania: three quarters live in poverty whereas more than half live in conditions of extreme poverty. The disproportion between the rate of extreme poverty registered by the Roma population vis-à-vis the rest of the population is more important that the rate of poverty itself.

Table 23. The rate of poverty based on ethnicity (2001)

	The rate of extreme poverty	The rate of poverty
Romanian	9,3	24,4
Hungarian	6,4	19,9
Roma	52,2	75,1
German	1,8	7,4
Other	11,3	31,7

Source: CASPIS's calculations (2003) based on the NSI's data referring to the year 2001

The population's principal earning sources are based on occasional activities and children's state allowance:

Table 24. The contribution made by different sources of income to the budget of the Roma population (1998) – decila 1 compared with decila 5 (1998)

	Decila 1	Decila 5
Children's allowance	63,1	26,4
Pensions	0,0	9,2
Unemployment Benefits	0,3	4,3
Salaries	0,0	6,2
Occasional and personal activities	31,8	46,6

Source: The IRQL (ICCV) database "Roma 1998".

Persons without any ID papers

For a number of reasons, in 1998, in Romania, there were approximately fifty thousand persons with no identity papers, the overwhelming majority of whom where Roma ethnic. This number remains significantly high, as programmes supporting people to obtain identity papers were limited to only a few counties/areas an included only a relatively small number of people (under 10.000 according to certain estimates).

An analysis based on categories of age reveals a *high percentage of people without identity papers among children* compared to similar adults. The detailed age-analysis reveals a relatively equal percentage among various under-14 age groups. The only plausible explanation appears to be a fall in the State's authority (and authoritarianism, as a method) after 1989 as much as the rise in costs for procuring identity papers for the Roma ethnic. The introduction of the allowance for families with many children was a factor that determined a rise in the number of requests for identity papers.

Table 25. The situation of persons that have no Birth Certificates in the Roma population

Age category	% without Birth Certificates
0-13 years	4,8
14-25	1,8
26-45	1,3
46-65	1,4
over 65	1,3
Total	3,1

Source: the IRQL (ICCV) database "Roma 1998".

Of the ***causes*** mentioned in various researches, the most frequent cause is related to the *certain maternity hospitals' refusal to provide mothers that have no identity papers with a Birth Certificate for their newly born baby.* Subsequently, it is most complicated to obtain a Birth Certificate without this maternity hospital receipt.

Another frequent cause is the (not legally married) mother's wish to give the child the name of its father who's absent (away for work or, imprisoned). Subsequently, due to the complicated undertaking in obtaining a Birth Certificate mentioned before, some mothers simply gives up and leaves the baby without identity papers.

A third cause refers to the compulsory requirement of *picking up the Certificate from the place where the child was born*. If the child was born at some distance from home, it may be too expensive for families to travel there to get the Certificate.

Another element that makes the procedure ever more cumbersome is the exaggerated bureaucracy that needs to be overcome to obtain a Birth Certificate, after the baby is one year old. Even if, during these last years, projects destined for identity paper-less Roma population – such as was the case in Galati, for instance, when thousands Roma ethnic individuals were supported to obtain a legal identity – we estimate that the number of persons that are still without a Birth Certificate or any other document vouching for their status as citizens continues to be relatively high (in the region of tens of thousands of such people).

Consequences: **illegally built/occupied dwellings**

The influence of identity papers gone missing on the social status of the Roma people is also important. The need for housing is a basic one for any human being. The status of any particular dwelling as concerns documentation proving its ownership is essential in any democracy governed by the state of law. For the majority of Romania's population, the housing problem is resolved (at least, quantitatively) via private property over a particular dwelling. There is, however, a significant proportion of the population that rents other people's property. At present, renting constitutes generally a disadvantage in that, letting prices are high, on the one hand and, on the other, the lack of medium and long-term security as regards the tenancy contracts – which can be voided by the property changing owners, either through selling or, in the case of nationalised properties, being repossessed by its pre-nationalisation owner. Hence, these are but two of the ways in which one can be deprived of his/hers housing/accommodation. 16,5% of the Roma population rent their accommodation hence, another high risk of exclusion.

Yet, a far more difficult situation is faced by some 21% of the Roma population who either live in a dwelling for which they have no ownership documentation as it was built illegally or, they simply squat. Notwithstanding the legal issues involved here (we are talking here of tens of thousands Roma households!) the social exclusion risk is ever so high as hundreds of thousands people stand to lose their abode if the letter of the law was to be applied rigorously.

Table 26. The Roma's housing situation

Housing situation	*Percentage*		
Rented home with courtyard	6,5%	*Rented*	
Rented apartment	10%	16,5%	*in block of flats:*
Owned flat	11%	*Legal property*	21%
Personal house (the family's) with property deeds	50%	61%	In house: 77,5%
House illegally built without any title deeds to the land	21%	*Illegal property* 21%	
Have not answered	1,5%		

Source: the IRQL(ICCV) database "Roma 1998".

The possible causes for the current situation pertain, in our opinion, to the relatively recent political stabilisation and, to a large degree, to a certain degree of political pressure exerted by an important part of the Roma population. On the other hand, a high fertility rate coupled with the limited resources of young couples is what drove forward the abusive building of dwellings on communal or, state-owned farmland, for instance. Though complex, the ownership issue must be resolved (with flexibility in finding amiable solutions where the situation allows compromise while insisting on the Roma populations right to property). Otherwise, it will encourage this cowboy style means of acquiring property in perpetuity.

Problems relating to the children's education in Roma communities

In 1992, in their volume "Worrying or Ignoring the Gypsies", Zamfir C. and Zamfir E. noticed that only 51% of the ten-year old Roma children frequented school regularly. Another 14% had interrupted their studies, 16% were frequenting school once in a blue moon whereas 19% had never even bothered to enrol.

Such an alarming situation became slightly better after the state Allowance for children was conditioned on their attending classes and improved further after the introduction of the "Croissant and Milk" programme, in 2002.

The Romas attitude to education remains negative. When it is not compulsory, formal education is largely refused even if it is free as kindergartens, schools, high schools, vocational schools or Universities are. Thus, only 20% of the suitably aged Roma children go to kindergarten. The higher education courses frequenting are worse still: one quarter of the Roma people have never completed at least one class/academic year at primary school and almost half have completed a maximum of four classes, only 5% graduated high school and 0,2% graduated University.

Illiteracy is a primary source of social exclusion. Practically, those 39% illiterate or partly literate Roma ethnic people have minimal chances of participating in the labour market.

The Romas participation on the labour market

Living in relatively recently settled communities (during the 50s, 60s or even later than that) – in practical terms, for no more than one generation or two, at most – many of the Romas remained in a situation similar to that of Western immigrants vis-à-vis their relationship with the rest of the community in which they are the last to have arrived. Often, they are not only short of the most basic means of living but they have a deficit of education and qualifications which forces them to work only as unskilled labour, agricultural labourers, in poorly paid and vulnerable jobs where they are the last to come and the first to go in case of streamlining. Their length of service is often insufficient to entitle them to social insurance benefits, which makes their vulnerability ever more critical.

All the above can be synthesised in a graphic explanation of causal chains that lead to the exclusion of the Roma ethnic population from the labour market as well as explain its share of consequences and the "catch 22" circle of exclusion.

Sources of exclusion from the labour market of the Roma ethnic population



Colour code:
- Red – "external" sources (state/community)
- Green – self-exclusion
- Orange – consequences of the labour market exclusion
- Black – family consequences

Measures for promoting the social inclusion of the Roma ethnic population

The Strategy for improving the situation of the Roma ethnic population (adopted via the Government Decision number 430/2001).

The Romanian Government's 2001 Strategy represents a political undertaking with highly detailed objectives. The document concerns *10 major spheres of action,* beginning with public administration, social security, health, the economy, culture, communication and civic participation. The Strategy contains *ten-year action routes* and a *four-year detailed methods plan*, as well as an *institutional framework* capable of ensuring the Strategy's objectives are well implemented, at local and central level. Moreover, a Monitoring Group for the Implementation of the Strategy was set up of Government and Roma organisations' representatives. As a result of this:

- At central level function a Mixed Committee of Strategy Implementation and Monitoring and other ministerial Commissions for the Roma population;
- At local level, there have been established 41 county offices for the Roma ethnic population and 399 experts in Roma affairs at Town Hall level;
- For 2002, in order that Romas access to health services was improved, The Ministry of Health financed from its .own budget the formation and the subsequent job placement of over 200 sanitary mediators, nation-wide;
- Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs personnel that has committed acts of discrimination against ethnic Romas have been monitored and sanctioned;
- 42 school inspectors for education in the Romani language were named of which, half belong to this ethnic group;
- The Ministry of Education initiated and implemented the programme *"The Disadvantaged Groups, in particular, the Roma ethnic children's Access to Education"* with a budget of 8,33 million Euro (7 million Euro financed by the European Union and 1,33 million Euro financed by the Romanian Government). The Programme will be finalised in 2004 and includes communities from 10 counties where there was support for improving the Roma children's access to education.

SOCIAL POLICIES IN THE SOCIAL INCLUSION AREA

At this particular moment in time, it is vital that *social inclusion* is internalised / included in the system of values/responsibilities/ and action plans of every social institution. This must become, in the shortest time possible, a priority course that is critical to any viable strategy/ comprehensive programmes for promoting social inclusion while preventing and absorbing all forms of social exclusion.

CASPIS and efforts to promote social inclusion via the PNAinc

The manifestation of negative economic and social processes during the transition period led to the apparition of certain social exclusion and segregation phenomena that particularly affect certain social groups. During these last years, a series of studies on poverty were carried out – IRQL (ICCV) 1995, The World Bank 1996, IRQL&NSI&UNDP 1998, IRQL&UNDP 2001, the Government of Romania & CASPIS 2002 – as well as a number of evaluations of certain programmes and social policies that address instances of a process of social exclusion and segregation. As poverty is more of a one-dimensional concept, it is imperatively necessary to have an assorted and manifold approach to the social exclusion phenomenon as an important factor of social disintegration. Beyond the current true magnitude of social exclusion – which needs not only to be gauged at but a reactive type of approach as to how to tackle best the issues relating to this phenomenon – it is most important to recognise the sources for this type of exclusion in order that a preventative approach in the sense of eliminating / diminishing the factors generating it is undertaken.

The most important and comprehensive document in this respect comes in the shape of the Anti-poverty National Plan for Promoting Social Inclusion (PNAinc) drafted by the Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion Commission (CASPIS) and approved by the Romanian Government in July 2002. PNAinc is conceived as an instrument of the social development process with the following functions:

- It is an instrument of the Romanian society's collective conscience that is reflecting on the problems it is currently facing and the avenues for the social construction of an anti-poverty culture and the promotion of an inclusive society.
- To promote an articulated social policy concept that becomes crystallised in a number of fundamental principles.
- It is a global, many-sided action plan as regards the principal sectors of social life (at national, county and local level) for the prevention/absorption of poverty and social exclusion while promoting social inclusion.

- It offers a reference framework for implanting the objective of creating a prosperous and inclusive society throughout its entire public activity sphere.
- It is an instrument for monitoring governmental efforts to prevent/absorb poverty while promoting social inclusion.

Any attempt to diminish social exclusion and eliminate certain forms of it begins from identifying the exclusion sources first as much as it follows with drawing the moral and social objectives underpinning the type of society Romania wishes to become, in the years to come. In attempting to formulate an answer to this very issue, the PNAinc underlines the fact that Romania's central as well as long-term objective is that of

> *"creating a prosperous society that is economically, socially and politically active, underpinned by a high level of collective and individual responsibility, that is socially cohesive and has a high level of opportunities for all of its citizens"*

The Romanian society will shortly have to become a society that is:

- ➢ ***Active***: capable of economic and social development, making the best of opportunities coming its way while dealing efficiently and constructively with the associated risks; continuously developing its capacities to energise the excluded social segments that are at risk of involution and dependency.
- ➢ ***Socially cohesive***: with a high degree of social solidarity that aims to reduce the numbers of those socially excluded and the gravity of the social deprivation afflicting them:
  - Eliminating the sources generating social exclusion and discrimination while promoting strong mechanisms for social inclusion;
  - Ensuring a decent minimum standard of living for everyone as well as guaranteeing access to fundamental social services;
  - Smoothing the economic and social polarities in order that differences remain equitable as well as stimulating rather than generating social conflicts and tensions.
- ➢ Offering ***opportunities for everyone*** – a society wherein each one of its members gets a real chance of active participation in all of its social spheres:
  - Financial – active and profitable participation to economic life;
  - Social and personal – access to the schooling system, medical services, cultural and professional opportunities;
  - Accessing fundamental goods and services – housing, the goods and services needed for a civilised standard of living, social and community environment that is safe and sound, a pollution-free environment.

In a resume of these three characteristics – i.e. *active*, *cohesive* and *offering opportunities for all* – it can be argued that the societal model Romania wants to

build for itself is an *inclusive* one, where those *groups that have been traditionally excluded may find opportunities for normal development.* Hence, the reason for the main objectives of the fight for social development through social inclusion being precisely and clearly defined:

- ***Eradicating the extreme poverty*** *created by the contingencies of life,*
- *Speeding up the* ***absorption of the severe social exclusion*** *and* ***eradicating the extremely difficult social problems*** *with devastating moral impact: institutionalised children, the Street Children, abandoned children, the economically and socially distressed elderly people;*
- ***Initiating the process of gradual absorption of the state of poverty****, which is but a diffuse characteristic of a large percentage of the population.*

The ideology advocating the withdrawal of the state from the challenge of social reconstruction is one of the factors responsible for worsening social exclusion. There is a need for re-building the public system of prevention and social support. Having eliminated centralised bureaucratic intervention, the local authorities' rapid reaction force offers new opportunities for developing local partnerships to prevent and combat social exclusion efficiently and decisively.

CASPIS is attempting to promote a new type of partnership approach to the grand social problems that need to be faced: the "*local initiative*" approach that is complementary to "*multiple-level financing*" i.e. community, county, national budget, international programmes. Local programme's multiple-level financing partnerships represents a fundamental option currently, at a time when the decentralisation process has only just started and community local financial resources are insufficient to develop and implement social development local projects. Hence, current options of increasing financing for projects that can guarantee an efficient return and a more considerate use of the resources available must be assumed urgently as there is ample scope for institutional as well as technical and methodological capacity development.

Further to decentralisation, an increase in the national capacities for strategically designing the most efficient use for the resources available per programme as well as an increase in those capacities to diagnose and monitor social problems is vital.

As the Romanian structures begin to settle after a turbulent transition, new possibilities (that ought to be urgently seized upon) open up to promote programmes for diagnosing and monitoring social exclusion processes as well as evaluating social policies and programmes. Lately, the number of social programmes available has multiplied considerably. Yet, though some of these many programmes have proved their potential worth, the lack of control, evaluation procedures and clear performance criteria apparent have transformed many of them into a source of financial wastage.

Hence the overdue need for putting an end to all this pilot experimentation of programmes that will not lead to enlarged institutional frameworks, applicable nation-wide. The accent must be put on institutional development that is centred on public/community partnerships.

An important avenue in this respect constitutes the increase in the responsibility of the rest of community actors in sustaining and promoting socially inclusive and socially cohesive values that must enable the development of support mechanisms that may, in turn, multiply their social initiatives.

Romania, together with the European Community, must realise that, in the near future, the clouds of further types of exclusion gather on the European horizon. The countries that are in full flight of European integration are beginning to be confronted by the risks of social exclusion despite their efforts to align themselves to European standards. It is essential that Romania, in partnership with other European nations, develops pan-European mechanisms for social inclusion.

The Social Assistance System Reform – fundamental mechanism for the promotion of social inclusion in Romania

The fundamental legislative package that sets the framework for reforming the social assistance system, in Romania is presented in the following table.

Law	Target Groups	Rights/ benefits predicted
1. The Law no. 705/2001 concerning the *Social Assistance National System*	- Families with juvenile children in care - Persons with deficiencies/disabilities - Other vulnerable groups - Families on the cusp of poverty - The elderly	- Social labour conscription in cash or in kind - Family allowance for families with children, vis-à-vis the birth, education children maintenance - Social benefit (in cash or in kind) awarded to persons whose earnings are scarce - Special benefits for persons with deficiencies/disabilities - Social assistance services: a) community, awarded at the beneficiary's place of residence/family/ community b) specialised, awarded at the beneficiary's abode and most often in specialised institutions - social and medical care services
2. The Law no. 116/2002 concerning the Prevention and Combating of Social Segregation	- Youngsters 16-25 y.o. that will be supported by ANOFM with a view to their professional inclusion on the labour market (single youngsters and those with children in maintenance; young families with or without children in maintenance etc.)	- support for young people's integration on the labour market via compensating with up to 75% of a two-year wage package - access to housing: covering entirely

Law	Target Groups	Rights/ benefits predicted
	- 35 (up to and including) y.o. persons who cannot acquire a home without help (youngsters from placement centres; married people – up to and including 35 y.o. –with/without children in maintenance etc.) - persons earning the GMW - children from families earning the GMW that maintain 2 or more school enrolled children – including those who continue their studies in higher education - adults	the bond paid in advance of the commencement of the tenancy or the rent for a period of maximum 3 years from County Council funds - medical assistance access (emergency and curative) for persons earning the GMW - access to education a) schooling bursary (sum indexed to inflation awarded by BS-MEC/ BL) b) adult literacy programmes (literacy scholarship)
3. The Law no. 416/2001 concerning the Guaranteed Minimum Wage	- Different types of families, defined in art. 2 and 3 of the Law who can prove (means tested) that their earnings are below the level stipulated by law - The wives of those doing their military duty that earn nothing or earn less than the GMW (art. 23)	- Ensuring each family earns a GMW through the monthly awarding of sums representing the difference between the family's net earnings and the GMW for the respective type of family - The level of the GMW is monthly indexed via GD - Heating support between November-March - Newly-born babies' allowance awarded to the first four newly-born babies - Other emergency allowances
4. The Law concerning the single- parent families (about to be adopted)	- Children from single-parent families and single parents raising their own children	- financial support for single-parent families

Through the framework law package adopted after 2000 (and followed by respective secondary legislation) in the social assistance area, a number of basic problems pertaining to socially excluded groups have been solved.

The first laws referring to the Guaranteed Minimum Wage, social exclusion, families with lots of children and single-parent families have solved to a large extent the problem of ensuring minimal financial resources for the most impoverished families. Other measures, such as the "Milk and Croissant" Programme, different ways of enticing school participation, measures for the social protection of the Roma ethnic population, strategies to promote workforce occupation had a substantial contribution to covering certain basic needs, augmenting school participation and the disadvantaged groups' labour market participation.

The next step – which is also the most difficult due to the inheritance of a sever social assistance deficit at community level – is crucial for promoting social inclusion in the area of social assistance and refers, in particular, to the implementation of community services for social assistance. Here are some co-ordinates for the reform in the social assistance area, in Romania:

RECOMMENDATIONS

1) The first category of action aims refers to the complete *absorption of serious forms of social exclusion that have resulted from the process of transition:*

- Eradicating the situation of people without identity papers (the majority of whom are Roma ethnic) that have no access to any form of social protection, to any of their rights as citizens; though the percentage of people without identity papers remains insignificant – the number estimated revolves around the 50.000 mark – this remains nevertheless a worrying statistic;
- The drastic reduction of cases in which illiteracy and school abandonment occurs while assuring primary education for all; for those who abandoned school or have never even been enrolled, special literacy programmes must be financed to enable them to acquire the minimal skills needed to read, write and calculate – skills that could then be formalised in a literacy diploma / certificate;
- The drastic reduction and the attempt to eliminate the plight of homeless people of all ages – be they children, adults or, even families – who live in the street; hence, it is essential for the local authorities to facilitate the creation of shelters and emergency accommodation throughout the country;
- Monitoring cases of forced evacuation from dwellings repossessed by their previous owners, identifying and developing housing alternatives for the evacuated families.

2) Action aims for promoting social inclusion in the *educational sphere:*

Support for the excluded yet, gifted people (especially from the rural area).

Introducing a scholarship package, underwritings and other gratuities for outstanding pupils and students designed to reduce their exclusion from medium- and higher education;

- Clothing/school uniform, school stationery (that could be offered "in kind");
- Free tickets (not just subsidised) / monthly passes between home and high school/University;
- Free meals at canteens/lunch tickets;
- Free housing (student accommodation or the equivalent monthly rent)

It remains to be seen to what degree such full bursaries ought to be awarded to every pupil/student who passed the entry examination and whose families have combined earnings of less than the Guaranteed Minimum Wage.

Support for the Roma ethnic children's education:

- Continuing to form and use school mediators in (Roma) communities with high school abandonment;

- Continuing to underwrite places in High Schools and Universities as previous results have been encouraging;
- Roma ethnic children will continue to be granted poverty bursaries designed for people who study in High Schools or, Universities;
- Access to kindergartens must be assured through the establishment of such nursery schools in rural places where there is a majority Roma ethnic population and where there are no such schools – with high school abandonment and rife illiteracy;
- Enrolling in schools children with no identity papers must be accepted via a simple procedure (a declaration from the parents that they have no identity papers) which must be followed by the free issuing of identity papers as a result of the submissions made by the respective school.

Introducing in the School Curriculum of an integrated programme teaching life skills, knowledge about the way in which society functions and is organised including its political system and its forms of social participation: civic education, life education, sexual education, youth communication, the prevention of drug and alcohol consumption etc. Such themes must be included in school programmes at all levels as a result of thorough needs' evaluation.

Such themes as well as many others ought to be included in education programmes for youth and adults from impoverished communities, such as those whose earnings are the GMW or, those undergoing programmes of social re-insertion i.e. alternative punishments/probation where they undertake formation courses/programmes instead of doing the equivalent number of community hours work.

The promotion of inclusive education; the population must be educated to accept in schools children that are either HIV positive, handicapped or from other excluded groups, via the visual means of national campaigning.

3) Eliminating all forms of social exclusion from the *health services sphere:*

As social financial benefits do not allow certain social categories to pay for essential medical services, it is necessary to increase access to fundamental health services for people with insufficient earnings.

Increasing the disadvantaged peoples' access to means of contraception; this could be achieved via the introduction of contraceptives on the free medicines' list – hence, their free distribution to such impoverished couples that are at a high risk of abandoned pregnancies and subsequent abandonment.

The result of the reform was a disparity of access to medical care as territorial medical services were replaced by family doctors – a system that was completely inadequate for the rural population. Hence the need to increase the access to medical services for people in rural areas via the introduction of more substantial financial (or, in kind) incentives that could determine doctors to work in areas that do not have sufficient numbers of doctors.

Increasing accent placed on prevention and treatment during the onset of the illness.

4) Promoting social inclusion in housing:

Massive creation of social dwellings in all counties and cities notwithstanding the provisions of the housing Law being observed vis-à-vis their distribution;ontinuing to support poor families with their heating bills during winter.

Identifying and monitoring maintenance indebted persons and stimulating local authorities to envisage ways of spreading out due payments.

Increasing the impoverished population's access to public utilities' consumption.

Improving the rural population's living conditions through investment in basic infrastructure.

5) Promoting labour market inclusion:

Developing integrated occupational services.

Introducing active measures designed to combat unemployment with the accent being placed on the creation of work places and the subsequent increase in the number of salaried workers. This is likely to lead to a rapid re-balancing act of the proportion between the number of people in work and the number of pensioners.

Special accent placed on the effective creation of job places especially in rural areas where job occupation remains low.

Supporting job places and other activities capable of producing earnings for the rural population as well as in disadvantaged areas in order that territorial exclusion is reduced.

Placing the accent on increasing job occupation in the Roma ethnic population and increasing job opportunities via literacy programmes followed by counselling and training.

Stimulating occupation in the formal economy concurrent to discouraging via the severe sanctioning of those working in the underground economy (in particular, of the employers)

6) Eliminating all forms of social exclusion in the area financial rights and benefits:

Eradicating discrepancies between pensions awarded for the same work conditions, length of service and occupational category which is but a result of retiring into pension at different moments in time.

Promoting more of a level playing field policy vis-à-vis the minimum wage criteria that ought to deter on the one hand a series of unscrupulous employers to pay lesser real wages while on the other, higher real wages that are

not registered accordingly. A fundamental measure would be to set differentiated minimum wages (either on territorial development criteria or, vis-à-vis the type of activity undertaken or, a combination of these and other criteria).

To reduce difficulties of co-financing the GMW by poor local communities, this (the co-financing) must be done by involving all local communities' participation yet, not with a fixed rate/percentage but with variable ones, proportional to the community's level of development.

7) Promoting social inclusion in the area of social assistance service:

Promoting an integrated social assistance system as the current system is still fragmented despite certain positive evolutions.

Diversifying the services offered as the range of social assistance services offered (i.e. counselling, social re-insertion, probation/alternative punishments, peer groups for youngsters and a lot of other services are yet unavailable in Romania).

Re-thinking the legislative and institutional framework for juvenile delinquency: separate tribunals for juveniles, punishments other than imprisonment etc.

The gradual passage from the types of services offered in institutions (however insufficient and sometimes of a reduced quality) to community social assistance services (day care centres, social centres) or, in house / family / at the beneficiary's place of residence.

For the disadvantaged categories (the elderly) for whom the institutionalisation waiting list is so big whereas the available places are so few an increase in the number of places available may be, temporarily, a positive measure concurrent though with an increase in community capacity to resolve such cases as well as an increase in the quality of services offered.

Increasing the capacity of the Ministry for Labour, Social Solidarity and the Family for drafting strategies and organising the social assistance services.

Increasing the social assistance services' human resource numbers as much as their quality.

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